14-1 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) Mission Particles and Fields Package Safety and Mission Assurance Critical Design Review May , 2011 Jorg Fischer, MAVEN PFP SMA

14-2 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 PFP Quality Organization Quality Assurance Build Configuration Verification Build Configuration Verification ESD Control PFP MAM Manager PFP MAM Manager Safety Configuration Management Configuration Management Documentation and Records Documentation and Records PMPCB, FRB, MRB Training and Certification Training and Certification Personnel Safety Personnel Safety Flight Hardware Safety Flight Hardware Safety Lab Inspections Contamination Control Contamination Control Support Flight H/W & S/W QA Testing Support Flight H/W & S/W QA Testing Quality Assurance Engineer Team Quality Assurance Engineer Team PFP Project Manager LASP SMA Manager CESR/IRAP SMA Manager CESR/IRAP SMA Manager GSFC SMA Manager GSFC SMA Manager Inspections, Audits Support lessons Learned SSL Safety & Quality Group Manager SSL Quality Committee

14-3 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 SSL PFP Quality Organization Jorg Fischer, Safety & Quality Group Manager, MAM - Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance Chris Scholz, Quality Lead Engineer - Quality Control, Inspections, Audits - Fabrication Control and Support - Training Anloc Le, Quality Parts Engineer - PFP Parts Control and Support Erica Kotta, Quality Associate - ESD Monitor & Control and Support - Parts and Materials Control and Support Daniele Meilhan, Quality Support - Calibration Control and Support

14-4 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Responsibilities of Mission Assurance TECH MD (or 5 plus H) Traceability Selection, Procurement, Shipping /Receiving -> Documentation ESD Control Calibration Control Holistic Approach Monitoring, Reviews, Training and Lessons Learned, QMS. Material and Process Control Non-Conformance Control – ECO, PFR, SCR, SPR Reporting and Reviews Manufacturing, Software Assurance, Contamination, and Test Control (I&T, Verification and Environmental Test), Test Witness, Internal and External Auditing (formal/Informal), In-process and MIP Inspections, Shipping/Receiving. Documentation Configuration Management and Data and Record Control EIDP, Final Acceptance Data Package -> Traceability

14-5 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Mission Assurance Implementation Plans Mission Assurance Implementation Plans (MAIP) Status SSL, LASP, CESR/IRAP have submitted a MAIP indicating how SSL will implement the MAVEN Mission Assurance Requirements –SSL: MAVEN_PF_QA_002 –LASP/LPW: MAVEN-RSS-PLAN-0038 –CESR/IRAP SWEA: SWEA-PL CESR-001-GEN –GSFC/MAG: MAVEN_PF_QA_002 –Result of many iterations between Project SMA & PFP –MAIP was reviewed and approved by Project –It includes a compliance verification matrix, deliverables list

14-6 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 SMA Requirements and Documentation 1.GENERAL 1.1.Basis and Scope of the Plan CESR 1.2.General Requirements 1.3.Use of Previously Designed, Fabricated, or Flown Hardware 1.4.Flow-Down of MA Requirements 1.5.Surveillance 1.6.SR&QA Verification 1.7.Status Reporting 1.8.Applicable Documents (Appendix A) 2.ASSURANCE REVIEW REQUIREMENTS 2.1.General Requirements 2.2.GSFC Flight Assurance Review Requirements 2.3.Flight Assurance Review Program 3.PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 3.1.General Requirements 3.2.Documentation Requirements Verification Matrix Verification Test Plan Verification Test Procedures Verification Test Report 3.3.Demonstration of Failure-Free Operation 3.4.Comprehensive Performance Test 4.SAFETY 4.1.General 4.2.System Description and Safety Assessment Report Preliminary Safety Assessment 4.3.Procedure Approval 4.4.Safety Noncompliance Requests 4.5.Safety Working Group Meetings 4.6.Safety Data Package, Launch Site Safety Plan, and Orbital Debris Assessment 4.7.Mishaps 4.8.Assessments 5.1.PARTS SELECTION EEE Parts Identification List 5.2.Other Parts Magnetic Devices Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits (PEMs) Units and Subassemblies Field Programmable Devices PIND Testing Destructive Physical Analyses (DPA) 5.3.Ceramic Capacitors 5.4.Derating 5.5.Radiation Tolerance 5.6.Alerts 5.7.Parts Age Control 5.8.Parts Control Board 6.MATERIALS AND PROCESSES CONTROL REQUIREMENTS 6.1.Selection Requirements Compliant Materials Noncompliant Materials Conventional Applications Nonconventional Applications Inorganic and Metallic Materials Non-metallic Materials Fasteners Lubricants Consideration in Process Selection Shelf Life Controlled Items Magnetics Compatibility 6.2.Documentation 6.3.GIDEP Alerts 6.4.Materials and Process Control Board 7.DESIGN ASSURANCE AND RELIABILITY 7.1.Requirements 7.2.Implementation 7.3.Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 7.4.Limited Life Items 7.5.Trending 7.6.Parts Stress Analysis 7.7.Worst Case Analyses 8.QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 8.1.Support of Design Reviews 8.2.Configuration Management 8.3.Identification and Traceability 8.4.Procurement Controls Purchased Raw Materials Age Control and Limited-Life Products Inspection and Test Records Purchase Order Review Re-submission of Non-conforming Materials 8.5.Receiving Inspection 8.6.Fabrication Control Manufacturing Certification Log Workmanship Process Control Reuse of Parts and Materials Retention of Test Samples and Removed Parts 8.7.ESD Control 8.8.Non-conformance Control Discrepancies Failures Alert Information 8.9.Inspections and Tests Inspection and Test Records Printed Wiring Boards Inspections and Tests 8.10.Metrology 8.11.Handling, Storage, Marking, Shipping Handling Shipping 8.12.Government Property Control 8.13.End Item Acceptance 8.14.Ground Support Equipment 9.CONTAMINATION CONTROL 9.1.Project Requirements 9.2.PFP Concerns 9.3.Control Plan 9.4.PFP Requirements on S/C I&T and Ops 10.SOFTWARE ASSURANCE General, Software Development, Documentation, Software Design Reviews, Configuration Management

14-7 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 PFP MAR Checklist  MAR compliance checked and approved MAVEN_PF_QA_001

14-8 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Requirements and Safety Flow-Down of MAIP Requirements –SSL, LASP, CESR/IRAP, GSFC Deviations – Materials and Processes requirements, Section 6 of MAIP – Compliance deviations are documented in the MAR checklist System Safety – Personnel, facility, and mission safety have been considered. –The Safety Plan has been generated MAVEN_PF_QA_005 Safety Plan and MAIP section 4 –The safety plan identifies all requirements, planned tailoring approaches, intended non-compliances, and safety data submittals have been identified. –There are no safety compliance issues. –Safety Assessment Report

14-9 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Suppliers and Alerts Suppliers –SSL procures all active EEE flight parts from GSFC –SSL procures passive EEE parts directly from the manufacturer or through authorized distributors. –Material certs on all machined parts and surface finishing –Source control drawings for detectors –SSL requires full traceability on all flight procurements. –Program requirements are flowed through procurement documentation. Where necessary, procurement documentation may include source control documents (SCDs) and engineering documentation. GIDEP Status –SSL will respond to GSFC GIDEP evaluation requests –There are no current GIDEP impacts – no parts on MAVEN are currently impacted by any Alert or Advisory. –Other Memos and Alerts will be Incorporated, for example: “The use of brominated polyimide is unacceptable” (Polyimide board material)

14-10 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Alerts Status DB  Alerts Status DB snapshots

14-11 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Contamination and ESD Control Contamination Control –Class 100,000 cleanrooms available –Contamination requirements and preliminary control plans have been defined, MAIP section 9. –Laminar Flow Benches available –Nitrogen available (Oxygen Sensors fixed and portable)  ESD Control –ESD Control Plan meets ANSI/ESD S20.20 requirements –Q-001-PROC A ESD Control Plan –All applicable personnel trained and certified by RMV Technology: Robert J. Vermillion, CPP-Lifetime Fellow, Certified ESD & Product Safety Engineer. –Training certifications are required for flight work  Planetary Protection –Ongoing participation

14-12 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Planetary Protection Status Attended training for PP Policies and Practices (Dec. 2010) Attend Weekly PPWG Telecons –Developing PP Implementation Document Released PFP Planetary Protection Implementation Plan –Includes IRAP Role (SWEA Peer Review RFA) –Updates incorporated into Contamination Control Plan and Bakeout Plan Setting up Assay Process –Attending ARC meeting at LM (26 May) UCB PFP PP Point of Contact –Jeremy McCauley

14-13 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Calibration, Parts and Materials Control  Calibration Control –Calibration Data base –All tools used for PFP flight are under Calibration Control –Blanket P.O. for MAVEN –ANSI/NCSL Z540  Receiving Inspection and EEE parts storage MAM implements parts and materials control –Incoming Inspections (two) –Bonded Flight parts storage –All Flight parts are in a data base –Packaging and shipping provisions to maintain low contamination exposure and ESD control during transport.

14-14 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Workmanship  Manufacturing, Assembly, and Quality Control of Electronic System will be in compliance to the most recent version of the following technical standards: NASA-STD Workmanship Standards for Staking and Conformal Coating of Printed Wiring Boards and Electronic Assemblies NASA-STD Workmanship Standard for Surface Mount Technology NASA-STD Soldered Electrical Connections NASA-STD Crimping, Interconnecting Cables, Harness, and Wiring ANSI/ESD Electrostatic Discharge Control

14-15 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Training and Certification  Training and Certification DB snapshot Quality Assurance Certifications 5/9/11SSL Name JPL Cert #CertificationReceivedExpiresSpecfication Certification Date Certified By DalenBruceQA 7397Conformal Coating and Staking12/2/1012/2/12NASA-STD A12/2/10 CS Surface Mount Technology7/14/097/14/11NASA-STD /14/09 CS Soldered Electrical Connections8/18/098/18/11NASA-STD /18/09 CS Crimp Cable and Harnessing12/1/1012/1/12NASA-STD /1/10 CS ESD Control6/25/096/25/11ANSI/ESD S /25/09 CS IrwinYvetteQA 7249Conformal Coating and Staking5/15/095/15/11NASA-STD A5/15/09 CS Surface Mount Technology7/10/097/10/11NASA-STD /10/09 CS Soldered Electrical Connections3/3/113/3/13NASA-STD /3/11 CS Crimp Cable and Harnessing6/17/096/17/11NASA-STD /17/09 CS ESD Control6/25/096/25/11ANSI/ESD S /25/09 CS Quality Assurance ESD Certifications Update: 3/30/10 NAME TRAINED / CERTIFIED DATE Due Date ANSI ESD S20.20 HIST. NASA STD HIST. GSFC Cert # HIST. COMMENT Peter Berg25-Jun-0925-Jun-11x 03-May-05C#-4538IPC-DVD-54C V.2 John Bonnell25-Jun-0925-Jun-11x 03-May-05C#-4562 Bruce Dalen25-Jun-0925-Jun-11x 03-May-05C#-4563IPC-DVD-54C V.2 Greg Dalton25-Jun-0925-Jun-11x 03-May-05C#-4549 William Donakowski25-Jun-0925-Jun-11x 03-May-05C#-4547 Jorg Fischer25-Jun-0925-Jun-11x 03-May-05C#-4561IPC-DVD-54C V.2

14-16 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 EEE Parts and Materials Parts selection, de-rating, screening, and qualification test criteria are defined EEE Parts per GSFC-311-INST-002 add1, Level 2 –Parts derating, Parts age control, Parts control board (PCB) –Radiation tolerance per MAIP section 5.5 –Alerts –Tests, Test Data & EIDP –Photos Materials and Processes Controls –Hazardous materials requirements –Vacuum outgassing requirements –Approved materials and processes lists –Limited Life Items list –Alerts, shelf life controls –Material certs (Mfg. CoC)

14-17 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 EEE Parts and Materials EEE Parts DB history snapshot

14-18 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 EEE Parts and Materials  EEE parts DB snapshot Total QTY2222 SSL ID # GSFC PR # For Ref. OnlyGeneric PN PROCUREMENT ORDER P/N ( MIL P/N, Standard Microcircuits Drawing, DESC, FCS, NSN, SMD, Hirel Part Number) SWEA EM DIG SWEA EM LVPS SWEA FM DIG SWEA FM LVPS QTY Received by UCB FUNCTIONDESCRIPTIONMFG Packa ge Type LEAD Bending REQ. Rad TID/SEL Th (M=Mfg, T=Test, No=no latchup, B=Bipolar, DD=Displaceme nt Damage) PCB Approved GIDEP ALERT Y/N ESD CLASS 0 COMMENTS Datasheet on file Y/N SCREENING QUAL REQ. PASSED SCREENING Y/N VENDOR COST PR No.ACTIVES Microcircuits - FSC 5962, Semiconductors (Transistors, Diodes) - FSC 5961, & SPECIAL COMPONENTS (Optocouplers, Oscillators) MICROCIRCUI T 0 FLT LV01028LV010RT2FS KB EEPROM IC, EEPROM, 3.3V, 128K x 8- Bit, 200 nsMaxwellLDFP32 X M: 25K/>84Y YES GSFC 1, LV01028LV010RTFI KB EEPROMEM ETUMaxwellLDFP32 X EM ETUY GSFC LV010 TEST28LV010RT2FS-20 (PC) 0128KB EEPROM Customer Source Inspection, Pre-CapMaxwell- -Y TEST Customer Source Inspection, Pre-Cap.GSFC 2, LV010 TEST28LV010RT2FS-20 (CT) 0128KB EEPROMGroup C Life Test Set-up ChargeMaxwell- -Y TEST Group C Life Test Set-up Charge.GSFC 9, LV010 TEST28LV010RT2FS-20 (CS) 0128KB EEPROMGroup C Life Test SamplesMaxwell- -Y TEST Group C Life Test Samples.GSFC 1, LV010 TEST28LV010RT2FS-20 (DP) 0128KB EEPROMGeneric Group D data packageMaxwell- -Y TEST Generic Group D data package.GSFC 1, FLT DFN32G08VS8289 IS 0 4GB FLASH NAND IC, Memory, Flash NAND, 4Gb X 32b, 3.3V, Industrial Temp, Space Grade3DPlus Y YES GSFC 4, DFN32G08VS8289 CN3DFN32G08VS GB FLASH NAND EM ETU IC, Memory, Flash NAND, 4Gb X 32b, 3.3V, Commercial Temp3DPlusStack T 100k/>77Y EM can be commercial version (-CN). EM ETU GSFC 1, DFN32G08VS8289 IB3DFN32G08VS8289 IS - 4GB FLASH NAND EM ETU IC, Memory, Flash NAND, 4Gb X 32b, 3.3V, Industrial Temp3DPlus Y EM ETU GSFC 1, MMFN S-F MS - 4GB FLASH NAND EM ETU IC, Memory, Flash NAND, 4Gb X 32b, 3.3V, Industrial Temp, Space Grade3DPlus Y EM ETU GSFC 4, DFN32G08VS8289 IS TEST 0 4GB FLASH NANDTID Testing for item 03DPlus- -Y TEST TID Testing for item 0.GSFC 16, DFN32G08VS8289 IS TEST 0 4GB FLASH NAND End Item Data Package for item 03DPlus- -Y TEST End Item Data Package for item 0.GSFC 2, FLT A121 0Preamp HybridA121 Option 1+AMPTEK Amptek screening.GSFC 1, A121A121 EM 50Preamp HybridEM ETUAMPTEKHybrid T: 100K/BY EM ETU Amptek screening.GSFC FLT A250F 0Preamp Hybrid AMPTEK IC, Pre Amp, Charge Sensitive, Hybrid Amptek screening.GSFC 1, A250FA250F EM 15Preamp HybridEM ETUAMPTEKHybrid T:100K/BY EM ETU Amptek screening.GSFC

14-19 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 EEE Parts and Materials  Materials List DB

14-20 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Inspections and Audits  Audits and Mandatory Inspection Points  Audits Vendor Audits, Compliance Audits (Safety, ESD, Configuration Control, Traceability, Non-Conformance, Calibration), Interface with External Audits, Assembly Traveler data package at each inspection point  Inspections Incoming/Receiving, Flight Kits, Pre-cap, Calibration, Acceptance and Environmental Test, Software, Interface with External Inspections, Printed Wiring Assemblies, Polymerics, Cables, Harnesses, and Wirinig.

14-21 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Non-conformance Control  Non-conformance Reporting Methods -Non-Conformance – Problem Failure Report (PFR) -Dispositions include: scrap, rework, repair, return to supplier, refer to MRB, safe for non-flight use. - Processing of Repair or Rework -Material Review Board (MRB) -PFP MRB -Customer participation and approval required -Dispositions include scrap, rework, return to supplier, repair by standard or non-standard procedures, use-as-is, request for waiver

14-22 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 PFP PFR Process

14-23 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) MAVEN_PF_QA_009, PFP Preliminary Hazard Analysis submitted to Project High Voltage Hazard –SWEA, SWIA, STATIC have significant HV (up to 15kV) –Not a personnel safety issue (no exposed HV) –Can damage the instrument if HV powered on in Air –Green-tag enable plugs prevent accidental power-on Radiation Sources –Used for SEP CPT –Small hand-help low activity sources –Handled by trained and qualified personnel –Not used at launch site Non-explosive Actuators (NEA) –Use spacecraft pyro system to limit risk of accidental actuation –SWEA, SWIA, STATIC covers – risk of instrument contamination if opened inadvertently on the ground –LPW – risk of damage to instrument, some small risk of harm to personnel if deployed inadvertently on the ground –Red-tag safety pin prevents accidental deployment

14-24 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Safety Assessment Report SAR MAVEN_PF_QA011B_SAR Preliminary design and planning documents for bench and integration testing contain sufficient controls to diminish hazard exposure probabilities to an acceptable level. The following Hazard Categories were reviewed and determined to be not applicable to the PFP. Fire/Explosion: The PFP does not contain flammable or explosive materials in the completed instrument. Noise: There are no acoustic issues pertinent to the instrument. Pressure: PFP utilizes no pressure vessels or containers meeting the working fluid, pressure differential, or energy criteria of AFSPCMAN for flight pressure devices. The purge cart is provided by Lockheed Martin. Temperature: PFP does not possess potential hazards associated with variations in the thermal environment during the integration, test, or launch phase. Non-Ionizing Radiation: Neither PFP nor GSE contain any non-ionizing radiation sources. Temperature: PFP does not possess potential hazards associated with variations in the thermal environment during the integration, test, or launch phase Contamination, Toxicity: Neither the PFP nor the GSE contains hazardous materials.

14-25 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 SAR The safety hazard assessment showed: Hazard Distribution by Subsystem Hazard severity categories, as defined in NPR

14-26 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 SAR - Hazards Asphyxiation Hazard: Nitrogen purge will be provided by the spacecraft contractor, risk to be carried there. Further, the instrument purged volume and flow rate are not large enough to be hazardous. I&T Cable Trip Hazard: Observation of proven safety practices for cable routing, handling of EGSE, and appropriate connectors and protective devices will be sufficient to preclude unacceptable exposure to electrical hazards. Radiation Hazard: Radiation sources (Am241, 1mCi) will be used to stimulate the SEP instrument during selected tests during ATLO at Lockheed Martin (not used at the launch site). The sources are small low level sealed sources which will be held by trained personnel close to the instrument apertures. Sources will be handled, stored, and shipped following appropriate procedures. Sources will not be used at the launch site.

14-27 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 SAR - Hazards HV Hazard: SWEA, SWIA, STATIC, supplies up to 15kV HV surfaces cannot be reached without disassembling instruments, Supplies are current limited to microamps They are designed to insure that current returns to the supply locally so that a HV failure will not damage any other hardware outside the instrument. Enable plugs are necessary. In order for HV to come on the following actions have to take place: HV enable installed Spacecraft turns PFP power service on Ground command sent to instrument to power on the instrument Ground command sent to enable high voltage (requires a hardware key code not present in any software or script on board. The ground command script which contains the enable codes is password protected against accidental execution before launch) Ground command sent to ramp up high voltage No single credible software, hardware, or operator error could result in high voltage being powered up.

14-28 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 SAR - Hazards Accidental Deployment Hazard: SWEA, SWIA, and STATIC contain small non-explosive actuators (TiNi P5 SMA pin-pullers) to operate their 1-time contamination control covers. These coves are entirely contained inside the instrument and involve moving a few grams a few millimeters. They pose no personnel hazard, but inadvertent actuation could risk contaminating the instruments. LPW booms contain small non-explosive actuators (TiNi Frangibolts)deploy to 7m at about 1m/s by spring force (~1.5 lbs). Should they deploy inadvertently, there is a small risk of harm to personnel and a larger risk of damage to the instrument. A red-tag safety pin which prevents deployment will be installed. Software Hazard: PFP software is not safety critical – and no involvement in personnel safety. In flight, FSW safes the instrument in response to zone alert commands from the spacecraft. On the ground, enable plugs prevent flight or GSE software from performing hazardous operations.

14-29 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 SAR - PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT

14-30 MAVEN PF ICDR May 23-25, 2011 Mission Assurance Summary Experienced Personnel provide oversight and technical support across all elements of PFP Project Mission Assurance Requirements are well defined and comprehensive. These are traditional requirements for SSL Missions and they are understood. Systems with experienced personnel are in place and operating. The Mission Assurance team is ready to support MAVEN PFP