Sign Ordinances – Reed v. Town of Gilbert Permit required to get a sign unless fell into 1 of 19 exemptions:  Political - temporary sign which supports candidates for office or urges action on any other election matter  Up to 32 feet square/erected any time before election but taken down w/in 10 days/unlimited number/ can be put in public way  Ideological - communicates a message or ideas for noncommercial purposes and doesn’t fall into another category  Up to 20 feet square/no time duration/unlimited number/ can be put in public way  Temporary Directional - directions to qualified events  no greater than 6 feet in height and 6 square feet in area/up to 12 hours before, during and 1 hour after event/placed only with property owner’s permission & originally not on public way/on 4 signs allowed

Content Discrimination Analysis  How does the majority find that this law is NOT content-based?  9 th Cir focuses on viewpoint (maybe SM) neutrality within categories of SM carved out – sign ordinance is FACIALLY SM-based with exceptions – the question is do we care?  Does the majority’s tailoring analysis undermine its content- neutrality analysis?  What is it’s reasoning for why the city can differentiate between temporary directional signs and political and ideological signs?  Does it have to do with aesthetics? Traffic safety?  Can we have sign ordinances that don’t distinguish subject matters re signs? Should courts treat them differently?

Permitting requirements in public forums Permitting schemes requiring speakers to apply for permission ahead of time can be prior restraints but are valid under certain circumstances. Circumstances under which they are not valid:  If they vest unlimited discretion in the licensor to permit/deny speech (Lovell )  If they expressly allow official to discriminate based on content (unless content is w/in a low value speech category – e.g., obscenity. Even then, there are strict procedural protections & rights of appeal). Circumstances when such schemes are valid:  If they are based on neutral concerns (e.g., traffic safety, public order) and involve only considerations of time, place and manner. (Cox v. New Hampshire)  Cities can charge nominal fees to defray expenses. They cannot link those fees/expenses to costs associated with policing particular events due to “security” concerns related to protestors’ message (Forsyth Co.)

Permitting schemes in application  Does the ordinance in the problem in the book satisfy the court’s requirements – either facially or as applied (p. 170)?  How does the Asheville ordinance improve on the problems with that ordinance?  Does it still have problems?  Do we like permits at all - what is lost from a free speech perspective with a permit system? Does that argue against them in all situations?