Digital Apollo: Human and Machine on the First Six Lunar Landings (MIT Press, 2007) David A. Mindell Dibner Professor History of Engineering and Manufacturing Engineering Systems M.I.T.

Table of Contents 1.Introduction: Between Human & Machine 2.Test Pilots, Systems, and the Space Age 3.X-15 and Automatic Control 4.Going to the Moon 5.A computer for the Moon 6.Apollo Software 7.Designing a Landing / Simulating 8.Apollo 11 9.Apollo Apollo Landing comparison & discussion 12. The Relevance of Apollo

By the time the Experimental Test Pilot attained his full stature, the “head-shrinkers” and “spasmatologists” had decided that man had reached the limit of his capabilities. There followed the great millennium of concentrated effort to design man out of the cockpit to make room for bigger and better “black boxes.” There was much gnashing of teeth and waving of arms but alas, the day of the “icy B.M.” was upon us. No one wanted the pilot around. SETP Proceedings, 1960, 1960

(Cheatham, 1967)

Landing factors (general) Crew backgrounds / training Prior anomalies Equipment anomalies Comms. problems Prior map quality Navigation uncertainty Crew interaction Landing radar altitude Terrain uncertainties / difficulty / site selection AOS to landing time LP Redesignations Political / program context Workload LEM weight Fuel usage Sun angle Visual recognition at pitchover P64 VFR / IFR Software updates Landing accuracy / feature spec. P66 time/altitude Cutoff time, rates Other?

Missions MissionNotable 11 (Armstrong, Aldrin)1st time, landing long, program alarms, site suitability 12 (Conrad, Bean)Accuracy, pitchover orientation, IFR 14 (Shepard, Mitchell)Abort button workaround, workload, landing radar delay 15 (Scott, Irwin)Pitchover orientation, simulation accuracy, 18 redesignations, IFR, hard landing, cooperation w/ Irwin 16 (Young, Duke)Most nominal, prior anomaly 17 (Cernan, Schmidt)Refined ellipse (valley), Professional identity: Schmidt ‘adequate’ pilot ‘outstanding’ LEM pilot, landing on AGS