“Shifts” in Strategy “Shifts” in Strategy Porcupine Controversy Porcupine Controversy Domestic Politics Domestic Politics Week8 Scenarios and Military Strategies

Readings… William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy.” Naval War College Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Summer 2008) wPDF.aspx?q=373 wPDF.aspx?q=373 York W. Chen, “The Evolution of Taiwan’s Military Strategy: Convergence and Dissonance,” China Brief, Vol. 9, No. 23, November 19, 2009, pp ngle/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35748&tx_ttne ws%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=27fc ngle/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35748&tx_ttne ws%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=27fc163208

In the Strait Taiwanese Shore Mainland Shore The So Called “Shifts“ in Military Strategy: Overview…….. Overview……..

From 1980s~ Peripheral: Mainland Shore Peripheral: Mainland Shore Secondary: In the Strait Secondary: In the Strait Decisive: Taiwanese Shore Decisive: Taiwanese Shore Decisive Battle Outside Territory : Strike the enemy before they can reach us! ~1999

Decisive Battle Outside Territory, How? Decisive Battle Outside Territory, How?

Hard ROC: Taiwan should build a defensive capability that will make us impossible to be scared, blockaded, occupied, or worn down. ~~2008

William S. Murray, Lt. Cdr, (retired) US Naval War College Hard ROC, How? Three Major Procurements (and F16) are all WRONG! I proposes a “Porcupine Strategy” forTaiwan Porcupine Hedgehog

……………… Murray’s proposal is "full of errors," "with serious misunderstanding over the nature of Taiwanese defense," and it would be "a disaster" for Taiwan to introduce the proposed strategy. Decisive Land Battle RUINES Taiwan! Army Chauvinism! For the convenience of U.S. Only!

“ Taiwan would find itself with a better defense for fewer dollars, and the United States would abide by the 17 August 1982 joint communiqu é… “ This … would provide the United States additional time to determine whether intervening in a cross-strait conflict was in its own national interest. ” INDEED US Perspective

“ The strategy would also place the responsibility for Taiwan ’ s defense squarely on its own military. Finally, it would restore the United States to unambiguous compliance with the Taiwan Relations Act. ” INDEED US Perspective

Perhaps most important, the United States could use the interim to deliberate how best to respond. For instance, Washington could withhold the possibility of intervention as leverage to induce Taipei to behave within acceptable parameters, both before and during crises. With the luxury of time, the United States might find ways to assist that avoided direct military conflict with China —for example, supplying critical military material via airlift…, or by shipping oil to Taiwan on reflagged, escorted tankers. INDEED US Perspective

[T]here are many examples of effective employment of diesel submarines in offensive operations. … During a conflict, Taiwan would likely maximize the effectiveness of its submarines by either laying mines against Chinese ports or by attacking with torpedoes or cruise missiles warships leaving their bases. This would provide a much higher probability of success against People ’ s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels than would the defensive tactic of waiting in or around Taiwanese waters for them. INDEED US Perspective

But China would have difficulty determining the origin of any resulting attacks and could attribute them to the United States, particularly any by Mark 48 torpedoes, which were included in the 2001 arms sale offer and a variant of which is carried by American submarines. Such a contingency seems unnecessarily escalatory, especially since there are other, purely defensive and non- escalatory, alternatives that could more quickly offer Taiwan equal or better deterrence and at lesser cost.

The Second Artillery ’ s SRBMs provide the PLA the capability to destroy very large numbers of fixed targets [airfields, harbors for air force/navy] with little or no warning. The Second Artillery ’ s SRBMs provide the PLA the capability to destroy very large numbers of fixed targets [airfields, harbors for air force/navy] with little or no warning. Unless Taiwan were to increase its inventory of PAC missiles hugely, … this would allow over nine hundred of China ’ s 2007 inventory of a thousand SRBMs to arrive unchallenged at their targets. Unless Taiwan were to increase its inventory of PAC missiles hugely, … this would allow over nine hundred of China ’ s 2007 inventory of a thousand SRBMs to arrive unchallenged at their targets. Taiwan can do little to prevent a Chinese bombardment by many hundreds, even thousands, of precision-guided munitions. Taiwan can do little to prevent a Chinese bombardment by many hundreds, even thousands, of precision-guided munitions. Rationale Unstoppable Missiles

Prescription Passive Defense: Absorbing Taipei might have a better payoff, therefore, in seeking not to defeat the incoming warheads but to prevent the attack from achieving its objectives. “These steps would greatly complicate targeting and help deny China air superiority in the aftermath of a major bombardment.”

[O]ne technologically unsophisticated and relatively affordable measure would be to harden key civil and military. [O]ne technologically unsophisticated and relatively affordable measure would be to harden key civil and military. The same logic would further suggest redundancy of critical infrastructure. The same logic would further suggest redundancy of critical infrastructure. Taiwan could complicate China ’ s targeting. Decoys are an excellent and affordable way to do so. Taiwan could complicate China ’ s targeting. Decoys are an excellent and affordable way to do so. Another worthwhile alternative to trying to shoot down ballistic warheads would be making critical targets mobile. Another worthwhile alternative to trying to shoot down ballistic warheads would be making critical targets mobile. Taiwan would do better to invest more in mobile SAM systems …. Taiwan would do better to invest more in mobile SAM systems ….

[T]welve P-3C aircraft will make little or no difference against China ’ s submarine fleet. …, a dozen P-3s can patrol only a fraction of the waters in which China ’ s submarines could operate against Taiwan …. [T]welve P-3C aircraft will make little or no difference against China ’ s submarine fleet. …, a dozen P-3s can patrol only a fraction of the waters in which China ’ s submarines could operate against Taiwan …. It is also erroneous to view diesel submarines as effective antisubmarine systems. … modern submarines are very quiet and exceedingly difficult to detect. It is also erroneous to view diesel submarines as effective antisubmarine systems. … modern submarines are very quiet and exceedingly difficult to detect. …, modern diesel submarines can be detected at ranges varying from two hundred yards to four nautical miles. …, modern diesel submarines can be detected at ranges varying from two hundred yards to four nautical miles. Rationale Useless ASW

China might then consider an extended blockade designed to prevent Taiwan from importing energy. The Republic of China would be acutely vulnerable to such an action, since it imports over 98 percent of its energy requirements. by stockpiling “Taiwan could prepare for a blockade by stockpiling critical energy, food, and medical supplies and planning for rationing and financial contingencies.98 Such preparations would reassure Taiwan’s leadership and citizenry that they could withstand a blockade, thus reducing the likelihood of panic and early capitulation.” Prescription Passive Defense: Sustainment

If Taiwan ’ s navy and air force were neutralized or destroyed by the [missile and air] bombardment, the army would have to repulse or defeat an invasion alone. If Taiwan ’ s navy and air force were neutralized or destroyed by the [missile and air] bombardment, the army would have to repulse or defeat an invasion alone. There are several weapons — all affordable…, if purchased, could greatly improve its chances of doing so. There are several weapons — all affordable…, if purchased, could greatly improve its chances of doing so. Prescription Decisive Land Battle….?

At the top of this list are mobile coastal-defense cruise missiles (CDCMs) … [which] could greatly enhance Taiwan ’ s ability to destroy an invasion force without third- party assistance. At the top of this list are mobile coastal-defense cruise missiles (CDCMs) … [which] could greatly enhance Taiwan ’ s ability to destroy an invasion force without third- party assistance. A second … attack helicopters. A second … attack helicopters. The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is … another weapon … appropriate for Taiwan. The Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) is … another weapon … appropriate for Taiwan. Another hardware recommendation … involves surf-zone sea mines. Another hardware recommendation … involves surf-zone sea mines.

Advanced tanks, artillery, and antitank weapons should not be left off this list of effective hardware, but Taiwan already has sizable stocks of most of them. Advanced tanks, artillery, and antitank weapons should not be left off this list of effective hardware, but Taiwan already has sizable stocks of most of them. None of these weapons would be effective if Taiwan ’ s army were not highly trained or motivated. None of these weapons would be effective if Taiwan ’ s army were not highly trained or motivated. [T]hwarting the ultimate objectives of a PRC attack would be best served by an all- volunteer, highly professional and highly trained army. [T]hwarting the ultimate objectives of a PRC attack would be best served by an all- volunteer, highly professional and highly trained army. Prescription Army Chauvinism….? A-

Slogans Absorbing the Bombardment Repelling the Invasion Sustaining in Blockade Resolute Defense Resolute Defense Effective Deterrence Effective Deterrence Anti Blockade Anti Blockade Joint Interdiction Joint Interdiction Ground Defense Ground Defense PorcupineStrategy HardROCHardROC MURRAYQDR2009NDR2009 Resolute Defense Resolute Defense Effective Deterrence Effective Deterrence Anti Blockade Anti Blockade Joint Interdiction Joint Interdiction Ground Defense Ground Defense Porcupine Strategy is Generally Correct… Adopted?

MissileDefense Submarines ASW aircraft Fighters CDCMs AttackHelicopters MLRS Tanks Sea Mines Slogans PorcupineStrategyHardROC HardROCMURRAYQDR2009NDR2009

Why Not? Could it be possible that… Pervious Direction is Right, but Blocked By Partisan? They will buy them in the future…… after they ASSUME OFFICE… U.S. Friends, Please sell us F16 and Submarines….

We are doing OUR part! True Story: “Garrison State” Compromise of Different Interest

Am I mean? I am fair!

80% 20% See? I am fair!! NOT sustainable given the increasing gap between PRC and ROC

I have a dream!! This may serve army’s Interest… 1981 ROC’s … but It does serve ROC’s Interest!! ……..Democratization and the END of Military Professionalism

Decisive Battle Outside Territory!! We don’t know what exactly you mean, but we can use it as an excuse to buy ships and aircraft… Unusual Elevation… c2.api.ning.com/files/S9-Y81bZRaqQiq20Z4ghOjDtSMoBEYrTey1qkGJKGAroMD-FmV*3Y8u2SuSI8epWBx*6cGmqjmAdfGFBtjntUViACubJj*Tz/AH64D.jpg

Words is yours, but we do our business in OUR way… They have more STARs than us… Hard ROC! Go! Go! Go! Respecting the Custom…

Murray’s proposal is "full of errors," "with serious misunderstanding over the nature of Taiwanese defense," and it would be "a disaster" for Taiwan to introduce the proposed strategy. “Air force leaders and… their navy counterparts… would certainly challenge the implications of this article’s analysis.” R.O.C. Defense Policy Overhaul Blocked by Departmental Selfishness!!