PHIL 340: ANCIENT ETHICAL THEORY Ben Hole Winter 2016 Office hours after class.

AGENDA 1. Administrative Stuff / Where we are and what we’re doing 2. Meno 3. Phaedo Jacques- Louis David

WHERE WE ARE AND WHAT WE ARE DOING Week, DateRequired Reading 1, 1/5Syllabus for Phil 340; Euthyphro (recommended) 1, 1/7Apology (all) 2, 1/12Meno (70-86); Phaedo (all) 2, 1/14Republic Book 1 (all); Book 2 ( ) 3, 1/19Republic Book 2 ( ); Book 4 (all) 3, 1/21Republic Book 4 (all); Book 8 (all) 4, 1/26Nicomachean Ethics Book 1 4, 1/28Nicomachean Ethics Book 1-2 5, 2/2Nicomachean Ethics Book 2-3; Book , 2/5Nicomachean Ethics Book 3-4 6, 2/9Nicomachean Ethics Book 4 6, 2/11 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” 7, 2/16Euthydemus ( ); Irwin on the Stoics (PDF) 7, 2/18Stoics (Primary texts excerpts in PDF form) 8, 2/23 Hursthouse, OVE Chapter 9; Annas, “Virtue Ethics: Which kind of naturalism?” 8, 2/25 Driver, “Virtue Theory”; Hursthouse, “Are the Virtues the Proper Starting Place for Morality?" Weeks 9-10 In-Class Conference

REVIEW 1.The Socratic Method (priority of definition, elenchus, and aporia) 2.Socratic Epistemology, Philosophy of Religion and Ethics (Ignorance, Piety, and The Examined Life) 3.The Trial of Socrates Narrative

MENO Priority of Definition:  Meno: “Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in some other way” (70a)  Socrates: “I blame myself for my complete ignorance about virtue. If I do not know what something is, how could I know what qualities it possesses?” (71b) Elenctic Examination of Possible Definitions Aporia (80a-b). Slave-Boy Conversation (82b.ff)

MENO, KNOWLEDGE, AND SOCRATES VS. PLATO Socratic Skepticism? A destructive interpretation of the Socratic method. Now we have innate ideas?

MENO, KNOWLEDGE, AND SOCRATES VS. PLATO Socratic Skepticism? “a first step toward ridding oneself of a false conceit of knowledge, so that genuine knowledge might, somehow, be put in its place. Plato... went beyond Socrates in developing a view about how such knowledge might be gained” (White 1976, cited by Benson 128) This interpretation of Socratic Skepticism has been criticized: a. By criticizing the distinction between Socratic and Platonic dialogues (Shorey 1903, Burnet 1920, and Taylor 1951) b. By criticizing the assumption that the Socratic Method is purely destructive (Irwin, Vlastos, B&S) Benson: “Plato's attitude toward the elenchos in the Meno has not changed. Rather, the Meno suggests that Plato is simply advancing beyond it” (130)

RECONSTRUCT SOCRATES’ ELENCTIC EXAMINATION OF MENO’S CLAIM THAT VIRTUE IS “THE CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE GOOD THINGS” (78C.FF; PAGE 68 IN THE HACKETT) 1.The candidate for the elenchus, C, produces a sincere belief, P... 2.Under questioning, C accepts Q and R (or Q, R, S etc.). 3.Q and R entail not-P. 4.C's commitment to Q and R is sufficiently strong that, faced with the contradictory conclusion, he finds P to be problematic, not Q or R. 5.P is refuted.

“Meno’s Paradox,” or “The Paradox of Inquiry” (Meno 80d-e) 1.Either you know what you’re looking for or your don’t. 2.If you know what you’re looking for, inquiry is unnecessary. 3.If you don’t know what you’re looking for, inquiry is impossible. ___________________________ Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible. Torpedo Fish, 80a.ff

The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno 82b.ff

The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno

The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno

The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno

The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno

The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno

The “Slave-Boy” Example from Plato’s Meno Discussion Question: Did the slave boy learn something new? Theory of Recollection: 80e.ff

RECOLLECTION ARGUMENT P1. We can “learn” certain concepts. P2. Possessing innate knowledge is necessary for our learning these concepts. P3/C2. We possess innate concepts. P3. The theory of recollection is the best theory of how we have innate concepts. C2. We ought to believe in theory of recollection.

PHAEDO

Apology: Socrates on Trial; views on philosophy, knowledge and death Crito : Socrates in prison; he does not value the opinion of the majority; argues for a social contract. APOLOGY & CRITO NARRATIVE

EDITOR’S NOTE “… None of this comports will with Socrates’ description of his philosophical interests in the Apology or with the way he conducts his inquiries in Plato’s ‘Socratic’ dialogues. It is generally agreed that both the Pythagorean motifs of immortality and purification and the theory of eternal Forms that is linked with them in this dialogue are Plato’s own contribution. Indeed, Phaedo’s affinities in philosophical theory go not towards the Socratic dialogues, but to the Symposium and Republic. There is an unmistakable reference to Meno’s theory of theoretical knowledge … as coming by recollection of objects known before birth. But now the claim is made that this recollection is of Forms.” (John Cooper, pg 93-94).

WHY INTRODUCE FORMS? Address Two Central Questions: 1. Metaphysical The Problem of Identity: What makes something what it is? How does it persist in this identity over time? The Priority of Definition. 2. Epistemological How do you know what something is? How do you know that X is X? “Meno’s Paradox,” or “The Paradox of Inquiry” (Meno 80d-e)

THE METAPHYSICAL QUESTION What makes something what it is? How does it persist in this identity over time? The priority of definition.

“I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than it participates in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything.” (100c) FormObject1Object2Object3 SELF-PREDICATION OMA Principle: Whenever we can apply a single term to more than one sensible object, there is a corresponding Form to that sensible object. (100c; also see Rep.596a)

BUT BEAUTY IS WILDLY DISJUNCTIVE ….

SO WHY ARE ALL OF THESE BEAUTIFUL? Self-Predication A thing’s being beautiful consists in, and is explained by, participating in the form of Beauty. X’s being F = X’s participating in F-ness. OMA Principle: Whenever we can apply a single term to more than one sensible object, there is a corresponding Form to that sensible object. (100c; also see Rep.596a)

EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUESTION How do you know what something is? How do you know that X is X? “Meno’s Paradox,” or “The Paradox of Inquiry” (Meno 80d-e)

1.Either you know what you’re looking for or your don’t. 2.If you know what you’re looking for, inquiry is unnecessary. 3.If you don’t know what you’re looking for, inquiry is impossible. ___________________________ Therefore, inquiry is either unnecessary or impossible.

SO HOW CAN WE KNOW SOMETHING? We can only pick out something if we already have an idea of it.

HOW DO WE PICK OUT WHICH ONES ARE TRIANGLES? We must some have some already existing idea of a triangle that allows us to recognize which of these shapes are triangles.

F Plato’s Epistemology: Theory of the Forms metaphysics

F Plato’s Epistemology: Theory of the Forms epistemology

F Plato’s Epistemology: Theory of the Forms epistemology

“I think that, if there is anything beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than it participates in that Beautiful, and I say so with everything.” (100c) FormObject1Object2Object3 THE ONE OVER MANY OMA Principle: Whenever we can apply a single term to more than one sensible object, there is a corresponding Form to that sensible object. (100c; also see Rep.596a)

DISCUSSION Think about someone or something (X) you find beautiful. (A)On the Theory of the Forms, why is X beautiful? (B)On the Theory of the Forms, how do you know that X is beautiful? (C)Does the Theory of the Forms offer satisfying answers? OBJECT TO THE THEORY OF THE FORMS

THE IMPERFECTION ARGUMENT (PHAEDO 74-76) This is both an argument for the existence of forms and an argument for our possession of a priori concepts. Plato bases the argument on (a) the imperfection of sensible objects and (b) our ability to make judgments about those sensible objects. The Basic Idea. We cannot abstract the concept of Beauty from our sense-experience of objects that are beautiful. This is because: (a) We never experience (in sense-perception) objects that are really, precisely, beautiful, and (b) We must already have the concept of Beauty in order to judge the things we encounter in sense-perception to be approximately, imperfectly, beautiful.

THE IMPERFECTION ARGUMENT (74-76) 1.We perceive sensible objects to be F. 2.But every sensible object is, at best, imperfectly F. (That is, it is both F and not F. It falls short of being perfectly F.) 3.We are aware of this imperfection in the objects of perception. 4.So we perceive objects to be imperfectly F. 5.To perceive something as imperfectly F, one must have in mind something that is perfectly F, something that the imperfectly F things fall short of. 6.So we have in mind something that is perfectly F. 7.Thus, there is something that is perfectly F, that we have in mind in such cases. /.: There is such a thing as the F itself, and it is distinct from any sensible object.

WHAT IS THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY? “I am afraid that other people do not realize that the one aim of those who practice philosophy in the proper manner is to practice for dying and death” (64a). Death is the separation of the soul from the body (64c).

THE BODY AS THE SOURCE OF DISCORD “Only the body and its desires cause war, civil discord and battles, for all wars are due to the desire to acquire wealth, and it is the body and the care of it, to which we are enslaved, which compel us to acquire wealth, and all this makes us too busy to practice philosophy.” (66cd)

PHILOSOPHY & OVERCOMING THE BODY 1.The body is an obstacle to knowledge. 2.The soul grasps knowledge. _____________________.: In order to acquire knowledge, we must detach ourselves from our bodies.

WHERE WE ARE AND WHAT WE ARE DOING Week, DateRequired Reading 1, 1/5Syllabus for Phil 340; Euthyphro (recommended) 1, 1/7Apology (all) 2, 1/12Meno (70-86); Phaedo (all) 2, 1/14Republic Book 1 (all); Book 2 ( ) 3, 1/19Republic Book 2 ( ); Book 4 (all) 3, 1/21Republic Book 4 (all); Book 8 (all) 4, 1/26Nicomachean Ethics Book 1 4, 1/28Nicomachean Ethics Book 1-2 5, 2/2Nicomachean Ethics Book 2-3; Book , 2/5Nicomachean Ethics Book 3-4 6, 2/9Nicomachean Ethics Book 4 6, 2/11 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” 7, 2/16Euthydemus ( ); Irwin on the Stoics (PDF) 7, 2/18Stoics (Primary texts excerpts in PDF form) 8, 2/23 Hursthouse, OVE Chapter 9; Annas, “Virtue Ethics: Which kind of naturalism?” 8, 2/25 Driver, “Virtue Theory”; Hursthouse, “Are the Virtues the Proper Starting Place for Morality?" Weeks 9-10 In-Class Conference