What's the state of South Sudan? A critical review of state building in Southern Sudan

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Semi-Autonomy for South Sudan 2005 Elections and census 2009/10 Referenda for secession 2011 Where are we now?

Historical trajectory of an independent South Sudan A need to secede? Development of slavery Turkiyya : Mahdiyya : Condomoninium Rule Colonial Rule: fostering difference Religion : Education : Economic Development The Sudanisation Process – Further exacerbating of difference

Historical trajectory of an independent South Sudan Secession Vs Unity The Rebels part 1: The Anya-Nya 1 st Civil War 1955 – 1972 The Rebels part 2: Anya-Nya and the SPLM/A 2 nd Civil War 1983 – 2005 SPLM factionalism and reconciliation 1992 – : A Comprehensive Peace?

Liberal Peace A liberal consensus? Post-Cold War and the End of History? Bridging good governance and conflict resolution Embedded liberal norms in the CPA – Democratisation – Marketisation

Liberal Peace Democratisation Limitations in the CPA – limited representation of political groups – Propensity towards authoritarianism in event of secession April 2010 SPLM polls 93% of southern vote Democratic transition vulnerable to ethnic divisions

Liberal Peace Marketisation Primitive accumulation by violent means Threats to small landholders and food security Risks of resource abundance and export market dependency Un equal barriers to markets Exacerbating economic inequalities

Strong State Transition Strong institutions precede democracy – Established borders – Central state formation War and violence conducive to state formation Conflictual, but necessary for political economic transitions International community's role in adaptation form wartime economies to peaceful development Potential for violence within these political tensions

Strong State Legitimate Rule SPLM/A to Government of South Sudan (GoSS) Ethno-religious nationalism Public goods, social contracts and taxation Elections as platform for legitimacy Recognition from external power-holders and the international community Establishing a monopoly of violence

Strong State Lack of monopoly of violence Sharp rise in intra-southern violence in 2009 Allegations of Khartoum fuelling this violence Reflecting failures of SPLM/A disarmament exercises and authority to impose ceasefires

Strong State Establishing a monopoly of violence Disincentive for violence – Promoting economic interdependence Political coercion and integration – Participation of factions and elites in GoSS – Combining armed forces within national army Limits? – Implications for suppression and corruption? – Too strong a state, creeping authoritarianism?

Challenges for Civil Society Extreme circumstances Violence undermining civil society Crises management rather than infrastructural growth Dependency upon foreign aid Imported models of development Domesticisation of international norms Centralised Governance Little integrated into the formal civil society sector

Restrictions on civil society organizations GoSS approval required for of all projects Restrictions on voluntary work Adapting international models into state control Effects for civil society Limited input on key political issues Imposing socio-economic models onto communities International structures translated through local power apparatus Example of illiberal outcomes of liberal internationalism Challenges for Civil Society

Conclusions CPA reforms are an enormous undertaking for a six year timeframe, so potentially destabilizing States with such unstable distributions of power could simply be allowed to fail, non-intervention holds serious implications Potential regional instabilities Abyei: conflict between SPLM/A and NCP over oil revenue and borders (separate referendum) Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile: realignment of allegiances between North and South (settled through 'popular consultations')

Proposals Slow domestically led timetable of assistance that does not overwhelm the economy or state institutions Monitored and stable return of displaced Southern Sudanese from the north and neighbouring countries Prepare for further refugee flows and humanitarian crises Public regulation of land distribution and investment Build up accountable and transparent Structures for international actors implementing CPA for June 2011

“… barring war, famine or genocide – and all are possibilities – in 10 months this sweltering malarial shantytown [Juba] will become the world’s newest capital city in the world’s newest country, South Sudan…. [aid workers] have coined a new term to describe its unique status: pre-failed state.” Alex Perry, Time Magazine, March 2010 “This [the CPA] is the best Christmas and New Year’s gift to the Sudanese people, to our Region and to Africa for With this peace agreement we have ended the longest war in Africa, 39 years of two wars since August 1955 out of 49 years of independence, and if we add the 11 years of Anyanya-2 war, then Sudan had been at war within itself for 50 years, which covers the whole of its independence period. With this peace agreement we have brought half a century of war to a dignified end. With this peace agreement there will be no more bombs dropping from the sky on innocent children and women. Instead of the cries of children and the wailing of women and the pain of the last 21 years of war, peace will bless us by once more hearing the happy giggling of children and the enchanting ululations of women who are excited in happiness for one reason or other.” John Garang, SPLM leader, 2005