Philosophy of Religion New Approaches to Classic Problems Philosophy of Religion

Outline 2 classic problems 1 new approach to each Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Problem of Perfect Divine Goodness and Divine Freedom 1 new approach to each

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The Problem The New Approach

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The Problem Take any person, S, and any action A that person performs at any time t.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The Problem Take any person, S, and any action A that person performs at any time t. Suppose that God has exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge. Thus, for any time t*, earlier than t, God knows that S does A at t. This arguably implies that S cannot do A at t freely:

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The Problem Take any person, S, and any action A that person performs at any time t. Suppose that God has exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge. Thus, for any time t*, earlier than t, God knows that S does A at t. This arguably implies that S cannot do A at t freely: And, since S, A, and t were selected arbitrarily, the argument could be repeated for any action of any person at any time.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The Problem Divine foreknowledge that S does A at t arguably implies that S cannot do A at t freely: At t, it has to be that God believed at t* that S does A at t. Necessarily, if God believes at t* that S does A at t, then S does A at t. So, at t, it has to be that S does A at t. If, at t, it has to be that S does A at t, then it is not the case that S does A freely at t. So, it is not the case that S does A freely at t.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom P1: A version of the principle of the ‘Necessity of the Past’. Whatever has already happened has to have happened at later times. So, God’s past beliefs have to have happened at later times. The Problem Divine foreknowledge that S does A at t arguably implies that S cannot do A at t freely: At t, it has to be that God believed at t* that S does A at t. Necessarily, if God believes at t* that S does A at t, then S does A at t. So, at t, it has to be that S does A at t. If, at t, it has to be that S does A at t, then it is not the case that S does A freely at t. So, it is not the case that S does A freely at t.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The Problem Divine foreknowledge that S does A at t arguably implies that S cannot do A at t freely: At t, it has to be that God believed at t* that S does A at t. Necessarily, if God believes at t* that S does A at t, then S does A at t. So, at t, it has to be that S does A at t. If, at t, it has to be that S does A at t, then it is not the case that S does A freely at t. So, it is not the case that S does A freely at t. P2: Guaranteed by divine infallibility. God cannot be wrong.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The Problem Divine foreknowledge that S does A at t arguably implies that S cannot do A at t freely: At t, it has to be that God believed at t* that S does A at t. Necessarily, if God believes at t* that S does A at t, then S does A at t. So, at t, it has to be that S does A at t. If, at t, it has to be that S does A at t, then it is not the case that S does A freely at t. So, it is not the case that S does A freely at t. P3: Follows from 1 and 2 given the principle of the ‘Transfer of Necessity’: the ‘has to be’ operator transfers across logical entailment.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The Problem Divine foreknowledge that S does A at t arguably implies that S cannot do A at t freely: At t, it has to be that God believed at t* that S does A at t. Necessarily, if God believes at t* that S does A at t, then S does A at t. So, at t, it has to be that S does A at t. If, at t, it has to be that S does A at t, then it is not the case that S does A freely at t. So, it is not the case that S does A freely at t. P4: A version of the ‘Principle of Alternative Possibilities’. In order for an action to be performed freely, it has to be that the action didn’t have to be performed—a relevant alternative could have been instead.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The most well-known responses to this argument object to one of its premises. E.g., Boethianism and Ockhamism object to 1 in different ways. Augustinianism objects to 4. You can read about these approaches in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on “Foreknowledge and Free Will”. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The Problem Divine foreknowledge that S does A at t arguably implies that S cannot do A at t freely: At t, it has to be that God believed at t* that S does A at t. Necessarily, if God believes at t* that S does A at t, then S does A at t. So, at t, it has to be that S does A at t. If, at t, it has to be that S does A at t, then it is not the case that S does A freely at t. So, it is not the case that S does A freely at t.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The most well-known responses to this argument object to one of its premises. E.g., Boethianism and Ockhamism object to 1 in different ways. Augustinianism objects to 4. You can read about these approaches in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on “Foreknowledge and Free Will”. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The Problem Divine foreknowledge that S does A at t arguably implies that S cannot do A at t freely: At t, it has to be that God believed at t* that S does A at t. Necessarily, if God believes at t* that S does A at t, then S does A at t. So, at t, it has to be that S does A at t. If, at t, it has to be that S does A at t, then it is not the case that S does A freely at t. So, it is not the case that S does A freely at t. Given that these canonical responses all face significant problems, there is motivation for exploring a novel approach.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly (not objecting to one particular premise or inference) as follows:

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal determinism. So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom This basic strategy is articulated and defended in Chapters 2-4 of T. Ryan Byerly, The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account (Bloomsbury: 2014). The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal determinism. So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom P1: Will be granted at least for the sake of argument by any party to this debate. For, what the debate is about is whether divine foreknowledge poses some special challenge to human freedom. If human freedom were intrinsically impossible, there would be nothing to discuss. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal determinism. So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom P2: Follows from 1. The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal determinism. So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom P3: Infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge requires divine beliefs, the truth of the contents of these beliefs, and a mechanism whereby these beliefs are rendered infallible. Neither the divine beliefs themselves nor the truth of their contents could be that which explains why humans lack freedom; so, this leaves the mechanism that renders divine beliefs infallible as the only candidate. But, the only mechanism we know of whereby infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge could be achieved which would also pose a threat to human freedom is if causal determinism were true and God’s foreknowledge were achieved via reliance upon it. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal determinism. So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom P3: Infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge requires divine beliefs, the truth of the contents of these beliefs, and a mechanism whereby these beliefs are rendered infallible. Neither the divine beliefs themselves nor the truth of their contents could be that which explains why humans lack freedom; so, this leaves the mechanism that renders divine beliefs infallible as the only candidate. But, the only mechanism we know of whereby infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge could be achieved which would also pose a threat to human freedom is if causal determinism were true and God’s foreknowledge were achieved via reliance upon it. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom. determinism. So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom. This is because the belief (and the truth of its content) is either explained by what it is about, or the belief (and the truth of its content) and what it is about share a common explanation. But, in neither case could the belief (or the truth of its content) explain why humans lack freedom.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom P3: Infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge requires divine beliefs, the truth of the contents of these beliefs, and a mechanism whereby these beliefs are rendered infallible. Neither the divine beliefs themselves nor the truth of their contents could be that which explains why humans lack freedom; so, this leaves the mechanism that renders them infallible as the only candidate. But, the only mechanism we know of whereby infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge could be achieved which would also pose a threat to human freedom is if causal determinism were true and God’s foreknowledge were achieved via reliance upon it. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal determinism. So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom. CD is the thesis that, given the past and laws, there is only one way the future can go. If this thesis is true, God could rely upon his knowledge of the past and laws to know the future infallibly and exhaustively.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom P3: Infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge requires divine beliefs, the truth of the contents of these beliefs, and a mechanism whereby these beliefs are rendered infallible. Neither the divine beliefs themselves nor the truth of their contents could be that which explains why humans lack freedom; so, this leaves the mechanism that renders them infallible as the only candidate. But, the only mechanism we know of whereby infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge could be achieved which would also pose a threat to human freedom is if causal determinism were true and God’s foreknowledge were achieved via reliance upon it. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal determinism. So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom. There are well-known reasons for thinking that the truth of causal determinism would threaten human freedom.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom P4: An ongoing research project. Defending this claim is best achieved by articulating and disjoining numerous distinct accounts of how God might achieve exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge without relying upon the truth of causal determinism. For example, some Boethian approaches attempt to do this; Molinist approaches attempt to do this; some Thomistic approaches attempt to do this; and there are new proposals being articulated as well—such as the time-ordering approach. The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal determinism. So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom.

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom P4: An ongoing research project. Defending this claim is best achieved by articulating and disjoining numerous distinct accounts of how God might achieve exhaustive and infallible foreknowledge without relying upon the truth of causal determinism. For example, some Boethian approaches attempt to do this; Molinist approaches attempt to do this; some Thomistic approaches attempt to do this; and there are new proposals being articulated as well—such as the time-ordering approach. The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal determinism. Boethianism: Michael Rota, “The Eternity Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2, 1 (2010): 165-86. Molinism: Tom Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Cornell University Press: 2006). Thomism: Hugh McCann, Creation and the Sovereignty of God (Indiana University Press: 2012). Matthews Grant, “Can a Libertarian Hold that Our Acts are Caused by God?” Faith and Philosophy 27, 1 (2010): 22-44. Time-ordering: T. Ryan Byerly, The Mechanics of Divine Foreknowledge and Providence: A Time-Ordering Account (Bloomsbury: 2014).

Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom The New Approach: Object to the argument indirectly as follows: Human freedom is not intrinsically impossible; if it does not exist, something must explain why it doesn’t exist. So, if the existence of infallible and exhaustive divine foreknowledge implies that humans don’t have free will, then the existence of this foreknowledge requires the existence of something that explains why humans don’t have free will. The best candidate for what this foreknowledge could require that would explain the absence of human freedom is the truth of causal determinism. But, we are not in a position to know that exhaustive and infallible divine foreknowledge requires causal determinism. So, we are not in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom. If 2-4 are true, then no argument attempting to show that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom puts us in a position to know that divine foreknowledge rules out human freedom.

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom The Problem A New Approach

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom The Problem There is motivation for theists to claim that God is both perfectly good and possesses free will. But, there is an apparent conflict between God being perfect good and God possessing free will:

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom The Problem There is motivation for theists to claim that God is both perfectly good and possesses free will. But, there is an apparent conflict between God being perfect good and God possessing free will: If God is perfectly good, then God is unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. If God is free, God is able to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. It cannot be that God is both able and unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification.

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom God wouldn’t be perfectly good if God brought about (or even permitted) an event for which there was no moral justification. But, perfect goodness is supposed to be an essential divine attribute. So, necessarily God doesn’t bring about such events—it isn’t possible that God brings about such events. Yet, if it isn’t possible that God brings about such events, then God is not able to bring about such events. The Problem There is motivation for theists to claim that God is both perfectly good and possesses free will. But, there is an apparent conflict between God being perfect good and God possessing free will: If God is perfectly good, then God is unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. If God is free, God is able to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. It cannot be that God is both able and unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification.

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom Theists tend to affirm that the value of an agent’s freedom is enhanced to the extent that the agent is able to perform both better and worse kinds of acts—endorsing this idea helps with the problem of evil. Since God is supposed to be a perfect being, it would appear to follow that God must then be able to perform both the best and worst kinds of acts. So, God must be able to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. The Problem There is motivation for theists to claim that God is both perfectly good and possesses free will. But, there is an apparent conflict between God being perfect good and God possessing free will: If God is perfectly good, then God is unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. If God is free, God is able to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. It cannot be that God is both able and unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification.

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom By in large, philosophers working on this problem have tended to reject 2, identifying asymmetries between humans and God that explain why the ability to bring about events for which there is no moral justification would enhance human freedom but not divine freedom. The Problem There is motivation for theists to claim that God is both perfectly good and possesses free will. But, there is an apparent conflict between God being perfect good and God possessing free will: If God is perfectly good, then God is unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. If God is free, God is able to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. It cannot be that God is both able and unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification.

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom By in large, philosophers working on this problem have tended to reject 2, identifying asymmetries between humans and God that explain why the ability to bring about events for which there is no moral justification would enhance human freedom but not divine freedom. The Problem There is motivation for theists to claim that God is both perfectly good and possesses free will. But, there is an apparent conflict between God being perfect good and God possessing free will: If God is perfectly good, then God is unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. If God is free, God is able to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. It cannot be that God is both able and unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. However, this approach: Tends to rely on endorsing the controversial doctrine of divine simplicity in order to account for the relevant asymmetries, and Is counterintuitive, in that it maintains that as one advances in goodness toward divine goodness, one loses abilities

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom By in large, philosophers working on this problem have tended to reject 2, identifying asymmetries between humans and God that explain why the ability to bring about events for which there is no moral justification would enhance human freedom but not divine freedom. The Problem There is motivation for theists to claim that God is both perfectly good and possesses free will. But, there is an apparent conflict between God being perfect good and God possessing free will: If God is perfectly good, then God is unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. If God is free, God is able to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. It cannot be that God is both able and unable to bring about events for which there is no moral justification. However, this approach: Tends to rely on endorsing the controversial doctrine of divine simplicity in order to account for the relevant asymmetries, and Is counterintuitive, in that it maintains that as one advances in goodness toward divine goodness, one loses abilities So, a novel approach is well-motivated

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom The Problem A New Approach Grant that by virtue of divine freedom, God is able to bring about events that have no moral justification, but maintain that God necessarily exercises perfect self-control over this ability.

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom This approach is articulated and defended in T. Ryan Byerly, “The All-Powerful, Perfectly Good, and Free God,” Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, vol. 8, ed. Jonathan Kvanvig (Oxford University Press: forthcoming). The Problem A New Approach Grant that by virtue of divine freedom, God is able to bring about events that have no moral justification, but maintain that God necessarily exercises perfect self-control over this ability.

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom A New Approach Grant that by virtue of divine freedom, God is able to bring about events that have no moral justification, but maintain that God necessarily exercises perfect self-control over this ability. Key features of this approach:

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom A New Approach Grant that by virtue of divine freedom, God is able to bring about events that have no moral justification, but maintain that God necessarily exercises perfect self-control over this ability. Key features of this approach: Draws on “Luther cases,” where an agent would claim that, by virtue of her own character, she “couldn’t” perform some act (e.g., torturing her child for a nickel). The sense in which the agent couldn’t act this way derives from an ability—her control over herself—not from any inability, as on the alternative approach.

Divine Perfect Goodness and Divine Freedom A New Approach Grant that by virtue of divine freedom, God is able to bring about events that have no moral justification, but maintain that God necessarily exercises perfect self-control over this ability. Key features of this approach: Draws on recent work defending Neo-Aristotelian approaches which take powers to be fundamental. On such approaches, it is possible to deny that the power to bring about an event requires the possibility of bringing about that event. Accordingly, God can have the power to bring about events which lack moral justification without it being possible that God does so.