12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 1 LHC Beam Loss Monitor Realisation LHC Machine Protection System Review.

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Presentation transcript:

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 1 LHC Beam Loss Monitor Realisation LHC Machine Protection System Review

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 2 LHC Beam Loss Monitor  BLM Overview  Tunnel  Tunnel Card (BLMCFC)  Frameword for Transmission  Failsafe Tunnel System  Surface  Surface Card (BLMTC)  Transmission Check & Tunnel Status  Quench Level Thresholds  Real-Time Analysis of Data  Combiner Card (BLMCOM)  Failsafe Surface System  Reliability Study

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 3 BLM Overview Design, implementation and testing of an acquisition system that measures the particle loss rate. Main components of the system: 3700 Detectors Current to Frequency Converters (CFCs) Analogue to Digital Converters (ADCs) Tunnel FPGAs: Actel’s 54SX/A radiation tolerant. Communication links: Gigabit Optical Links. Surface FPGAs: Altera’s Stratix EP1S40 with 780 pin.

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 4 Tunnel Card (BLMCFC) Design Criteria Keypoints: Radiation Environment  Radiation Tolerant Devices available  Actel SX/A family (54SX32A)  Qualification/Irradiation tests Not very complicated digital part design but  Triple modular redundancy (TMR)  8 channels Large Dynamic Range  Current-to-Frequency Converter  Analogue-to-Digital Converter 208pin PQFP

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 5 Tunnel Card’s Design Choices Basic components used: Off-the-shelves Current-to-Frequency Converter (x8)  Irradiation tests at cyclotrons of Lauvain and PSI Actel FPGA (54SX32A) (x1)  208 pin  32,000 LE  One-time-programmable  Redundant Inputs  Triple counter inputs  Redundant outputs  Double 16bit data bus  Double 4bit control bus CERN Custom ASICs A/D Converter AD74240 CMOS (x2)  Quad 12bit  40Ms/s  Parallel output Line Driver LVDS_RX CMOS (x6)  8 LVDS to CMOS line receivers Temperature Sensor DCU2 (x1)  12 bit output GOL (Gigabit Optical Link) (x2)  Analogue parts needed to drive the laser.  Algorithm running that corrects SEU.  8b/10b encoding.  16 or 32 bit input.  Error reporting (SEU, loss of synchronisation,..) Part NameIntegral Dose (KGy)* C/F Converter 0.5 ACTEL 3.2 AD LVDS_RX 10 DCU2 10 GOH 3.14 Table: Radiation dose withstood by component without error. Figure: CFC card top view. * For 20 years of nominal operation it is expected to receive around 200 Gy.

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 6 Frameword for Transmission Formatting of the frameword for transmission (256 bits) Transmission of frameword every 40μs.  The data rate must be high enough to minimise the total latency of the system. Redundant optical link  In order to increase the reliability and the availability of the system. CFC(1) 8bit ADC(1) 12bit CFC(2) 8bit ADC(2) 12bit … CFC(8) 8bit ADC(8) 12bit Start 16bits Card No. 16bits Frame ID 16bits Status 16bits Counter + ADC Data 72bits + 96bits CRC-32 32bit Transmitted Codeword Data

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 7 Mezzanine Cards  Redundant transmission  High radiation tolerance  > 3 KGy  800 Mbps  Data 640 Mbps  8bit/10bit encoding  4 optical diodes  4 TLK (Texas Instruments) transceivers  8bit/10bit decoding  Synchronisation  Clock extraction  1MB non-volatile RAM  Programmable either via FPGA or RJ45

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 8 Steps taken for a Failsafe Tunnel System To ensure Ionisation Chamber connection:  Modulation Tests  Tests initiated when no beam present.  Sine wave checks the connection and the ADC.  Rectangular wave checks the connection and the CFC. To ensure CFC card correct operation:  Constant Current  A current (~10pA) is applied constantly.  Status monitor  High tension check.  Temperature To minimise SEU:  Radiation Tolerant Components  Custom ASICs,  No Configuration Data,  Radiation Qualification.  TMR (triple modular redundancy)  FPGA design tripled and added voting.  Doubled/Tripled I/Os  Tripled Counter inputs.  Doubled Data and Control outputs.

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 9 Surface Card (BLMTC) DAB64x specifications Stratix FPGA  Vertical Migration to EP1S40 SRAM memories  512K x 32bit Connectors for Mezzanine  2 x 64pin PMC connectors  Provide 3.3V, 5V, GND, and  Connection to 114 FPGA I/O pins. Card bus  VME64x Stratix Device Features Feature EP1S40 LEs 41,250 M512 RAM blocks (32 ×18 bits) 384 M4K RAM blocks (128 ×36 bits) 183 M-RAM blocks (4K ×144 bits) 4 Total RAM bits 3,423,744 DSP blocks 14 Embedded multipliers 112 PLLs 12 Maximum user I/O pins615

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 10 Transmission Check & Tunnel Status Compare CRCs Secondary B Signal (256 bits) S/W & TTL output Check CRC validity DeMux … 8 Truncate extra/redundant bits (leave 160 bits) Status 10-bits Primary A Signal (256 bits) Only CRC (4 byte) Only CRC (4 byte) Signal Select (A or B) Error Check CRC validity Error Reception ______________ _ _ Tx Check & Signal Choice ______________ _ _ Tunnel Status Check ______________ _ _ Format Data ______________ _ _ Signal Select Table CRC32 checkComparison of 4Byte CRCs OutputRemarks AB Error DumpBoth signals have error Error OKDumpS/W trigger (CRCgenerate or check wrong) ErrorOKErrorSignal BS/W trigger (error at CRC detected) ErrorOK Signal BS/W trigger (error at data part) OKError Signal AS/W trigger (error at CRC detected) OKErrorOKSignal AS/W trigger (error at data part) OK ErrorDumpS/W trigger (one of the counters has error) OK Signal ABy default (both signals are correct) At the Surface FPGA:  CRC-32  Error check / detection algorithm for each of the signals received.  Comparison of the pair of signals.  Signal Select block  Logic that chooses signal to be used  Identifies problematic areas.  Tunnel’s Status Check block  HT, Power supplies  FPGA errors  Temperature

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 11 Quench Level Thresholds Threshold values depend on  Beam Energy and  Integration Time (Loss Duration) The acquisition card transmits a value which corresponds to the particles seen over the integration time of 40μs.  Using this values the surface FPGA calculates and keeps 11 more running sums per detector.  The max integration time needed to be observed is 100s.  The intermediate observation points are found by identifying the places where the approximation introduces the minimum fitting error. Figure and error calculations by G. Guaglio

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 12 Real-Time Analysis of Data Running Sums  Multi-point Shift Registers holds data  Successive calculation  100μs-10ms (System A) 5 Running Sums Max. values of the last second  10ms-100s (System B) 6 Running Sums Threshold Table  Threshold depends on energy and a acquisition time.  Unique thresholds for each detector.  Read at system power-on from an external Non-Volatile RAM. Masking Table  Masking of channels is allowed only when safe.  Unique masking table for each card.  Read at system power-on from an external Non- Volatile RAM.

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 13 Combiner Card’s Beam Permit Logic Gianfranco Ferioli

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 14 Combiner Card Arrangement One combiner card per crate Daisy-chained Distributes to all BLMTC cards  Beam Energy  Beam Status Collects from all BLMTC cards  Card running  Maskable Dump  Unmaskable Dump Checks status of all power supplies High Tension Modulation Tests Gianfranco Ferioli

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 15 Steps taken for a Failsafe Surface System To ensure a reliable communication link:  Double (redundant) optical link  CRC-32 error check algorithm  All single-bit errors.  All double-bit errors.  Error detection – four times more characters.  Any odd number of errors.  Any burst error with a length less than the length of CRC.  For longer bursts Pr = * probability of undetected error.  224 bits of data + 32 bits of CRC remainder = 256 bits.  8b/10b encoding  Clock data recovery (CDR) - guarantees transition density.  DC-balanced serial stream - ones and zeros are equal/DC is zero.  Special characters used for control – sync, frame.  256 bits of data are encoded in 320 bits = 64 extra bits. To avoid misplacement of threshold and/or masking table  Card ID  Each tunnel card holds a unique 16bit number  Included with every transmitted frame  Compared with the one loaded together with the tables To avoid loss of data  Frame ID  Surface FPGA checks for missing frames  16bit Frame ID number increments by one and is included at every transmission To ensure recognition of system failures and dump requests  Outputs (Dump signals) from the FPGA as frequency  At a dump request, reset, or failure the transmitted frequency will be altered.  Outputs (Dump signals) from the surface cards are daisy chained  Using the VME backplane as interconnection  Card disconnection and/or failure is immediately recognisable by the Combiner card.

12 April 2005 Christos Zamantzas 16 Reliability Study by G. Guaglio Relative probability of a system component being responsible for a damage to an LHC magnet in the case of a loss  More than 80% from the Ionisation Chamber Relative probability of a BLM component generating a false dump.  ~98% from components that are in the tunnel