The Climax of the Cold War Peaceful Coexistence and Its Crises,

Khrushchev and Peaceful Coexistence Embracing the role of nuclear weapons as a political tool: Soviet policy of nuclear brinksmanship Aimed to create a nuclear stalemate in order to: -force American recognition of the Soviet Union as an equal -settle outstanding practical differences -secure peaceful progress of economic competition and national-liberation movements Soviet lack of nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the United States

A New Crisis over Berlin/East Germany Soviet efforts to build up East Germany as a viable state, showcasing success of socialism: - extension of economic aid - GDR acceded to the Warsaw Pact Obstacles to the Soviet program in East Germany: - Walter Ulbricht’s abandonment’s of the “New Course” in favor of rapid construction of socialism. - West German economic miracle. - joint occupation of West Berlin deep within East Germany (one sixth of East German population departed to the West through Berlin between ).

Khrushchev with Walter Ulbright

Soviet ambassador to East Germany on Berlin Pervukhin: “The presence in Berlin of an open and, to speak to the point, uncontrolled border between the socialist and capitalist worlds unwittingly prompts the population to make a comparison between both parts of the city, which, unfortunately, does not always turn out in favor of a democratic Berlin.”

Khrushchev’s ultimatum on Berlin Six-months deadline to resolve all outstanding issues pertaining to the status of Berlin remaining since WWII. Remove western military presence from West Berlin and make it into a free city. Alternatively, the USSR would conclude a peace treaty with East Germany and transfer control of access to West Berlin to GDR. Khrushchev: “Berlin is the testicles of the West. Every time I want the West to scream, I squeeze on Berlin.” Soviet fear of nuclearization of West Germany and pressure from the Chinese to confront the US.

Crisis Politics Dulles leaned toward accepting East Germans as Soviet agents. Resistance from Adenauer and West Germany to any legitimation of East Germany. Khrushchev’s back and forth on Berlin: - silent abandonment of the ultimatum. - conference of foreign ministers in Geneva on Berlin and status of Germany. - Khrushchev’s visit to the US in 1959/Camp David summit. Eisenhower’s new-found willingness to engage in diplomacy with the Soviet Union: - awareness of American nuclear superiority. -abhorrence of pervasive influence of military-industrial complex.

Konrad Adenauer, FRG Chancellor

Khrushchev and Eisenhower in 1959

Revival of Crisis over Berlin Khrushchev’s insecurity that his policy of peaceful coexistence/reaching specific agreements with the United States was not bearing results. U-2 incident/collapse of the Four Power summit in Paris (May 1960) Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s/early 1960s: - ideological differences over foreign policy, i. e. peaceful coexistence vs. confrontational brinksmanship. - de-Stalinization vs. the “Great Leap Forward.” - Chinese chafing over their junior role in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Pressure from the East German leadership on Khrushchev.

U-2

Khrushchev and Mao Zedong in 1959

GDR and East Berlin Acceleration of depopulation of East Germany: - 144,000 left in 1959, 200,000 left in Ulbricht blamed the USSR for GDR’s economic woes, initiated independent contacts with the Chinese. In 1961, Khrushchev renewed the ultimatum to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany without agreement on the status of West Berlin. Soviet agreement with East German proposal to construct a barrier between East and West Berlin: - erection of the Berlin Wall in August of brief standoff between Soviet and American forces.

Vienna Summit, 1961

Khrushchev on the Berlin Wall “We did not want a military conflict. There was no necessity for one. We only wanted to conduct a surgical operation. Besides, if it had not been for the wall, the Soviet Union would have been obliged to send unskilled labor to support the sagging East German economy. We did not want our workers to clean their toilets.”

Kennedy on the Berlin Wall Tough public stance to defend western rights of access to West Berlin – fear of losing credibility. Willingness to accept separation of Berlin and the status quo. “Khrushchev is losing East Germany. He cannot let that happen. If Germany goes, so will Poland and all of Eastern Europe. He will have to do something to stop the flow of refugees – perhaps a wall. We will not be able to prevent it. I can hold the alliance together to defend West Berlin, but I cannot act to keep East Berlin open… The wall is not a nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than war.”