What does ‘and’ mean? ‘and’ may be ambiguous: An utterance of a sentence of the form ‘A and 1 B’ is true if and only if ‘A’ is true and ‘B’ is true. An utterance of a sentence of the form ‘A and 2 B’ is true if and only if (i) ‘A’ is true and ‘B’ is true and (ii) the event described in ‘A’ occurred before the event described in ‘B’. An utterance of a sentence of the form ‘A and 3 B’ is true if and only if (i) ‘A’ is true and ‘B’ is true and (ii) ‘B’ is true because ‘A’ is true.
As an example of and 2 we had this conversation: CHANDLER: I, I'm sorry, I uh I already have a roommate. […] EDDIE: No he, he moved out and I moved in. CHANDLER: Well I, I think we'd remember something like that. Eddie’s utterance would hardly be altered if split into two to avoid using ‘and’: EDDIE: No he, he moved out. I moved in. And as an example of and 3 we had this: CHANDLER Well then, how do you know when vegetables are done? PHOEBE Well you know, you just, you eat them and you can tell.
The additional temporal and causal content communicated is part of what is conversationally implicated (that is, PM) and not part of the proposition expressed (that is, PE). But are these explanations correct? ‘And’ appears to carry temporal or causal significance when embedded. Consider these examples: (1) “If Hezbollah set up a checkpoint and three of their fighters were kidnapped, they are incompetent.” (2) “If three of their fighters were kidnapped and Hezbollah set up a checkpoint, they are incompetent.”
Mood and Force: further aspects of meaning 1. We need to refine our hypotheses by distinguishing two aspects of meaning -- what is conveyed and the force with which it is conveyed. 2. Not every aspect of meaning is systematically related to words and their syntactic structure. Since this is true, we shouldn’t assume without argument that any aspect of meaning is systematically related to words and their syntactic structure. So far we have been working with three “ingredients of meaning” i.MS, the meaning of the sentence ii.PE, the proposition expressed by an utterance of the sentence (Grice calls this ‘what is said’) iii.PM, the proposition the utterer meant to convey (Grice calls this ‘what is implicated’) We need to distinguish at least one further aspect of meaning, the force of an utterance. iv. F, the force of an utterance
Force is not the same as mood. Mood is a property of sentences and force is a property of utterances. MoodForce indicativeassertion imperativecommand interrogativequestion optativeexpression of wish
Two Potential Problems [recap] I broke a finger I visited a house Utterances of these sentences appear to convey additional information depending on factors like the profession and status of the utterer. This is a potential problem because the role of such contextual factors is does not seem to be explicable by appeal to conversational implicature. One response is to insist on a distinction between what an utterer communicates and what an audience is likely to infer. The same strategy won’t help to explain the distinction between these sentences, however: Dogs must be carried. Shoes must be worn.
Second potential problem Consider utterances of the following sentences: “I’ve had breakfast” “I’ve had a cold” “I’ve had chickenpox” Contrast Groucho Marx: “I’ve had a great evening. This wasn’t it.” According to the explanation of how communication by language is possible we have developed, knowing the meanings of words together with an understanding of rules of composition and the cooperative nature of conversation enables language users to know what utterers mean to convey. It seems implausible to suppose that we could derive the meanings of these sentences from a claim about the meaning of “I’ve had ____”.
Can conversational implicature explain the difference in what utterers of these sentences convey? If not, our account of meaning and how it makes communication by language is at best incomplete. This doesn’t look like a case conversational implicature could deal with because it’s not a case where what the utterer means to convey varies depending on the conversation. It appears to be a feature of any of the utterances of these sentences. If we nevertheless try to deal with this using conversational implicature we get this: 1. When you utter “I’ve had breakfast”, the proposition you express (PE) is that your life has not been one without breakfast; and 2. by virtue of expressing this proposition you implicate that you have had breakfast today.
We would need to give a deduction of the conversational implicature. Here is what the deduction would look like: 1. There is reason to suppose the utterer is being cooperative and therefore adhering to the Cooperative Principle its Maxims. 2. Unless the utterer thought that _______, her utterance of “I’ve had breakfast” would violate the Cooperative Principle and its Maxims. 3. The utterer thinks, and can reasonably predict that her audience will think, that (2) is true. The problem is working out whether there is anything that can plausibly be put into the blank space.
Compositionality and Complex Nouns Hypothesis 2(i) says languages are compositional. Here’s an encyclopedia definition of compositionality: “A language is compositional if the meaning of each of its complex expressions (for example, ‘black dog’) is determined entirely by the meanings [of] its parts (‘black’, ‘dog’) and its syntax” {Richard, 1998 #802}. We might think that complex nouns work like this: ‘black’ applies to things that are black ‘dog’ applies to things that are dogs ‘black dog’ applies to things which are both black and dogs But of course things are much more complex: Dog sleigh -- pulled by dogs Horse box -- a box for a horse Nuclear train -- who knows (might be nuclear powered, might be carrying something nuclear, might be made from uranium, …)
Sense and reference These statements give the meanings of names: ‘Ida’ refers to Ida ‘David Cameron’ refers to David Cameron But is the reference the meaning? What about ‘George Orwell’ refers to George Orwell and ‘Eric Blair’ refers to Eric Blair or the pair: ‘Clark Kent’ refers to Clark Kent and ‘Superman’ refers to Superman When names co-refer, surely what is said depends on which name you use?