Civil society engagement with the Security Sector in Somalia Presenter: Ali Iman, LPI Somalia Hosted by: GPPAC and IKV Christi Feb, 2014, The Hague

Operational Environment for CSOs  CSOs operate in:  in an insecure environment of a protracted, complex conflicts,  Fully dependent on organised armed actors of various types—and nationalities—for almost all aspects of work.

Who is who in the Security Sector?  AMISOM: the largest operational military contingent, (Its composition and numbers) with an aid delivery role as well, AMISOM itself divided into geographical ‘sectors’.  Somali National Army (SNA) and police: Yet to be fully rebuilt after decades of clan-based warfare Remain loose outfits, Lacking effective central command and control, cohesion and professionalism, Even sporadic infighting

Who is who in the Security Sector? Contd.  Al-Shabaab : Problems of negotiating access with a ‘designated’ armed group Unacceptable operational conditions (MSF, WFP etc)  UNDSS (security/safety of UN and its partners) A key security actor in facilitating UN bodies and NGOs’ work and security management.  Private security firms working as business enterprises and providing armed escorts Neutral, more professional and better paid than other Somali forces and SPUs

Who is who in the security sector? Contd.  Local authorities and clan militias in different south- central regions essential for local acceptability, community mobilisation and physical security  Special Police Units (SPU) in the North (Somaliland and Puntland) UNDP-funded specifically set up to escort and protect NGO/UN staff, compounds and assets Payment issues, though better trained and disciplined than SNS forces

Implications of a Crowded Security Sector  High cost of operations in Somalia Financial cost of working in Somalia multiplies, For one activity, NGOs may have to deal with and gain security cover from several security actors.  Constraints on peacebuilding scope and activities Project design and sometimes even contents have to have armed actors’ ‘buy-in’, which limits the scope of peacebuilding and other development work.

Implications of a Crowded Security Sector Contd.  Neutrality question: Due to the structure of the conflict—multi-layered with local, regional and international dimensions—suspicions and mistrust of both local and international civil society actors (spies)  Physical threats kidnapping, roadblocks, armed robberies, landmines, crossfire etc  Travel restrictions/movement within Somalia Banning of NGO activities/operations Frequent clashes Politicization of humanitarian aids

The role of ‘civil society’?  High level of dependency on multiple security forces  In the absence of a viable central state, how does civil society define its role in a fragmented country controlled by a multitude of armed state and non-state actors?  A thriving private security business—vested interests in the economy of conflict. Is ‘civil society’ part of it? Direct hiring of armed escorts by NGOs

Reasons for SS Proliferation  Failure to reach a broad-based political settlement and general lawlessness: too many armed actors and territorial/clan fiefdoms  Arms proliferation and a culture of violence: repeated failed attempts to form a central Somali government  Humanitarian/development aid as a driver of conflict: direct and indirect payments, misuse or misappropriation of aid goods.  Direct engagement & presence of a large number of regional and international military forces Perceived as foreign and threat to national sovereignty