sender policy framework

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Presentation transcript:

sender policy framework spf sender policy framework

From OpenSPF Note: http://www.openspf.org/ is a good reference source for SPF

Explain how SPF works in 1 minute http://www. openspf Domains use public records (DNS) to direct requests for different services (web, email, etc.) to the machines that perform those services All domains already publish email (MX) records to tell the world what machines receive mail for the domain SPF works by domains publishing "reverse MX" records to tell the world what machines send mail from the domain When receiving a message from a domain Recipient can check those records to make sure mail is coming from where it should be coming from With SPF, those "reverse MX" records are easy to publish: One line in DNS is all it takes

What does SPF actually DO? http://www.openspf.org/FAQ/What_it_does Spammer forges a hotmail.com address Tries to spam you They connect from somewhere other than Hotmail When the message is sent, you see: MAIL FROM: forged_address@hotmail.com Don't have to take his word for it Ask Hotmail if the IP address comes from their network (In this example) Hotmail publishes an SPF record That record tells you (your computer) how to find out if the sending machine is allowed to send mail from Hotmail If Hotmail says they recognize the sending machine It passes You can assume the sender is who they say they are If the message fails SPF tests It's a forgery That's how you can tell it's probably a spammer

sender policy framework Client validation system Verifies envelope sender is permitted to send mail on behalf of the domain In practice, only verifies IP address Aims to prevent rogue mail servers SPF provides no information about the contents of an email

how spf works SPF is stored in DNS An SPF record type is available Its use is not widespread RFC 4408 Deprecated in 2014? RFC 7208 RFC 7372? Using a TXT record is more common

how spf works An SPF record designates permitted and rejected sender(s) for a domain Mail from a non-permitted sender may be safely rejected

what spf checks SPF evaluation performed on two pieces of information Client email address Client IP address Client email is retrieved or derived from: Envelope sender (MAIL FROM) HELO/EHLO host name

what spf checks Evaluation is always performed on envelope sender Evaluation should be performed twice if envelope sender and HELO domains differ The RFC is unclear on how to merge the results of the evaluations Likely that the ‘best’ outcome is accepted

reading spf records (spf or txt record) Always start with ‘v=spf1’ Read left-to right Evaluation stops when a mechanism is matched Last element of a SPF record should always be an ‘all’ or a ‘redirect’ If no mechanisms are matched, the result returned is ‘Neutral’

3 example spf records (lines are wrapped) gmail.com. 300 IN TXT "v=spf1 redirect=_spf.google.com" _spf.google.com. 107 IN TXT "v=spf1 ip4:216.239.32.0/19 ip4:64.233.160.0/19 ip4:66.249.80.0/20 ip4:72.14.192.0/18 ip4:209.85.128.0/17 ip4:66.102.0.0/20 ip4:74.125.0.0/16 ip4:64.18.0.0/20 ip4:207.126.144.0/20 ip4:173.194.0.0/16 ?all” hotmail.com. 3600 IN TXT "v=spf1 include:spf-a.hotmail.com include:spf-b.hotmail.com include:spf-c.hotmail.com include:spf- d.hotmail.com ~all“

spf mechanisms ALL A Matches anything Matches if client IP matches one of the IP addresses of the named domain Performs DNS lookup on named domain Looks for A record if client IP is IPv4 AAAA if client IP is IPv6

spf mechanisms IP4, IP6 Matches if client IP is in the named netblock Variants for IPv4 and IPv6 Netblock must in CIDR format e.g. 172.16.1.0/24

spf mechanisms MX Matches if client IP is one of the servers in the MX records of the named domain PTR Matches if PTR record for client IP exists and maps to a host in the named domain

spf mechanisms EXISTS Matches if the named domain exists Can be used to emulate DNS blacklists e.g. ‘v=spf1 -exists:%{ir}.zen.spamhaus.org’

spf mechanisms INCLUDE Matches if the result of the referenced policy was PASS Name is poorly chosen

spf qualifiers “+” Pass “–” Fail Client is permitted to send mail for the domain Pass is implied if the qualifier is omitted “–” Fail Client is not authorized to send mail for the domain

spf qualifiers “~” SoftFail “?” Neutral Client should not send mail for the domain Mail should not be blocked solely on a SoftFail Result can be used by spam filtering software “?” Neutral No assertion on if client is authorized Must be treated same as if there were no SPF record

spf modifiers SPF modifiers Provide additional information Do not directly affect the evaluation of SPF records

spf modifiers redirect Redirect to a different SPF record Replaces result of this SPF record Redirect or All should always be last element of a SPF record

spf modifiers exp Provides an explanation of why SPF validation failed to the client The TXT record is looked up at named domain and its contents is used as the explanation SPF macros can be used to make the explanation more informative

selected spf macros A number of macros are available in SPF records Form: %{some stuff } Macros are expanded during SPF evaluation Some stuff: s = client email address l = local part of client email address o = domain of client email address h = domain name from HELO or EHLO

selected spf macros Some stuff (cont.) d = client domain name i = client IP address v is "in-addr" - if client IP is IPv4 "ip6" - if client IP is IPv6 Used to construct PTR addresses e.g. %{ir}.%{v}.arpa

spf macro transformers Some stuff (cont.) r - reverse macro, splitting on ‘.’ by default e.g. %{ir} will reverse an IP address 0-128 - number of delimited components to keep if d is ‘www.example.com’ %{d2} is ‘example.com’

spf macro delimiters Allows you to specify a delimiter to be replaced with periods Available delimiters are in the set .-+,/_= e.g. if l is ‘jwatso8+foo’ %{l+} is ‘jwatso8.foo’

example spf records (redux) gmail.com. 300 IN TXT "v=spf1 redirect=_spf.google.com" _spf.google.com. 107 IN TXT "v=spf1 ip4:216.239.32.0/19 ip4:64.233.160.0/19 ip4:66.249.80.0/20 ip4:72.14.192.0/18 ip4:209.85.128.0/17 ip4:66.102.0.0/20 ip4:74.125.0.0/16 ip4:64.18.0.0/20 ip4:207.126.144.0/20 ip4:173.194.0.0/16 ?all” hotmail.com. 3600 IN TXT "v=spf1 include:spf-a.hotmail.com include:spf-b.hotmail.com include:spf-c.hotmail.com include:spf-d.hotmail.com ~all“

spf example

spf header SMTP servers should add a ‘Received-SPF’ header to any E-Mail where a SPF record was checked The Received-SPF header should contain the result of the SPF check

Example spf headers Received-SPF: Pass (mybox.example.org: domain of myname@example.com designates 192.0.2.1 as permitted sender) receiver=mybox.example.org; client-ip=192.0.2.1; envelope-from=<myname@example.com>; helo=foo.example.com; Received-SPF: Fail (mybox.example.org: domain of myname@example.com does not designate 192.0.2.1 as permitted sender) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=192.0.2.1; envelope-from=<myname@example.com>;

spf limitations Only works if everyone uses it Only prevents mail from unauthorized hosts Even then only if servers check it Does not verify the sender, only their domain Does not verify the contents of a message SPAM can (and will) still find a way

sender id

sender id Microsoft Sender ID is a superset of SPF MS owns the patents Many open-source projects are wary of implementing it despite Microsoft’s promises

sender id Sender ID has two modes of operation mfrom pra validates envelope sender, just like SPF pra validates Purported Responsible Address

sender id’s pra Purported Responsible Address email address of most likely responsible party Derived by applying heuristics to a number typical E-Mail headers Defined in RFC 4407

sender id problems Sender ID violates SPF specification by trying to use a SPF record to verify the PRA Recommended practice is to add an empty Sender ID PRA record Prevents evaluation of your SPF record in determining PRA ‘spf2.0/pra ?all’

sender id recommendations (per jason watson) I do not feel it adds much value to pure SPF I recommend a neutral PRA record to prevent unintended consequences of Sender ID evaluating your SPF record mfrom will still evaluate your SPF record in the same manner as pure SPF