“Streamlined” Bundle Security Protocol Edward Birrane

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Presentation transcript:

“Streamlined” Bundle Security Protocol Edward Birrane

2 Overview Introduction − RFC6257 overview Motivation − Lessons Learned from BSP Implementations − Bundle Encapsulation − Recommended strategy to capture DTN security mechanisms SBSP Overview − Security Operations Overview – New Features and Constraints Security Functions – Review Common Cases Questions

Bundle Security Protocol Overview  Defines 4 Extension Blocks (BAB, PIB, PCB, ECB) Bundle Authentication: Covers entire bundle Payload Integrity: Integrity signature of payload-related blocks Payload Confidentiality: Crypto-text of other payload-related blocks, or describes crypto-text residing in payload block. Extension Security: Security for non-payload-related blocks. May have multiple blocks for a single service Often a pre-payload block working with a post-payload block. Example: Bundle Authentication of a large bundle Ciphersuites populate blocks BSP blocks contain ciphersuite identifiers and associated information. Bundle agents expected to support multiple ciphersuites. Protocol does not address management issues Key management is an open problem. Security policy enforcement and configuration is an open area. 3

BSP: Abstract Block Structure  Software implements this structure and uses it for processing  When creating/forwarding bundles, structure is populated and then serialized into the bundle bitstream.  When receiving a bundle, bitstream is desearialized into this structure and then validated.  Some fields omitted based on whether 1 or 2 blocks are used to implement a security service. 4 All BSP Blocks follow a standard block structure

Security Source/Destinations  Layered Security  Security-sources may differ from the bundle source.  Security-destinations may differ from the bundle destination.  Caveats  Up to the security-aware node to ensure there are no conflicts amongst all security-destinations in all security blocks in the bundle.  Cannot reach the bundle destination before reaching all necessary security-destinations. 5 Each security block has a security source and destination

− Decouple the routing and security functions – Security-destinations separate from bundle destinations problematic in many deployment scenarios. – Make common cases simpler; allow rare cases to scale. – Simplify block encapsulation an nesting rules. – Increase support for non-payload integrity – RFC6257 has no integrity mechanism for extension blocks separate from integrity signatures computed as part of confidentiality. – Leverage encapsulation to simplify processing rules. – Require fewer nested security blocks to provide super-encryption – Support security tunnels without any changes to the security spec. – Fragmentation must be addressed more thoroughly – Several problematic cases when assembling/fragmenting. Major Lessons Learned from RFC6257

Encapsulated Bundle − Implements security tunnels in a graceful way – Encapsulated bundle source/destination never changes. – Encapsulating bundle src/dest set to the security-src/security-dest – Lets existing routing mechanisms figure out the routing portion. – Provides mechanism for hiding primary block – Encapsulating bundle can have simpler primary block than encapsulated bundle. Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation Make an entire bundle the payload of another bundle. PRIMARY PAYLOAD PCB BAB Encapsulating Bundle PRIMARY PAYLOAD

Proposed Changes 1.Specify a bundle-in-bundle encapsulation (BIBE) protocol 2.Build a “streamlined” BSP which assumes the existence of BIBE. 3.Write a security practices document showing how SBSP+BIBE provides security services equivalent to those provided by BSP. Bundle Security Protocol RFC6257 Bundle Security Protocol RFC6257 Security Practices Streamlined Bundle Security Specification (SBSP) Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation Extension Blocks Defs Ciphersuites, Policies, Configurations

− Three security blocks, not four – Bundle Authentication Block (BAB), Block Confidentiality Block (BCB), Block Integrity Block (BIB) – Concept of “security operation” as (service, target) – (integrity, payload), (confidentiality, payload) – Only 1 unique instance of a security operation in a bundle. – Extension blocks treated same as payloads – Extension block no longer replaced by security block. – Support for integrity of extension blocks – (integrity, extension_block_1), (integrity, extension_block_2) – Support for primary block integrity – (integrity, primary_block) – Goal: minimal change to BSP for simple cases – “Simple” cases capture most deployments today. Streamlined BSP Overview

− Security-Service – Authentication, Confidentiality, Integrity – Security-Target – Block to which a service is applied. – Need to uniquely identify every block in a bundle – can’t rely on an extension block’s order in a bundle – Security-Operation – Unique combination of service/target. – OP(authentication, bundle), OP(confidentiality, primary) – OP(integrity, extension_block_1), OP(integrity, extension_block_2) – Operation MAY require 1 or more physical blocks. – MAY NOT be applied more than once in a bundle. – OP(confidentiality, payload), OP(confidentiality, payload) not allowed – OP(integrity, block N), OP(integrity, block N) also not allowed. SBSP: Terminology (1/2) New terms for security concepts.

− Lone Block – Used when a single SBSP block is used to implement a single security operation. – Ex: OP(confidentiality, payload) will result in a Lone BCB. – Ex: OP(authentication, bundle) with a single-block ciphersuite will result in a Lone BAB. – First Block / Last Block – Used when multiple SBSP blocks implement a single security operation. – Ex: OP(authentication, bundle) with a two-block ciphersuite will result in a “First BAB“ before the payload block and a “Last BAB” after the payload block. – No terms for blocks between “First” and “Last”. – No evidence we need > 2 blocks for a security operation. SBSP: Terminology (2/2) New terms added to differentiate multiple security blocks that comprise a single “security operation”.

SBSP – Abstract Security Block − Correlator field is no long present. – Less need for correlation with simplified rules for security operations. – Security-target new, compound field for block identification – Security-dest in EID list is optional. – For BIB or BCB, destination MUST be bundle destination – For BAB, optional and when given, must be the envisioned next hop.

− No block identification mechanism in RFC5050 – Note: RFC5050 should provide a block identifier. – Identify blocks as – Block type as encoded in the block – Enumeration is a simple SDNV count – The Nth instance of the block in the bundle (not based on bundle order) – NOT required to be monotonically increasing. Gaps OK. – Implementation recommendation – Create special EID and put it in EID list of blocks in a bundle. – Scheme is the block type – Scheme-Specific-Part is the enumeration SDNV. – Can be added every time a block is added – Can be added on-demand (if not already there) when a SBSP block targets an existing block. SBSP: Security Target We need a mechanism for uniquely identifying a block in a bundle.

− Bundle Authentication Block (BAB) – Authentication over the entire bundle, similar to RFC6257 BAB. – Security-target set to 0, always applied to whole bundle. – Only block that MAY specify a security-destination. – May define multi-result ciphersuite in lieu of multiple BABs – Simplifies protocol support. Moves complexity to ciphersuite handlers where it only affects those needed that ciphersuite. – Block Integrity Block (BIB) – Similar to RFC6257 PIB, but applies to blocks other than the payload. – Allows primary block as a security target. – Restrictions on security target to prevent “recursion” – A BIB cannot target any other SBSP block type. – May define ciphersuite for multiple security signatures in lieu of multiple BIBs for a given target. SBSP: Block Types (1/2) SBSP security blocks treat all security targets the same.

– Block Confidentiality Block (BCB) – Similar to RFC 6257 PCB, but applies to blocks other than the payload. – May target payload block, any non-SBSP block, and an SBSP BIB. – No support for super-encryption. We recommend super-encryption be handled via encapsulation. – Does NOT fully encapsulate security target. – As with PCB, only data portion of the block is replaced by ciphertext. – In special cases where other parts of a block require confidentiality, encapsulation or other mechanism may be used. – BCB may include additional authenticated data to integrity-sign parts of the target block not otherwise covered by the ciphersuite, such as the target-block EID references. SBSP: Block Types (2/2)

– A few concerns with BCB/BIB interactions – When applying confidentiality to a target, confidentiality MUST be applied to any integrity also applied to the same target. – A BIB won’t verify if its target has been encrypted with a BCB after the BIB was created. – i.e., when adding a BCB for a target, MUST add a BCB covering a BIB for that target, if such a BIB exists. – Integrity processing cannot evaluate an encrypted BIB. – BIB may not be evaluated if it is the security-target of a BCB in the bundle. – Integrity processing cannot evaluate an encrypted security-target. – Security-target contains ciphertext and will not match the BIB integrity signature. – SBSP mandates processing order for SBSP blocks – BAB evaluated first. – All BCBs evaluated before any BIBs. SBSP: Block Interactions

– Changes to canonicalization – Bundle Canonicalization – Largely same as RFC6257, including nits, errata – Primary-Block Canonicalization – To allow for primary block integrity. – Payload-Block Canonicalization – Extension-Block Canonicalization – Fragmentation – Integrity and confidentiality MAY NOT be applied to a fragment. – Even if security-target is not the payload. – May use encapsulation if this feature is required in a network. – May NOT fragment a bundle with a BAB. – Fragmentation must occur before calculating authentication information. – BABs may be added to fragments. SBSP: Canonicalization and Fragmentation

– Bundle – Primary block, payload block, and two extension blocks – Authentication – Add BAB to the bundle using a two-BAB ciphersuite – Integrity – Sign the primary block – Sign the second extension block – Sign the payload – Confidentiality – Encrypt the first extension block. – Encrypt the payload block – By SBSP rules, encrypt the BIB providing integrity to the payload block as well. SBSP: Bundle Example (1/2) Example of common security features in a single bundle

SBSP: Bundle Example (2/2)