 Why does environmental policy differ across countries?  Why doesn’t science necessarily lead to convergent outcomes?  What is the relationship of science and culture?  How can we tell if one approach is better or worse than another (cf. WTO case study)? 9/28/11ESPP-78 1

ORNL Radioecology Workers Kenyan Rainmaker 9/28/11ESPP-78 2

 Short history  Conflicting values  High scientific uncertainty  Unequal global risks, benefits, and profits  Underdeveloped institutions of responsibility  Lack of democratic accountability 9/28/11ESPP-78 3

 Predictability  Standardization  Ease of implementation  Transparency of rules and reporting  Reliable expertise  High political buy-in  Being right (reputation) 9/28/11ESPP-78 4

 United States  Wide introduction, little or no debate  Organics must be GM free  Britain  National mobilization against GM crops  Uncertainties emphasized; cautious introduction  Germany  Target of Green opposition  New expert commission; strict rules for coexistence, testing, labeling 9/28/11ESPP-78 5

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9/28/11ESPP-78 7 But science does not support the Frankenfood fears of some, particularly outside the United States, that biotech foods or other products will harm human health. Madeleine Albright, 2000

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Product (USA) Process (UK) Program (Germany) Matters of concern Health and safety Local ecologies, livelihoods State-industry complex Basis for policy “Science” Public acceptance Expert judgment Results Lax regulation Rejection Strict regulation 9/28/11ESPP-78 9

9/28/11ESPP Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.

 ‘Risk assessment’ and ‘scientific justification’ are central to the dispute.  Recent scholarship and practice relevant to Panel deliberation.  Evolving practices in the social handling of risk issues.  International legal and policy significance of ‘Biotech Products’ case.  Generic implications for future WTO authority. 9/28/11ESPP-78 11

 Conventional understanding of RA is inadequate and inappropriate - not ‘a science’ or a single ‘methodology’.  GM is low certainty, low consensus. Cf. earlier WTO disputes: high certainty, high consensus.  Judgments and values shape selection of foci for scientific analysis.  Legitimate national differences exist.  Risk is cultural as much as technical. 9/28/11ESPP-78 12

 US:EU differences reflect different circumstances, values and institutional frameworks – all are equally valid in SPS terms.  Importance of public involvement for determining risk parameters.  Hence need to question basis for claim of EU ‘undue delay’.  WTO role should be as procedural reviewer, rather than arbiter on merits of RAs. 9/28/11ESPP-78 13

 Adjudication of competing factual claims – or administrative review of procedural adequacy?  Institutional capacity  ‘Global’ feasibility, based on historical national experiences  Quality control of deliberation as well as analysis  Compatibility with ideas of democracy. 9/28/11ESPP-78 14

 Incorporate relevant recent scholarship, incl. social sciences.  Recognise necessary limitations of science.  Respect public deliberation and cultural context.  Adopt appropriate WTO role – procedural review, rather than substantive evaluation.  Reject ‘undue delay’ claim. 9/28/11ESPP-78 15