Traceability & isolation evolution Vincent BRILLAULT, CERN/EGI-CSIRT GDB Mars 2015, Amsterdam.

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Presentation transcript:

Traceability & isolation evolution Vincent BRILLAULT, CERN/EGI-CSIRT GDB Mars 2015, Amsterdam

Why traceability and isolation ? Current situation What’s “new” “glExec” Black boxes The future? Vincent Brillault, CERN/EGI-CSIRT2 Overview GDB Mars 2015, Amsterdam

For security, but not only! Traceability: Identify, reconstruct & understand – Security incidents: catch bad users, fix vulnerability – Issues/bugs/strange behaviors Isolation: – Prevent credential theft & impersonalization – Prevent jobs from harming each-other Vincent Brillault, CERN/EGI-CSIRT3 Why? GDB Mars 2015, Amsterdam

Site responsible for (policy-wise): – Recording all activity: when, where, who, what – Securely and centrally store logs for months – Process logs upon CSIRT request during incidents Identifying and isolating users: – WN/pilot jobs: glExec (if/when deployed & used) – Endpoint/services: end-user x509 certificate/proxy Multi-site analysis difficult: – Broadcast warning/regex and wait/hope… – Rely on VO frameworks or central services Vincent Brillault, CERN/EGI-CSIRT4 Current situation GDB Mars 2015, Amsterdam

New technology on the rise: – Virtualization & VMs: black boxes managed by VOs – Cgroups/namespaces: new isolation solution? Multi-user pilot-jobs on the decline VOs have large frameworks & log activity Vincent Brillault, CERN/EGI-CSIRT5 What’s “new” GDB Mars 2015, Amsterdam

Promising technology: cgroup & namespaces Explore new solutions: – Identify what needs to be isolated from users, e.g: Pilot job own credentials (if kept) VO logging facilities & framework callback (if any) – See if new technology can cover out needs – Identify/resolve OS dependencies (EL7+ ?) Accept a split log “responsibility” – When/where Who: Site + VO – When/where What: Site & VO We may be able to retire glExec and close this debate! Vincent Brillault, CERN/EGI-CSIRT6 “glExec” GDB Mars 2015, Amsterdam

Pilot jobs/VMs becoming black boxes – Site: Log externally observable behavior – VOs: Log what happens inside Identify how to keep site expertise: – Identify strange behaviors (e.g. Bitcoin mining) – Debugging/problem resolution Keep response capability: – User suspension: Service/endpoints: OK (x509 certificates/proxy) Shared resources (e.g. network): ?? – Properly integrate VOs in response procedures Vincent Brillault, CERN/EGI-CSIRT7 Black boxes GDB Mars 2015, Amsterdam

New model possible: – Consider pilot jobs/VMs as black box – Build and trust central security VO logs – Concentrate on unprivileged isolation There is a lot of questions, no clear solution yet VOs’ expertise needed: – Keep making sure pilot jobs are protected – How to take advantage of job frameworks Sites’ expertise needed: – What data/access/control is needed – What technology can be supported Vincent Brillault, CERN/EGI-CSIRT8 The future? GDB Mars 2015, Amsterdam