April 18, 2015 University of Iowa Department of Political Science Yang Zhang

 Hu Yaobang  CCP General Secretary  1987 Removed  Zhao Ziyang  CCP General Secretary  1989 Removed

 Since the rule of law is not guaranteed in authoritarian regimes, where political institutions are vulnerable, the formal office ranking does not necessarily reflect the real control over the government.  In an authoritarian state, political leaders are not directly elected by voters, so their political survival is more likely to be threatened by the dissatisfaction of the political elites rather than the distrust of the public.

 A faction relation involves two sides, a leader and a follower, who are unequal in status and power, and who exchange different political resources with each other (Andrew Nathan 1973).  Faction leaders rely on their followers for policy implementation.  Faction followers rely on their leaders for career advancement.

 One source of informal power is the structural position in a social network.  Network centrality can translate into political authority and resources.

 Social ties  Family  College  Birth place  Work unit  Work ties are not static because one can move from one work unit to another.  Long and various political experience enables a political elite to reach diverse political forces and build a complex follower network.

 Unlike formal power, the informal power— embedded in the work-tie network (follower network)—needs to be accumulated gradually through frequent interpersonal interactions.  Informal power is positively associated with party standing.  Even if party elders retire from their official positions, they can influence the party politics through the connections to their past followers.

 But when party elders retire from a formal party organization, their follower networks stop growing, which allows incumbent party leaders to occupy the center of the political network.

party standing informal power/ network centrality retirement

General Secretary Politburo Standing Committee Politburo Central Discipline Inspection Commission Central Discipline Inspection Commission Central Committee National Party Congress Central Military Commission Secretariat

General Secretary Politburo Standing Committee Politburo Central Discipline Inspection Commission Central Discipline Inspection Commission Central Committee National Party Congress Central Military Commission Secretariat voterspotential candidatesPresidium nominators

 There is only one candidate for each seat in the Politburo.  The composition of the Presidium  Incumbent Politburo members  Retired Politburo members  Other senior party leaders

1. In the Central Committee, a member’s network centrality is positively associated with his or her standing in the Chinese Communist Party. 2. As time passes, in the Presidium, the average network centrality of retired Politburo members will keep decreasing, while that of incumbent Politburo members will keep increasing.

3. A potential candidate for the Politburo who has higher network centrality in the Central Committee is more likely to get a seat in the Politburo. 4. As time goes on, the tie to a retired Politburo member in the Presidium will become less important in the Politburo election. 5. As time goes on, the tie to an incumbent Politburo member in the Presidium will become more important in the Politburo election.

 Central Committee Dataset, (Shih, Shan & Liu, 2008)  Demographic characteristics  Political career history  Three Politburo Elections (1992, 1997 & 2002)  Deng Xiaoping handed over his last official position in  Jiang Zemin was the incumbent general secretary of the party during this period of time.

 Nodes  200+  Central Committee members + Presidium members  Link: vertical work tie 1. Two members have worked in the same province, government department, or party organization for at least 5 years. 2. One member is always subordinate to the other.

 PageRank is used by Google to rank the webpages of a certain topic.

 Jiang Zemin was the incumbent general secretary of the party.

 Bo Yibo was a retired Politburo member in the Presidium.

Party Standing0.010***0.014***0.008*** Notes: Control variables include gender, ethnicity, and education. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

* PageRank1.93**1.91**1.93***2.33*** # Ties: Incumbent Politburo Members 0.75** # Ties: Retired Politburo Members 0.91*1.06*1.69*-0.08 # Ties: Other Presidium Members Notes: Control variables include party standing, gender, ethnicity, and education. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

 The structural position in a social network is an important type of political capital.  In China, party standing is positively associated with network centrality in the work-tie network.  The political elites who occupy the center of the work-tie network have high likelihood of becoming Chinese top leaders.  The social connection to Presidium members is also important in the Politburo turnover.  As time goes on, retired Politburo members keep losing their informal influence, while incumbent Politburo members keep accumulating their power.