Study on The Secure Key-Evolving Protocols Kim Joong Man 20022036

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
1 Introduction CSE 5351: Introduction to cryptography Reading assignment: Chapter 1 of Katz & Lindell.
Advertisements

1 Asynchronous Broadcast Protocols in Distributed System Oct. 10, 2002 JaeHyrk Park ICU.
Network Security Term Project 2002 Fall Network Security Chul Joon Choi Prof. Kwang jo Kim Network Security Term Project (2002 Fall) 발표자 :
Introduction to PKI Seminar What is PKI? Robert Brentrup July 13, 2004.
Lect. 11: Public Key Cryptography. 2 Contents 1.Introduction to PKC 2.Hard problems  IFP  DLP 3.Public Key Encryptions  RSA  ElGamal 4.Digital Signatures.
CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 16 Jonathan Katz.
1 CIS 5371 Cryptography 9. Data Integrity Techniques.
1 Self Protecting Cryptosystems Moti Yung Columbia University/ RSA Labs.
Lecture 19 Page 1 CS 111 Online Symmetric Cryptosystems C = E(K,P) P = D(K,C) E() and D() are not necessarily the same operations.
02/22/2005 Joint Seminer Satoshi Koga Information Technology & Security Lab. Kyushu Univ. A Distributed Online Certificate Status Protocol with Low Communication.
Forward-Secure Signatures (basic + generic schemes)
Tanenbaum & Van Steen, Distributed Systems: Principles and Paradigms, 2e, (c) 2007 Prentice-Hall, Inc. All rights reserved DISTRIBUTED.
The Hierarchy of Key Evolving Signatures and a Characterization of Proxy Signatures Tal Malkin (Columbia Univ.) Satoshi Obana (NEC and Columbia Univ.)
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Celia Li Computer Science and Engineering November 10, 2005.
Lecture 9 Overview. Digital Signature Properties CS 450/650 Lecture 9: Digital Signatures 2 Unforgeable: Only the signer can produce his/her signature.
Key distribution Ján Kotrady. Content: What is key distribution? Key agreement and distribution Basic algorithm – Diffie-Hellman Basic attacks – Man in.
Intrusion Resilience via the Bounded-Storage Model Stefan Dziembowski Warsaw University and CNR Pisa.
Systems Architecture Receiver Anonymity Matthias Füssel, Dennis Schneider June 5, 2007.
CS480 Cryptography and Information Security Huiping Guo Department of Computer Science California State University, Los Angeles 14. Digital signature.
What is in a name? Identity-based cryptography. How public-key crypto works When you use public key cryptography, you can publish a value (public key)
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol
Security of Digital Signatures
Cryptography CS 555 Topic 34: SSL/TLS.
Theft-protected Proprietary Certificates
Golden Linear Group Key Agreement Protocol
Symmetric Cryptography
Cryptography and Network Security
Cryptography Why Cryptography Symmetric Encryption
Cryptography Reference: Network Security
Cryptography Reference: Network Security
Information Security message M one-way hash fingerprint f = H(M)
Public Key Encryption Systems
CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 15
Security.
Public Key Encryption and the RSA Algorithm
Asynchronous Cryptology: Implementations and Applications
Cryptography.
Presented by: Dr. Munam Ali Shah
Information Security message M one-way hash fingerprint f = H(M)
Information Security message M one-way hash fingerprint f = H(M)
Cryptography Basics and Symmetric Cryptography
Public Key Infrastructure
Cryptography Lecture 27.
Topic 30: El-Gamal Encryption
Chapter 3:Cryptography (16M)
9.2 SECURE CHANNELS Medisetty Swathy.
Information Security message M one-way hash fingerprint f = H(M)
Security.
CDK4: Chapter 7 CDK5: Chapter 11 TvS: Chapter 9
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol
Threshold RSA Cryptography
Best Digital Signature Service in Noida. Electronic Record 1.Very easy to make copies 2.Very fast distribution 3.Easy archiving and retrieval 4.Copies.
Cryptography Reference: Network Security
Discrete Math for CS CMPSC 360 LECTURE 14 Last time:
Introduction to Cryptography (1)
Chapter -5 PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND RSA
DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS Principles and Paradigms Second Edition ANDREW S
Lihua Liu† Zhengjun Cao‡
Introduction to Cryptography
Cryptography Lecture 21.
Public Key Encryption Systems
SPIRAL: Security Protocols for Cerberus
Cryptography Lecture 23.
Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
Cryptography Lecture 26.
How to Use Charm Crypto Lib
Lecture 6.2: Protocols - Authentication and Key Exchange II
Presentation transcript:

Study on The Secure Key-Evolving Protocols Kim Joong Man

2 Contents Introduction What is the Key-evolving? Preliminaries Key-evolving encryption scheme Key-evolving signature scheme Previous Work Future Work References

3 Introduction The Key Exposure Problem The exposure of the secret (signing) key is the total break of the system In practice, a more serious threat to security than the possibility of cryptanalysis of the signature scheme itself How to protect Bob’s private key Replace Bob’s public key when his private key is exposed - Not practical since Bob may not be aware of losing his private key Protect Bob’s private key on a secure device - Quite costly Use a threshold scheme to distribute SK - TA’s bear heavy load of computation

4 Our Goal To mitigate damage caused by key exposure Single-machine technique : no distribution of keys No special hardware

5 What is the Key-evolving? (Anderson’s Key-Evolving Paradigm) Break lifetime of scheme into T time periods e.g., 1 period = 1 day; T = 365 PK fixed – important for key management! SK evolves via public one-way function h SK j is deleted after time period j is over Signature is pair ( j,tag ), where j is the time period in which the signature occurred Period 1Period 2Period T ……… SKSK 1 SK 2 …… SK T h h hh

6 Preliminaries Forward-secure The compromise of the current secret key will not compromise previous secret keys Backward-secure The compromise of the current secret key will not compromise future secret keys Key-independent The protocol is both Forward-secure and Backward-secure

7 Key-evolving encryption scheme Key generation algorithm Private key update algorithm Gen (1 k, N ) = ( PK, SK 0 ) Encryption algorithm Decryption algorithm Upd ( PK, SK j-1, j ) = SK j Enc ( PK, m, j ) = Dec ( SK j, ) = m N is the total number of time periods, 1 k is a security parameter j is the current time period

8 Key-evolving signature scheme Gen (1 k, N ) = ( PK, SK 1 ) Secret key update algorithm Verification algorithm Sign ( SK j, M ) = Upd ( SK j ) = SK j+1 If Ver ( PK, M, ) = 1 then accept else reject If Ver ( PK, M, ) = 1 then accept else reject Key generation algorithm Signing algorithm N is the total number of time periods, 1 k is a security parameter sign is the signature of M at the current time period j j+1 is the next time period

9 Previous Work – TT01 Gen (1 k, N ) = ( PK, SK 0 ) P = 2q + 1 Select f(x) ≡ Set up :

10 Previous Work – TT01 Upd ( PK, SK j-1 ) = SK j Enc ( PK, m, j ) = Dec ( SK j, ) = m The decryptor Bob and TA together compute SK j = f(j) from their shares in a secure distributed way Compute and return

11 Previous Work – TT01 Key evolving with TA TA’s together compute SK j at the current time period j Only Bob (decryptor) knows SK j Use the Lagrange interpolation method Communicate via private channel between TA’s and Bob TA 1 …… Bob TA z TA 3 TA 2 Secure channel Compute SK j

12 Future Work Survey the secure key-evolving schemes Analysis of previous schemes Bringing up the problems in key-evolving protocols Modifying in more efficient scheme

13 References [1] R.J.Anderson, “ Two remarks on public key cryptology”, In rump Session Euro-crypt’97 [2] C.F.Lu, S.W.Shieh, “ Secure Key-Evolving Protocols”, RSA 2002 [3] A.J. Menezes, P.C. van Oorschot, and S.A. Vanstone, “Handbook of Applied Cryptography”, BocaRaton, 1997 [4] W.Tzeng and Z.Tzeng, “Robust Key-evolving public key encryption schemes”, Record 2001/009, Cryptology ePrint Archive 2001 [5] J.Katz, “A forward-secure public-key encryption scheme”, Cryptology ePrint Archive Report 2002 [6] M.Bellare, S.K.Miner,” A Forward-Secure Digital Signature Scheme”, Cryptology - CRYPTO '99 Proceedings, LNCS 1666 [7] R.Anderson, Invited lecture, Fourth Annual Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM, 1997