WHAT HAPPENS TO DETERRENCE AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS DECREASE TOWARD ZERO? INVITED TALK AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY ANAHEIM, CALIFORNIA SIDNEY DRELL STANFORD UNIVERSITY MAY 2, 2011

KEY FACTS ABOUT NEW START TREATY (FEBRUARY 05, 2011) Strategic Reductions 1550 warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as 1 warhead toward this limit Combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments

VERIFICATION AND TRANSPARENCY Measures under the Treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. During the announcement of the New START agreement, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called it “a much more effective transparent verification method that demands quicker data exchanges and notifications.”

2010 NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW Number 1 key objective of United States nuclear weapons policy and posture: Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism

Does getting to zero offer realistic prospects for establishing a safer world – than less radical alternatives for reducing nuclear arms and limiting their spread?

TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR PROGRESS IN THE REDUCING ARSENALS TO LOW LEVELS 1.Accurate and transparent counting of warheads and delivery systems 2.Accurate and transparent determination of stockpiles of weapons useable nuclear material and means of their protection against theft 3.International control and management of the nuclear fuel cycle and civilian power 4.Cooperation and transparency in non-nuclear military issues as deemed important for strategic stability as nuclear weapons receded in importance.

WORLD FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS  No assembled weapons  Any remaining nuclear-weapon components and delivery systems monitored in declared sites  Nuclear infrastructure for stewardship, verification and other activities

NEED FOR AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL ISSUES TO MINIMIZE THE RISK OF BREAKOUT AND INSTABILITY:  What are the necessary elements of an adequate nuclear infrastructure, that is, one with a capacity for timely though limited reconstitution of a nuclear deterrent?  What activities, facilities or weapons-related items should be limited or prohibited?  What can be done to assure early and reliable warning of an attempt at breakout?  What can be done to protect that infrastructure from being destroyed in a pre-emptive strike?

MONITORING  Separate nuclear/non-nuclear elements  Technical demands set by need to uncover covert potential cheating vs. legitimate activities.

OPEN SKIES TREATY (WITH CHRISTOPHER STUBBS) 1955 Eisenhower 1956 U CORONA satellite 1989 Bush 41, Mulroney 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty 1992 U.S. signs OST 2002 Duma ratifies and enters into force June 2002-December 2010: 34 nations ~750 overflights

OPEN SKIES TREATY Unrestricted flight paths 24 hour notice km in 2 days Unclassified and shared data U.S. and Russia quota 42/21 Agreed and verified sensors 30 cm optical (4 bands) 50 cm IR 3 meter coherent, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) Concerns for sensor improvements

UNREALIZED POTENTIAL Modernize and Enhance Sensors and Aircraft  Digitize Cameras  Implement IR and SAR Expand Membership Detect Gases and Particulates  (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty: FMCT)  CTBT verification  NPT verification teeth (T°by IR; activity by SAR)  Lower Altitude Flights (RPV)

 START follow on  Short range, battlefield nuclear weapons  Fissile material production cut-off  International control of the nuclear fuel cycle  Additional verification teeth for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)