Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Minimizing the Production and Use of Highly Enriched Uranium Miles A. Pomper James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Why does HEU Matter? Both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium key materials for nuclear weapons HEU easiest fissile material for a terrorist to make into a nuclear weapon ▫Not a dirty bomb, but actual nuclear weapon Can use in a simple, gun-type bomb (ie. no implosion device) Gun-type bomb was used in Hiroshima

Department of Homeland Security briefing: For an IND, an adversary requires three things: 1. A sufficient quantity of weapon usable nuclear material  We do not believe terrorists can enrich uranium or breed Plutonium 2. A gun or implosion system design  The information is out there (so is misinformation) 3. Construction  A small team of qualified individuals could probably do it, given technical expertise, operational capability Source: “Nuclear Smuggling,” Department of Homeland Security Nuclear Assessment Program, Nuclear_Smuggling_-_Zachary_K.pdf

Civilian and Naval HEU Can = Bomb-Grade Uranium

How Much HEU Is Needed? Critical mass as function of uranium enrichment (with a beryllium reflector) Source: Alexander Glaser, Frank Von Hippel, Arms Control Today, January 2006  “Weapons-grade” uranium is not required  Hiroshima bomb employed 80% enriched uranium  The uranium targets used to produce Tc-99m are up to 93% enriched

NON WEAPONS USE FOR HEU ANNUAL USE WORLDWIDE (KG) NAVAL PROPULSION3100 (1900 U.S.) RESEARCH REACTORS750 MEDICAL ISOTOPES40-50 TOTAL~3900 = almost 160 nuclear weapons Non-Weapons HEU Can = Bomb-Grade Uranium

HEU in the Communiqué of the Nuclear Security Summit The participating states: “encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel and minimization of use of highly enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible.” Recognizes conversion and minimization as goals, but language is very mild, no benchmarks for progress

Commitments on HEU at the Nuclear Security Summit (1) Some states made concrete commitments or “house gifts” at the nuclear security summit Canada ▫Returning spent HEU fuel from its medical isotope reactor to the U.S. ▫Funding HEU removals from Mexico and Vietnam Kazakhstan ▫Converting one HEU research reactor (of three) and eliminating remaining HEU Mexico ▫Converting one HEU research reactor (of three) and eliminating remaining HEU

Commitments on HEU at the Nuclear Security Summit (2) Ukraine ▫Removing all HEU by 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, half to be removed by end of Vietnam ▫Converting only research reactor to LEU Belarus* (not at Summit, but Dec 2010) ▫Pledged to ship total stock of 170 kilograms of fresh HEU, 40 kg of which is weapons-grade

Limits to HEU policy at the Nuclear Security Summit The communiqué, work-plan, and national statements on HEU ▫ important as a statement of value ▫ elevate importance of HEU minimization, reactor conversion BUT: No collective legal commitment by states No incentive for collective progress No timelines Some key states didn’t attend summit such as Belarus Others made weak or no commitments, ie. Russia

What needs to be done?

The key outlier: Russia Russia has repatriated more than 35 shipments of spent and fresh HEU, almost 1500 kilograms But done very little on its own reactors—has largest stocks of civilian HEU in the world ▫Estimated at up to 30 tons but no clear numbers ▫Russia recently announced that it has closed five research reactors that used HEU ▫But has 16 research reactors (including 11 civilian reactors) + critical assemblies using HEU ▫Two critical assemblies at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk alone were reported to hold 8.7 tons of uranium with enrichment of 36 % and 90 % US and Russia agreed last year to carry out feasibility studies on converting six reactors from HEU to LEU. Technical feasibility is not in doubt, what is in doubt is Russian will to move forward Efforts to convert HEU to LEU have been stymied by : ▫ Russian legislators fearful of a commitment to an expensive enterprise ▫ Russian scientists who fear a decline in research productivity ▫Technical problems ▫Economic and administrative incentives

Another Challenge: Belarus Has total stock of 170 kilograms of fresh HEU, 40 kg of which is weapons-grade  25 kg needed for nuclear weapon Last fall, shipped 44 kg of 45 % HEU to Russia + 41 kg of such spent Pamir fuel Rest of weapons grade material to be shipped next year (Dec 10 agreement) Big question: Will Lukashenko keep promise?  Deterioration in relations with West since late December elections

Medical isotope production: Switching from HEU to LEU? Positive development: In August 2010, U.S. received its first commercial shipment of medical isotopes produced using LEU fuel and targets, from South Africa Not so positive development: Russia plans to export Mo-99 isotopes to fill in shortages in production but using HEU Kiriyenko: LEU-based production the goal but need to ensure market capability ▫Suggests timeline is needed for conversion ▫Are incentives needed to ensure move to LEU?

Additional Challenges to Conversion 1.Widespread and often misplaced scientific concern about decline to research productivity  Post-conversion results don’t appear to bear out results  More study needed of high-flux reactors 2.Fast reactors  Some countries use HEU as seed fuel for fast reactors  How about ROK?  Recent MIT study indicates not necessary, can use LEU.  Some highly difficult technical challen ges  i.e FRM II in Germany

Until Conversion: HEU Management Guidelines (1) Plutonium Management Guidelines developed almost 2 decades ago  Voluntary measure  9 countries drafted and subscribe to them: NWS, Japan, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerland  Reaffirm states commitments to existing obligations  Safeguards, Safety, Security  Pledge to have national strategies for plutonium management  New commitments to transparency  Controls over international transfers.

Until Conversion: HEU Management Guidelines (2) No HEU management guidelines in effect US, France, with support from CNS have been working on guidelines for some years Guidelines cover many of same areas but details are quite different  Different uses of material  Different relevant quantities  Important questions to resolve France chairing a working group preparing for summit on this issue  Has prepared Non –Paper (has support from US)  Looking for potential voluntary agreement among supportive states as early as end of this year (INFCIRC). Management, or elimination ?

Next Steps: 2012 Nuclear Security Summit and beyond The United States, ROK and others should encourage states to build on the 2010 commitments Should support adoption of HEU guidelines (or adopt them)  Some strains over process for drafting/approval Should support states voluntarily adopting HEU code of conduct  Ultimate elimination vs. management Should consider adding to agenda a commitment to the phase out of HEU in the civil sector by 2020 or at least a collective date for ending HEU-based medical isotope production. Could offer financial and expert support for: ▫Further research reactor conversion, consolidation, and downblending ▫Further repatriation of HEU ▫Establishing cooperative regional research reactor centers ▫Coordinated reporting on research reactors and HEU holdings, to be compiled in an improved IAEA database ▫More support for IAEA Nuclear Security Fund ▫Scientific panel to look for potential reductions in fissile material and high-risk radioactive sources