Vulnerability Assessment Sequoia Voting Systems October 10, 2006.

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Presentation transcript:

Vulnerability Assessment Sequoia Voting Systems October 10, 2006

Vulnerability Assessment Introduction Assessment Overview Findings and Recommendations

Items Reviewed Security Practices of Sequoia System Architecture Touch Screens (DRE) Optical Scanners Vote Count Software Physical Security Election Processes

Physical Security

Security of the Voting System Components WinEDS 400C High Speed Scanners Edge Touch Screen (DRE) HAAT and Voter Access Cards Insight Optical Scanners

Findings and Recommendations Majority of Vulnerabilities Already Mitigated Harden Systems Checksum WinEDS Encrypt Network Traffic Harden Network Intrusion Detection

Summary  Sequoia Voting System – Certified by State and Federal Government  Relatively low risk vulnerabilities remedied by  Network Security  Human Process Countermeasures  No practical, realizable vulnerabilities were uncovered that could not be eliminated