PAWS Framework draft-lei-paws-framework-datamodel-00

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PAWS Framework draft-lei-paws-framework-datamodel-00 Zhu Lei, e-mail address: lei.zhu@huawei.com Mobile phone: +86-10-13910157020 Wei Xinpeng, e-mail address: weixinpeng@huawei.com IETF Paris meeting 2012-03

Contents Requirements and audience Real scenarios Issues of PAWS protocol Data model Security Need extensibility Page 2

Use cases and requirements In the scope: a protocol to access white space data base Out of the scope: interference avoidance, provisioning Use cases: discovery, registration, hotspot, wide area, wireless backhaul, ad hoc deployment, mobile MSD, indoor and M2M. Requirements satisfied by this document: Data model: D.1-D.10 (all) Protocol: P.1, P.2 (partial), P.3-P.12, P.18-P.19 Operational requirements: O.1-O.9, O.15-O.18, O21-O22 What are others: some process involving slave devices Security requirements: Reasons: The spectrum is lasting limited resource dominated by regulatory from long term perspective and assumed to be used properly. Requirements in general: Bidirectional authentication Integrity protection Page 3

Scenarios Countries Provinces of China Page 4 Roles Administrator FCC, Ofcom, etc Primary user TV secondary user Wifi, cellular Service provider ISP, property owner, Enterprise Countries Country Area (million square kilometer) Population (million) Density (per sq.km.) Bangladeshi 0.14 147.4 1023 Japan 0.37 127.6 338 Indian 2.98 1095.4 333 UK 0.24 60.6 248 China 9.6 1319.0 138 France 0.55 60.9 111 US 9.82 300.0 31 Provinces of China Province Area (million square kilometer) Population (million) Henan 0.16 90.3 Shandong 0.15 91.0 Sichuan 0.48 85.0 Guangdong 0.18 72.0 Beijing 0.016 15.0 Shanghai 0.006 14.0 Page 4

Issues of framework Figure 1 shows a common system model consisting of Master Device and Database merely. The Master Device connects to the database directly using WS interface. Figure 1: Framework of PAWS Master device in Figure 1 is a kind of white space device which querying available channel list from database providing radio access to user equipments. Due to PAWS principle of access technology agnostic, it can be access point of WiFi, NodeB of 3GPP WCDMA or eNodeB of 3GPP LTE etc. Database in Figure 1 is in charge of storing and maintaining white space channel information for certain area(s), it may be operated by regulatory. When the database receives request of white space spectrum querying from the master device, it will respond a list of available white space channel list to the master device if there are available spectrums. Page 5 Page 5

Protocol framework: framework of PAWS database discovery The function of AddrDatabase is to provide the list of trusted databases in the relevant regulatory domain to the master device. The AddrDatabase is either hosted by or under control of the national regulator. Page 6

Protocol framework: protocol stack WS.App is the white space spectrum application protocol. This protocol stack is used by WS interface. Page 7

Protocol framework : interface of PAWS Database Discovery Device Registration with Trusted Database White Space Channel Query White Space Channel Update Page 8

Interface of PAWS: WS Channel Update In order to avoid interfering with the primary user or other secondary user, the white space updating mechanism is provided in this draft. There are two methods for white space updating: METHOD1 : The white space device MUST access the database to obtain and update the list of available channels that could be utilized by the device. According to some regulatory rules the white space device SHOULD update the white space channel periodically, and the period may be different due to different regulatory rules. METHOD2 : Database push updates in channel availability changes to the master device, when the availability of channel changes database SHOULD inform the master device and after receiving the notification the master device SHOULD begin the white space channel query procedure to get the updated white space channel. METHOD1 METHOD2 Page 9

Message encoding In this framework XML is used to encode the message. HTTPS is used to carry the XML, there is an example of how XML formatted message is embedded in HTTP: For the request message: GET destination_url HTTP/1.0 Content-Type: text/xml <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> xml message body

Security countermeasures The master device shall be authenticated by database based on a globally unique and permanent master device identity. The master device shall authenticate the database. Sensitive data including authentication credentials, user information, cryptographic keys shall not be transmitted between the master device and the database in plaintext in unauthorized access. It means that the link between the master device and the database shall provide integrity, confidentiality, and replay protection of transmitted data. The master device should have a secure module to store long term key or certificate. The identity of master device could be stored in a trusted physical module and/or a possible non-removable smartcard. Page 11

Security schemes TLS TLS is application protocol independent, higher level protocols can layer on top of the TLS protocol. It is composed of two layers: the TLS record protocol and the TLS handshake protocol. According the RFC5246, RSA or Diffie-Hellman can be used for authentication and key exchange. The identity of the master device and the database can be authenticated using asymmetric, or public key, and cryptography (e.g., RSA,DSA, etc) symmetric cryptography is used for data encryption (e.g., AES, RC4, etc). A keyed MAC is used to message integrity check. Secure hash functions (e.g., SHA-1, etc) are used for MAC generated. Page 12

Additional coordination role of DB Private network WS+ Master device Database Coordination DB Internet WS

Protocol framework: coordinating DB Coordinating Database is logical function which is a combination of master device and Database (which stores a part or all of the white space spectrum information in certain area), the Coordinating Database gets white space spectrum from database acting as Master Device, the logical function of Coordinating Database is depicted in Figure 3. Page 14

Protocol framework: coordinating DB functions Coordinating database includes three main functions: (1) The function of master device. It can retrieve available channel list from Database on behaviors of master device (fulfilled by function of white space device). (2) The function of database. To master device the coordinating database acts just like a database, it can receive the registration information from master device, response with proper available channel list when receiving query request from master device etc. (3) The function of implementing spectrum management policies. For example, the white space coordination control between different master devices. Page 15