Functional Safety in industry application

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Presentation transcript:

Functional Safety in industry application Yunxi Zhang 张云禧 TÜV Rheinland Greater China +86 10 65666660-149 Yunxi.zhang@tuv.com www.tuvasi.com

Topics under discussion 1 History in Functional Safety 2 Terms of Functional Safety 3 Systematic Faults according to IEC 61508-2 4 Random Faults according to IEC 61508-2 2

History in Functional Safety and TÜV Rheinland in the past 40 years

Use of electronic circuits in safety related application Safety Consideration - Functional Safety Beginning in the 1970‘s TÜV Rheinland carried out type approval of safety related electronic circuits, mainly fail-safe technology Low complex components, hard wired technology Measures e.g.: Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) Failure rate (l), MTBF calculation

TÜV Handbook “Microcomputer in Safety Technique” Research project computer safety Definition of safety classes (5) Fault models of integrated circuits Structures, redundancy, diversity Diagnostic measures for: CPU, RAM, ROM Communication, I/O …. Internal discussion of: Failure rates Failure rate targets related to safety classes Diagnostic coverage not accepted in industrial standards at that time Results published as book 1984

Certification of Programmable Electronic Systems Early 1980‘s Microprocessor based Transmitter 1986 First Safety related Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) 1oo2 Architecture 1991 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) TMR system 2oo3 1992 Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) TMR system 2oo3, hot stand by

Development of safety related standards Security ……. 1984 1989 1996 2000 2003 2006 2010 2011 20xx TÜV handbook EN 1050 EN 954 VDE 0801 A.1 IEC 61508 IEC 61511 EN 50156 EN ISO 13849 IEC 62061 IEC 61508 Ed. 2 ISO 26262 IEC xxxx DIN 19250 VDE 0801 VDE 0116 and many other product or application standards Safety classes Requirement classes / Safety Category Safety Integrity Level / Performance Level

Functional Safety Standards used for Certification Security ……. 1984 1989 1996 2000 2003 2005 2010 2015 Application related Standards and TÜV handbook IEC 61508, EN ISO 13849, EN 50156, IEC 61511 and other Application Standards IEC 61508, ISO 26262 and other product or Application standards DIN 19250, VDE 0801 VDE 0116 and other Application related Standards

Relation of IEC 61508 / Sector, Application Standards Overview: ISO 13849-1 Machinery IEC 61800-5-2 Electrical drives IEC 61513 Nuclear Sector IEC 61508 EN 50128 Railway application IEC 62061 Machinery IEC 60601 Medical devices EN 81 Lifts IEC 61511 Process Sector EN 50156 Furnaces

Terms of Functional Safety

„Functional Safety“ A safety system is functionally safe if Random, systematic and common cause failures do not lead to malfunctioning of the safety system and do not result in injury or death of humans pollution of the environment loss of equipment or production 4 4 The safety function of a device / control system has to be guaranteed both under normal conditions and in the existence of faults. 37 11 37 Kr - Gb_Basis 61508- Begriffe der Sicherheitstechnik.pptm

„Safety Function“ IEC 61508-4, 3.5.1 A function of a safety related system to reduce the risk in an application with the objective to achieve or keep a safe state. The safety function is always related to a safety loop, not to a component or device. Sensor Logic Actuator 4 4 PLC U 41 12 41 Kr - Gb_Basis 61508- Begriffe der Sicherheitstechnik.pptm

„Systematic and random faults“ IEC 61508-4 3.6.5-6 Systematic faults Software Bugs Pentium FDIV-Bug … The system is already operating in Windows error-free for over 6 hours. Something must be wrong here. Restart My first fault message Fault My first fault message! Random faults Ageing or worsening of components Soft Errors … 4 4 44 13 44 Kr - Gb_Basis 61508- Begriffe der Sicherheitstechnik.pptm

Target failure measures IEC 61508-1 , Table 2 / Table 3 target failure measures for a safety function operating in low demand mode of operation PFDAV 2. target failure measures for a safety function operating in high demand or continuous mode of operation PFH 86 114 7 7 86 Kr - Gb_Basis 61508- Risikoanalyse.pptm

Safety Function, Safety Loop Sensor E / E / PES Actuator 35% 15% 50% Typical share of failure rates experienced by industrial plants 233 15 20 20 233 Stf - Gb_IEC61508-2 Sicherheitstechnische Parameter PFD-PFH.pptm

Systematic Faults according to IEC 61508-2

Type of Faults Failure / fault 13 13 Fault control Fault avoidance/ Fault: abnormal condition, that may cause loss resp. at least a reduction of a functional unit (system or sub-system) to perform a required function Failure with definite cause, can only be eliminated by alteration of design, production process, operating mode, operation instructions or other influencing factors Failure / fault Systematic failure Random failure 13 13 Failure, occurring at a random time and whose cause can not be defined distinctively Fault control Fault avoidance/ Fault control 148 16 148 Stf - Gb_IEC61508-2 Systematische Fehler.pptm

Measures to avoid systematic faults (QM) Annex B of IEC 61508-2: Recommendation of measures and methods to avoid systematic faults in hardware during the different life cycle phases 13 Annex B and C of IEC 61508-7: Description of measures and methods with further references 13 149 17 149 Stf - Gb_IEC61508-2 Systematische Fehler.pptm

Measures to control systematic failures IEC 61508-2 , Annex A.3 The standard requires the application of QM measures to avoid failures in the different phases during the life cycle of a product. The requirement to apply these measures is dependent on the SIL. No matter how well these measures are applied, there is a residual probability of systematic failures occurring. That's why the standard requires the implementation of measures and techniques to control systematic failures caused by HW and SW design (see IEC 61508-2, Table A.15) due to environmental stress or external influences (incl. EMC) (see IEC 61508-2, Table A.16) during operation, (operator mistakes) (see IEC 61508-2, Table A.17) 13 13 156 18 156 Stf - Gb_IEC61508-2 Systematische Fehler.pptm

Random Faults according to IEC 61508-2

Type of Faults Failure / fault Fault control 15 15 Fault avoidance/ Fault: abnormal condition, that may cause loss; at least a reduction of a functional unit (system or sub-system) to perform a required function Failure with definite cause, can only be eliminated by alteration of design, production process, operating mode, operation instructions or other influencing factors Failure / fault Systematic failure Random failure Failure, occurring at a random time and whose cause can not be defined distinctively Fault control 15 15 Fault avoidance/ Fault control 172 20 172 Stf - Gb_IEC61508-2 zufällige Fehler und Ausfallbetrachtungen.pptm

Measures to control random faults (on-line diagnostic) Annex A Table A.2 ….. Table A.14 of IEC 61508-2: Techniques/measures to control random faults of different component 13 Annex B and C of IEC 61508-7: Description of measures and methods with further references 13 149 21 149 Stf - Gb_IEC61508-2 Systematische Fehler.pptm

Thank you ! Any question please feel free to contact: 肖潇然 jane.xiao@tuv.com +86 10 6566 6660-174 13811276916