PASSWORD tYPOS and How to Correct Them Securely R. Chatterjee, A. Athalye, D. Akhawe, A. Juels, T. Ristenpart To typo is human; to tolerate, divine.

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Presentation transcript:

pASSWORD tYPOS and How to Correct Them Securely R. Chatterjee, A. Athalye, D. Akhawe, A. Juels, T. Ristenpart To typo is human; to tolerate, divine.

rahul

Password-based authentication systems 3 Password459! Salted, slow cryptographic hash H( Password459! ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ?

Password-based authentication systems 4 Password459! Salted, slow cryptographic hash H( Password459! ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? password459! H( password459! ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? Any typo is rejected Typo-tolerant password checking Allow registered password or typos of it Typo-tolerant password checking Allow registered password or typos of it

Typo-tolerant password checking in industry 5 Password459! pASSWORD459! password459!

We know little about password typos Lots of work on usability of passwords… [Ur et al. 2012], [Shay et al. 2012, 2014], [Mazurek et al. 2013], [Bonneau, Schechter 2014] [Keith et al. 2007, 2009], [Bard 2007], [Jakobsson et al. 2012] … but nothing on typo-tolerant password checking. 1.How can we build a typo-tolerant systems? 2.How much would tolerating typos help users? 3.Does it endanger security? 6

Our work We measure password typos at Dropbox and show they are a huge problem for both users and service providers. We develop approaches to typo-tolerant checking, and show they improve utility with minimal security impact. “Have your cake and eat it too” 7

8 How to do typo-tolerant password checking?

We focus on relaxed checkers 9 Password459! password459! H( password459! ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? H( PASSWORD459! ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? H( Password459! ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? Apply caps lock corrector Apply first case flip corrector … … Slow hash No change in password hash database Can we find a small but useful set of typo correctors?

MTurk password transcription study ,000+ passwords typed by 4,300 workers

Impact of top-3 typos in the real world 11 Instrumented production login of Dropbox to quantify typos NOTE: We did not change authentication policy. 24 hour period: 3% of all users failed to login because one of top 3 typos 20% of users who made a typo would have saved at least 1 minute in logging into Dropbox if top 3 typos are corrected. Allowing typos in password will add several person-months of login time every day.

12 Typo-tolerance will significantly enhance usability of passwords. Can it be secure?

Threat #1: Server compromise 13 Password459! password459! H( password459! ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? H( PASSWORD459! ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? H( Password459! ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? No change in password hash database No change in security in case of server compromise No change in security in case of server compromise

Threat #2: Remote guessing attack 14 password H( password ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? H( PASSWORD ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? H( Password ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ? Apply caps lock corrector Apply first case flip corrector Apply extra char. at end corrector H( passwor ) = “ a5idoiaU7p.. ” ?

Passwords are not uniformly distributed! 300% improvement, only if all checked passwords are equally probable. BUT, humans do not chose random passwords. Good for online guesses, maximizes success probability Good for online guesses, maximizes success probability

Attack simulation using password leaks 16

password Password Security-sensitive typo correction 17 Don’t check a correction if the resulting password is too popular. pASSWOR PASSWORD

Security of checkers with filtering 18 Change in success: 0.02%

19 Typo-tolerant checking can enhance users’ experience for essentially no degradation in security.

pASSWORD tYPOS in one slide 1.Introduce typo-tolerant password checkers Compatible with existing password databases, easy to deploy 2.Study password typos empirically 3% of users fail to login due to correctable, top-3 typos 3. Analyze security of typo-tolerant checkers “Free” correction theorem (In theory) With heuristic, works in practice too 20 Thanks! Thanks! /rchatterjee/mistypography