1 Stephen M. Maurer Goldman School of Public Policy IT and Public Policy – Nov. 4, 2004 The New Economy.

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Presentation transcript:

1 Stephen M. Maurer Goldman School of Public Policy IT and Public Policy – Nov. 4, 2004 The New Economy

2 History The Microsoft Case Doctrine: What The Court Said Reading the Legal Tea Leaves Policy Conclusion: Taking Stock

3 1890:The Sherman Act 1911:Standard Oil 1956: AT&T I Network Effects Innovation Issues Relief

: IBM Innovation Relief : AT&T II

: Microsoft I Licensing & Developer Agreements :Microsoft II Explorer & Java Trial, Appeal, Relief Phase

?:Microsoft III (E.C.) Server Market Media Player

7 Subject Matter? No. Defendant Wins Yes. Liability No. Defendant Wins Yes. Defenses & Justifications No. Defendant Wins Yes. Relief No. Defendant Wins Plaintiff Wins Yes!

8 Section 1 “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.” 15 USC § 1. Law Subject Matter? No. Yes.

9 Section 1 Requires Multiple Parties What Does It Mean? Law Subject Matter? No. Yes.

10 Section 2 “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony... Law Subject Matter? No. Yes.

11 Section 2 Does Not Require Multiple Parties What Does It Mean? Law Subject Matter? No. Yes.

12 An Economic Statute? “If we will not endure a king as a political power we should not endure a king over production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life.” -- John Sherman Law Subject Matter? No. Yes.

13 An Economic Statute? “Power that controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial oligarchy.” -- William O. Douglas Law Subject Matter? Yes. No.

14 An Economic Statute? “Maximizing Consumer Welfare” A Determinate Standard? “Fostering Competition” Early Theories – Modern Approach Law Subject Matter? Yes. No.

15 M.C. Demand Law Subject Matter? Yes. DWL No.

16 An Economic Statute? “Fostering Competition” A Microeconomic Concept Competition vs. Innovation Law Subject Matter? Yes. No.

17 Schumpeterian Competition “We decide this case against a backdrop of significant debate among academics and practitioners over the extent to which ‘old economy’ §2 monopolization doctrines should apply to firms competing in dynamic technological markets characterized by network effects.” [11] Tea Leaves Subject Matter? Yes. No.

18 Network Externalities The Entrenchment Issue The Externalities Issue Subject Matter? Yes. Tea Leaves No.

19 The Entrenchment Issue “Indeed, there is some suggestion that the economic consequences of network effects and technological dynamism act to offset one another, thereby making it difficult to formulate categorical antitrust rules absent a particularized analysis of a given market” Subject Matter? Yes. Tea Leaves No.

20 The Entrenchment Issue Business as Usual? Guidance vs. Case-by-case Rules. Subject Matter? Yes. Tea Leaves No.

21 The Externalities Issue Does the Court “Get It”??? Policy Subject Matter? Yes. No.

22 Copyright vs. Antitrust (Innovation vs. Competition) Microsoft’s argument that copyright allows it to prevent people from changing the desktop “... is no more correct than the proposition that one’s personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability” [p. 33] Law Subject Matter? Yes. No.

23 Theories Monopolizing PC Market [§2] Attempted Monopoly of Browsers [§2] Tying Windows to Explorer [§1] Liability Yes. Law No.

24 Section 1 Rule of Reason Defining The Market Balancing Positive and Negative Effects Per Se Rules Price Fixing Geographic Divisions Boycotts etc., etc. … Liability Yes. Law No.

25 Tying Elements: (1) Two separate products (2) Market power in the tying product (3) Consumers have no choice in the tie (4) Substantial volume of commerce is affected. Law Liability No. Yes. Section 1

26 Tying Traditional rationale: Leveraging Monopoly An Incoherent Doctrine? Law Economics Law Liability No. Yes. Section 1

27 Tying Microsoft II Rationale: Consumer choice. - Efficiency of integration; “Novel, purported efficiencies” [p. 79]. Liability No. Yes. Law Section 1

28 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2 Monopolization of the PC Market Elements 1) Market Power + 2) Anticompetitive Conduct

29 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2 Monopolization: Market Power = Market Share + Barriers to Entry

30 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2 Monopolization: Market Power Defining Market Share What is the Market? Should Middleware Count? Defining Barriers to Entry The Applications Barrier

31 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2 Monopolization Anticompetitive Conduct: 1. OEMs and Control of the Desktop What’s the Alternative?

32 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2 Monopolization Anticompetitive Conduct: 2.Integrating IE and Windows Taking IE Off Add/Remove List Commingling Files Overriding User Choice of Browser

33 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2 Monopolization Anticompetitive Conduct: 3. Agreements With Internet Access Providers License Restrictions Free Tool Kits Are OK

34 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2 Monopolization Anticompetitive Conduct: 4.Agreements With Independent Software Providers Browser Defaults

35 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2 Monopolization Anticompetitive Conduct: 5.Threatening Apple Courts Understand Threats...

36 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2 Monopolization Anticompetitive Conduct: 6.Java Incompatible Java is OK! Deception & Threats to Intel What’s the Alternative?

37 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2/Attempted Monopolization (Browsers) (1) Anticompetitive conduct + (2) Specific intent to monopolize + (3) Dangerous probability of success. -

38 Liability No. Yes. Law Section 2 Attempted Monopolization Dangerous Probability of Success - What barriers to entry?

39 Section 1/Tying: “Enmesh[ing] the courts in product design decisions.” [p. 80]. Defenses & Justifications No. Yes. Law

40 Section 2/Monopolization: Copyright Defense: “Drastic Variation” “Stable and Consistent Platform.” No Principled Distinction... Defenses & Justifications No. Yes. Law

41 Section 2/Monopolization: Bundling No Justification for Commingling or Taking IE Off Add/Remove List “Valid Technical Reasons” for Overriding Browser Choice Defenses & Justifications No. Yes. Law

42 Section 2/Monopolization: Agreements With IAPs & ISVs “No Justification” Defenses & Justifications No. Yes. Law

43 Is Antitrust Futile? Abbott Lipsky Cell Phones Relief Yes. Law No.

44 Relief Yes. Law Any girl can be glamorous. All you have to do is stand still and look stupid.” Hedy Lamarr ( ) No.

45 Analog  Digital  Frequency Hopping AMPS  GSM  CDMA Relief Yes. Law No.

46 Designing Relief Injunctions Criminal vs. Civil Constitutional Requirements Damages Relief Yes. Law No.

47 Structural Relief 1.Isolating the Monopoly ATT IBM Microsoft 2.Innovation Effects? 3.Complementary Monopolies Relief No. Yes. Law

48 Bell Operating Companies AT&T Long Distance Western Electric & Bell Labs AT&T Relief Yes. Law No.

49 AT&T I Relief No. Yes. Law

50 Bell Operating Companies AT&T Long Distance Western Electric & Bell Labs AT&T II Relief No. Yes. Law

51 CPU Software Printers Tape Drives Service Disk Drives Peripherals IBM Relief No. Yes. Law

52 Microsoft Relief No. Yes. Law

53 Relief No. Yes. Policy Ordinary Case: The Shoe Monopolist

54 Relief No. Yes. Policy Complementary Goods: The Left Shoe Monopolist

55 Relief No. Yes. Policy Complementary Goods: The Left Shoe Monopolist

56 Designing Relief District Court (Judge Jackson): Did Microsoft Win ? Relief Yes. Law No.

57 Designing Relief District Court (Kotelly-Kolar) Proportionate Relief The Middleware Fight The Clones Issue? Relief Yes. Law No.

58 Designing Relief The EC Fines Compulsory Licensing Opening The Interface Unbundling Media Player Relief Yes. Law No.

59 Relief No. Yes. Policy Criminal Sanctions Modern Tactics Abbot Lipsky General Electric & The “Phases of the Moon”

60 Innovation vs. Competition Network Effects Schumpeterian Competition Valuing Network Externalities Interfaces Market Imperfections – The Desktop Technical & Business Judgments Appropriate Relief