مهندسي سيستم‌هاي تجارت الکترونیکی Electronic Commerce System Engineering (ECSE) رشته مهندسي فناوري اطلاعات- گرايش تجارت الکترونیکی دوره کارشناسی ارشد حضوری

Fatemeh Hendijanifard

 Definition  Different Approaches  Properties desired from a combinatorial auction mechanism  Bidding Languages  Related works

 An auction is a mechanism to allocate a set of goods to a set of bidders on the basis of their bids.  Combinatorial auctions are those auctions in which bidders can place bids on combinations of items, called “packages,” rather than just individual items.

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 combinatorial auctions  multi-object auctions  Multi goods auctions  package auctions  bundle auctions

 Resources  Single item or multiple items  Market structure  Forward auction  Reverse auction  Double auctions or Exchange

 Preference structure  Bid structure  Matching supply to demand  single-sourcing  multi-sourcing  Information feedback  direct mechanism such as a sealed bid auction  indirect mechanism such as an ascending-price auction

 Sequential auctions  Parallel auctions  Combinatorial auctions  {A},{B},{C},{A,B},{A,C},{B,C},{A,B,C}  Complementarity  Substitutability

 Items may be grouped as bundles  => Takes into considerations the dependencies between the items.  => Greater economic efficiency  Allowing bidders more fully to express preferences often leads to improved economic efficiency

 No Bidder is made worse off by participating  Seller Maximum Expected Revenue

 Efficiency  value of all the winners is maximized  Individual rationality  every agent gains a non-negative utility by being a participant in the mechanism.  Budget balance  Budget balance ensures that the auctioneer or the exchange does not make losses (positive revenue)

 Incentive compatibility  bidding their true valuations for the goods  Solution stability  Revenue maximization or cost minimization  Low transaction costs  No delay  Real-time answer  Efficient determination algorithm  Fairness

 Atomic bids  OR bids  XOR bids  OR-of-XOR bids  XOR-of-OR bids

 Winner determination problem  CAP  Iterative combinatorial auctions  Combinatorial exchanges

 Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions  Truthful mechanism design via linear programming  Super solutions for combinatorial auctions  Item pricing for revenue maximization in combinatorial auctions  Combinatorial auction design

 FCC spectrum allocation  Electronic procurement  Bandwidth exchanges  Logistics and transportation  Supply chain formation  Distributed resource allocation

 Combinatorial Auctions can lead to higher economic efficiency  Practical Combinatorial Auctions are hard to implement with compliance to the truth revelation principle

 Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg

mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction bidding and efficiency issues computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue implementation and methods of testing the performance of combinatorial auctions, including simulation and experiment. four important applications: airport runway access, trucking, bus routes, and industrial procurement

  Introduction to Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg  Combinatorial auctions for electronic business, Y NARAHARI1 and PANKAJ DAYAMA2

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