Briefing is drawn from IDA Paper P-5126

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Presentation transcript:

Acquisition Policy and Process, Funding Climate, and Cost Growth Briefing for the Business Implementation SIG December 18, 2014 David L. McNicol

Briefing is drawn from IDA Paper P-5126 IDA Paper P-5126, “Evidence on the Effect of DoD Acquisition Policy and Process on Cost Growth of Major Defense Acquisition Programs” is available at: https://www.ida.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/CARD/P-5126.ashx To obtain a hard copy, contact IDA Library Reference Services: Phone: (703) 845-2087 E-mail: refdesk@ida.org A summary of P-5126 in included in Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We Go From Here? Staff Report prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Washington, GPO, 2014.

Agenda Have acquisition process and policy had a visible effect on the growth in Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC)? Where do the PAUC growth outliers come from and how important are they? Do reasonable changes in the break points between funding climates substantially alter the results?

Methodology Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained Funding Environment (FY) Relatively Accommodating Funding Environment (FY) Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) 1970–1980 1981–1982 Post Carlucci Initiatives DSARC 1987–1989 1983–1986 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 1990–1993 No observations Acquisition Reform (AR) 1994–2000 DAB post AR 2001–2002 2003–2007

The Cost Growth Data The research used PAUC growth for 151 Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) that passed MS II/B during FY 1970–FY 2007. Each of these MDAPs entered the acquisition process as an Acquisition Category (ACAT) I program and went into production. PAUC growth is measured from the MS II/B baseline and normalized to the MS II/B total quantity acquired. PAUC growth is associated with the MDAP and not a time period. For example, the average PAUC growth specified for a period (e.g., FY 1970–FY 1980) is the average quantity normalized PAUC growth of all MDAPs that passed MS II as ACAT I programs during those years.

PAUC Growth Acquisition Regime and Procurement Funding Climate Relatively Accommodating (FY) DSARC 1981–1982 11% (6) Post Carlucci DSARC 1983–1986 13% (29) DAB No observations AR DAB post AR 2003–2007 7% (19) Note: Number of observations available in parentheses. The differences in average PAUC growth across acquisition regimes are not statistically significant for the Relatively Accommodating funding climate.

Relatively Constrained (FY) PAUC Growth Acquisition Regime and Procurement Funding Climate (cont’d) Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained (FY) DSARC 1970–1980 35% (42) Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 34% (11) DAB 1990–1993 36% (11) AR 1994–2000 66% (27) DAB post AR 2001–2002 57% (6) Note: Number of observations available in parentheses. The differences in average PAUC growth across acquisition regimes also are not statistically significant for the Relatively Constrained funding climate.

Relatively Constrained (FY) Relatively Accommodating (FY) PAUC Growth Acquisition Regime and Procurement Funding Climate (cont’d) Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained (FY) Relatively Accommodating (FY) DSARC 1970–1980 35% (42) 1981–1982 11% (6) Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 34% (11) 1983–1986 13% (29) DAB 1990–1993 36% (11) No observations AR 1994–2000 66% (27) DAB post AR 2001–2002 57% (6) 2003–2007 7% (19) Note: Number of observations available in parentheses. Average PAUC growth was significantly less in the Relatively Accommodating funding climate for each of the three acquisition regimes for which the comparison can be made.

General Observations The major surprise in the preceding chart is the low PAUC growth of MDAPs that passed MS II/B during in a period of good funding weather. A total of 108 MDAPs passed MS II/B during the two periods of Relatively Accommodating funding. We have PAUC growth for 54 of these. The average PAUC growth for these 54 MDAPs was a tenth of a percent. Only four of these 54 programs showed PAUC growth ≥ 50%, and three of these employed some form of Total Package Procurement. Acquisition policy and process apparently work well (by the standard of PAUC growth) for MDAPs that passed MS II/B in good funding weather.

Agenda Have acquisition process and policy had a visible effect on the growth in Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC)? Where do the PAUC growth outliers come from and how important are they? Do reasonable changes in the break points between funding climates substantially alter the results?

Number of MDAPs with PAUC Growth ≥ 50 Percent Acquisition Regime Topline Relatively Constrained (FY) Topline Relatively Accommodating (FY) DSARC 1970–1980 15 of 42 1981–1982 0 of 6 Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 2 of 11 1983–1986 3 of 29 DAB 1990–1993 3 of 11 No observations AR 1994–2000 13 of 27 DAB post AR 2001–2002 3 of 6 2003–2007 1 of 19 Total 36 of 97 (37%) 4 of 54 (7%) The probability of a PAUC growth ≥ 50% was 27 percentage points higher in a Relatively Constrained funding climate than in a Relatively Accommodating funding climate.

Percent of PAUC Growth Accounted for by Observations ≥ 50% Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained Funding Climate (FY) Relatively Accommodating Funding Climate (FY) DSARC 1970–1980 73% 1981–1982 Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 62% 1983–1986 70% DAB 1990–1993 64% No observations AR 1994–2000 90% DAB post AR 2001–2002 75% 2003–2007 43% Not weighted by program size, MDAPs with a PAUC growth of ≥ 50% account for just over three-quarters of quantity adjusted cost growth.

Number of MDAPs with Negative PAUC Growth Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained Funding Climate (FY) Relatively Accommodating Funding Climate (FY) DSARC 1970–1980 5 of 42 1981–1982 2 of 6 Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 2 of 11 1983–1986 10 of 29 DAB 1990–1993 1 of 11 No observations AR 1994–2000 4 of 27 DAB post AR 2001–2002 0 of 6 2003–2007 5 of 19 Total 12 of 97 (12%) 17 of 54 (31%) The probability of negative PAUC growth is 21 percentage points lower for MDAPs that passed MS II/B in a Relatively Constrained funding climate.

Alternative Explanations for Negative PAUC Growth and PAUC Growth ≥ 50 Percent P-5126 concludes that “…the relevant context for understanding PAUC growth is the interface between the acquisition process and the resource allocation process.” This conclusion includes two possibilities: Major acquisition programs more frequently adopt more optimistic costing and programmatic assumptions in Relatively Constrained funding climates compared to Relatively Accommodating climates. In Relatively Constrained funding climates, some MDAPs are issued top-down guidance (possibly from the Program/Budget process) that results in more optimistic costing and programmatic assumptions. In Accommodating funding climates, some MDAPs are over-funded so that they can be used as a “bank” to hold funds for later commitment. Each explanation implies more negative PAUC growth in Accommodating climates and more MDAPs with PAUC growth of ≥ 50% in Relatively Constrained climates. Each of the two explanations probably is correct in some instances. P-5126 did not attempt to distinguish between the two statistically.

Agenda Have acquisition process and policy had a visible effect on the growth in Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC)? Where do the PAUC growth outliers come from and how important are they? Do reasonable changes in the break points between funding climates substantially alter the results?

Selection of Break Points between Funding Climates This research used only two funding climate categories—Relatively Constrained and Relatively Accommodating. Our touchstone in selection of break points was major shifts in the expectation about future funding of senior DoD decision makers. We used three events to identify the break points between funding climates: The invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR in late December 1979. The passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in December 1985; and The terrorist attack on the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001. Senior decision makers could reasonably expect each of these events to result in major and sustained changes in the defense funding climate. After examining contemporary policy statements and events we selected: FY 1981 as the first year of the Carter-Reagan buildup; FY 1986 as the final year of the Carter-Reagan buildup; and FY 2003 as the first year of the post-9/11 defense buildup.

Relatively Constrained (FY) Relatively Accommodating (FY) PAUC Growth Acquisition Regime and Procurement Funding Climate—Alternative Break Points Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained (FY) Relatively Accommodating (FY) DSARC 1970–1979 37% (39) 1980–1982 7% (9) Post Carlucci DSARC 1986–1989 25% (17) 1983–1985 14% (23) DAB 1990–1993 36% (11) No observations AR 1994–2000 66% (27) DAB post AR 2001–2007 19% (25) Note: Number of observations available in parentheses. Two conclusions change if the alternative break points are used: Average PAUC growth for the Acquisition Reform years is significantly higher than in other acquisition regimes. The difference in PAUC growth between the two funding climates is not statistically significant for the Post Carlucci DSARC acquisition regime.

Concluding Comments

Implications for Debates on Acquisition Reform It seems unlikely that further changes in the acquisition process will have a major effect on PAUC growth. The relevant context for understanding very high PAUC growth is the interface between the acquisition process and the program/budget process. The underlying cause of persistent high PAUC growth is not a deeply established culture of the DoD acquisition organizations and their professional employees.