Policy reforms and the politics of nature The case of marine fisheries in China and Senegal Gianluca Ferraro and Marleen Brans Public Management Institute Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

2 Introduction Underdal (2000): ‘science and politics in international regimes’ –Intellectual capacity of institutions –Political capacity of institutions Interaction btw science and politics for institutional success Rotmans and Van Hasselt (1996): ‘integrated assessment for informed policies’ –Scientists: what is plausible (knowledge) –State and societal actors: what is desirable (legitimacy) National policies as a result of a science-politics dialogue Since 1990s: sustainable development in international agreements From UNCLOS to A21-CCRF-JPOI (Frestone et al. 2006; Turrell 2004) Hegemony of science in international agreements (Underdal 2000, Blok 2008) / Salience of politics in their implementation

3 Theoretical framework Internationalization of public policies (Bernstein & Cashore 2000) Policy change only through voluntary incorporation (Cicin-Sain et al. 2006)  domestic implementation of international commitments (Young 1999) Regime studies (e.g., Brown Weiss & Jacobson 1998/2000) Europeanization research (e.g., Risse et al. 2001) →Penetration, adaptational pressure, capacity to reform Policy science (Goggin et al. 1990, Winter 2003, Grindle & Thomas 1991) →Policy design, conflicts, resources Domestic implementation: three arenas and three phases → Focus on design and arenas of conflicts

4 Theoretical framework

5 Methodology Qualitative research Process-tracing (Checkel 2005; George & Bennett 2005) Focus on policy tools (Charles 2001; FAO 1997) → Licenses (UNCLOS and CCRF) → MPAs (A21 and JPOI) Cases China (Guangdong Province) Senegal →ECOST project (EU FP6) Data collection: document analysis and interviews International regime (11 interviews) China (13 interviews) Senegal (10 interviews)

6 Licenses. China Fisheries Law 2000 Extension of the EEZ after the ratification of UNCLOS Stricter requirements in line with CCRF Weak enforcement Administrative tolerance of street-level bureaucrats →Informal patron-client relationships Provincial discretion: GDOFA (FL 1986/2000, PAFL2002) Fiscal decentralization Conflict of interests / fisheries resources as a source of public revenue Provincial discretion also in capacity reduction BBP

7 Licenses. Senegal Code of Marine Fisheries 1987 Extension of the EEZ after the ratification of UNCLOS Licenses on artisanal fishers in 2005 Perception of the crisis →Failed reform with CMF1998 (political weight of artisanal fishers) Weak enforcement Administrative tolerance of inspectors Political salience of artisanal fishers (no capacity reduction initiatives)

8 Marine protected areas. China Marine Environmental Protection Law 1982 Delay in implementing measures: Measures on the Management of Marine Nature Reserves (1995) / SOA Perception of crisis + UNCED → MPAs in China Agenda 21 and China Ocean Agenda 21 Bureaucratic conflicts on the allocation of competences (SEPA/SOA)  –Delay in the revision process: MEPL 1999 –No implementing acts by 2009  inadequate design Decentralization of MPAs’ management Provincial priorities: economic development Outcome: limited number of MPAs and weak management

9 Marine protected areas. Senegal No ‘marine protected areas’ in primary legislation Designation of 5 MPAs by Presidential Decree (2004) Political commitment to Johannesburg + perception of crisis : Ministry of Environment, Directorate of National Parks 2008: shift to Ministry of Maritime Economy  Unclear ‘machinery’ [A new Directorate for MPAs?] Incomplete execution Periodical reshuffling of competences (‘la valse des compétences’) Patron-client relationships and political pressures Ambiguity and weak enforcement  non open opposition from fishers, but violations Outocome: success only in 1 MPA

10 Discussion 1.Escalating opposition –Enactment → Role of crises (internal push + international pull) –Execution and enforcement as delicate phases → Change becomes visible.. Richardson (1997) → Relevance of policy design and adaptational pressure 2.Institutional incompatibility –Gradualism vs. Innovation → Time as a scarce resource → Crises and punctuations for change –Informal institutions (Zakane 2008) → Tradition for small-scale fishers (Castilla & Defeo 2005) → ‘Institutional bricolage’ (Cleaver 2003)

11 Discussion 3.Tools, phases, and arenas –Licenses (regulations) Enforcement, clientelism, and administrative tolerance China: conflict of interests Senegal: political weight in the enactment –Marine protected areas (direct government) Execution, vague design, and bureaucratic conflicts China: provincial discretion Senegal: personal gain

12 Conclusion. Science and politics Any change envisaged faces the possible reaction of multiple interests Such interests are located at various levels and in several arenas Oppositions emerge mainly during the phases of execution and enforcement Opposition is stronger when a high level of change is required by international provisions Diverging positions can have potential disruptive effects Ecological considerations and socio-economic viability of policy initiatives Influence of science at the domestic level, too

13 Gianluca FERRARO, Prof. Dr. Marleen BRANS Public Management Institute Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Parkstraat 45/Bus 3609, 3000 Leuven (Belgium) / Thank you Contact details