Thurs. Feb. 25

Schultz v Boy Scouts of America (NY 1985)

The three reasons most often urged in support of applying the law of the forum-locus in cases such as this are: (1) to protect medical creditors who provided services to injured parties in the locus State, (2) to prevent injured tort victims from becoming public wards in the locus State and (3) the deterrent effect application of locus law has on future tort-feasors in the locus State.

The first two reasons share common weaknesses. First, in the abstract, neither reason necessarily requires application of the locus jurisdiction's law, but rather invariably mandates application of the law of the jurisdiction that would either allow recovery or allow the greater recovery. They are subject to criticism, therefore, as being biased in favor of recovery.

Finally, although it is conceivable that application of New York's law in this case would have some deterrent effect on future tortious conduct in this State, New York's deterrent interest is considerably less because none of the parties is a resident and the rule in conflict is loss-allocating rather than conduct- regulating.

Dissent: [T]here can be little doubt that New York has an interest in insuring that justice be done to nonresidents who have come to this State and suffered serious injuries herein. There is no cogent reason to deem that interest any weaker whether such guests are here for the purpose of conducting business or personal affairs, or, as in this case, have chosen to spend their vacation in New York. Likewise, it cannot be denied that this State has a strong legitimate interest in deterring serious tortious misconduct, including the kind of reprehensible malfeasance that has victimized the nonresident infant plaintiffs in this case.

“As to defendant Franciscan Brothers, this action requires an application of the third of the rules set forth in Neumeier because the parties are domiciled in different jurisdictions with conflicting loss-distribution rules and the locus of the tort is New York, a separate jurisdiction. In that situation the law of the place of the tort will normally apply, unless displacing it ‘”will advance” the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants’”

For the same reasons stated in our analysis of the action against defendant Boy Scouts, application of the law of New Jersey in plaintiffs' action against defendant Franciscan Brothers would further that State's interest in enforcing the decision of its domiciliaries to accept the burdens as well as the benefits of that State's loss-distribution tort rules and its interest in promoting the continuation and expansion of defendant's charitable activities in that State.

Conversely, although application of New Jersey's law may not affirmatively advance the substantive law purposes of New York, it will not frustrate those interests because New York has no significant interest in applying its own law to this dispute.

Finally, application of New Jersey law will enhance "the smooth working of the multi-state system" by actually reducing the incentive for forum shopping and it will provide certainty for the litigants whose only reasonable expectation surely would have been that the law of the jurisdiction where plaintiffs are domiciled and defendant sends its teachers would apply, not the law of New York where the parties had only isolated and infrequent contacts as a result of Coakeley's position as Boy Scout leader.

“unprovided-for” cases

Grant variation Arizonan and Californian get in accident in Arizona Californian dies Arizonan sues Californian’s estate AZ has no survivorship of actions Cal does

Ontario guest riding in NYer’s car accident in Ontario Ontario has guest statute NY doesn’t

unprovided-for case: P’s domicile’s loss-allocating rule benefits D (by prohibiting action) D’s domicile’s loss-allocating (and usually conduct-regulating) rule benefits P (by allowing action) wrongdoing is in P’s domicile

Currie: Use law that is most humane and enlightened Use forum law

Kramer’s solution - affirmative defense of P’s domicile does not apply - but cause of action for relief of P’s domicile does apply

Ontarioan guest sues Ontarioan host for accident in Ontario - both Ontario negligence law and its guest statute apply

unprovided-for case: P’s domicile’s loss-allocating rule benefits D (by prohibiting action not through affirmative defense, but simply because it does not recognize a cause of action) D’s domicile’s loss-allocating (and usually conduct-regulating) rule benefits P (by allowing action) wrongdoing is in P’s domicile

Erwin v. Thomas (Or. 1973) - P (Wash) suing D (Ore) in Ore Ct for injury in Wash - Suit is for loss of consortium - Wash does not allow such suits by women (only men) - Ore does

“Washington has decided that the rights of a married woman whose husband is injured are not sufficiently important to cause the negligent defendant who is responsible for the injury to pay the wife for her loss. It has weighed the matter in favor of protection of defendants. No Washington defendant is going to have to respond for damages in the present case, since the defendant is an Oregonian.”

“On the other hand, what is Oregon's interest? Oregon, obviously, is protective of the rights of married women and believes that they should be allowed to recover for negligently inflicted loss of consortium. However, it is stretching the imagination more than a trifle to conceive that the Oregon Legislature was concerned about the rights of all the nonresident married women in the nation whose husbands would be injured outside of the state of Oregon.”

Casey v Mason (Ore. 1967) Ore wife brings loss of consortium action in Oregon ct against Wash D for accident in Wash Ct applies Wash law

unprovided-for case: P’s domicile’s loss-allocating rule benefits D (by prohibiting action not through affirmative defense, but simply because it does not recognize a cause of action) D’s domicile’s loss-allocating (and usually conduct-regulating) rule benefits P (by allowing action) wrongdoing is in P’s domicile - solution – P fails to state a claim

Variation on Hurtado (Cal. 1974) - Ps from Mexican state of Zacatecas sue Californian for wrongful death due to an accident in Zacatecas - Zacatecan law had a limit on the amount of damages for wrongful death (part of the cause of action, not an affirmative defense) - California law had no such limit

Grant variation variation Arizonan and Californian get in accident in Arizona Californian dies Arizonan sues Californian’s estate AZ has no survivorship of actions Neither does CA!

Grant variation variation Arizonan and Californian get in accident in Arizona Californian dies Arizonan sues Californian’s estate Under AZ law, the defendant being alive is an element of a cause of action for negligence CA law allows survivorship

Grant variation Arizonan and Californian get in accident in Arizona Californian dies Arizonan sues Californian’s estate AZ has no survivorship of actions Cal does Kramer – inapplicability of AZ affirmative defense means that AZ cause of action applies Green – inapplicability of CA negligence action means that CA no-liability background law applies

true conflicts

Lilienthal v Kaufman (Ore. 1964) - D (Ore) went to Cal and entered into an agreement w/ P (Cal) for joint venture - D executed in Cal two promissory notes - P demanded payment on notes - D declared spendthrift under Ore law - No such law in Cal

How would 1 st Rest answer?

How would rule of validation answer?

Concurrence To distinguish the Olshen case it would be necessary to assume that although the legislature intended to protect the interest of the spendthrift, his family and the county when local creditors were harmed, the same protection was not intended where the transaction adversely affected foreign creditors. I see no basis for making that assumption. There is no reason to believe that our legislature intended to protect California creditors to a greater extent than our own.