Impact of forestry interventions on land conflicts and land tenure in Eastern Africa Esbern Friis-Hansen, Senior Researcher Rasmus Hundsbæk Pedersen, Postdoc

From land grabbing to unpacking land-based investments? DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 2

Background: The land grabbing debate 2007-08 Triple crisis over finance, fuel and food: Increased level of FDI into natural resources In developing countries (esp. Africa), preceded by liberalisation. Flurry of activity, publications, among scholars and NGO activists. Convergence of critique of contemporary capitalism and neocolonialism. DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Land grabbing revisited Around 2013: land grabbing revited: Scale: From 203 million ha (2012) to 42.4 million ha (2016) (Land Matrix). Other actors than FDI involved, unpacking required. Debates over methodologies and definitions. = Cotula (2013): The great African Land Grab? DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Today: Plural approaches to studying land-based investments Diversity of drivers and actors: more focus on domestic actors and political economy. Context matters: more complex links between local-national-international. Distribution of costs and benefits requires unpacking (though social diversification seem trend across). Interplay between commoditisation, authority, rights, infrastructure. Land grabbing label reserved to a narrower set of cases. DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Scale and actors of timber rush DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 6

Scale and actors of timber rush OWNERSHIP Coverage (ha) 0-3 years 3-8 years > 8 years Farmers and domestic investors 150,159 7.7% 64.2% 28.2% Companies 20,573 3.7% 50.1% 46.2% Government 36,182 5.6% 40.2% 54.2% Total 206,914 6.9% 85.6% 34.5% DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 7

Pace, Scale and Drivers of Timber Rush Market volume; Market access; Land and labour availability; Culture; Cost-benefit; Land use factors influencing village plantation Actors Land access & process Value chain Villagers Alternative landuse options Land properties Infrastructure Access procedures Land reforms Institutions Governance Relations (villagers- domestic investors) Asymetric economy VC input-output VC relations VC governance VC standards Changes in product, process and fuction Institutional context Domestic investors Foreign investors Impact Farmer-investor land conflicts Agriculture or trees Income from sale of trees Labour market Wider growth from value chain

Forest land use Villagers plant trees on slopes og infertile land, but also on flat fertile agricultural land Domestic investors plant trees between the villages and on former common land Land use planning and local bylaws are insufficient institutions for regulating land use DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 9

Land conflicts and institutions Relations between domestic investors and the villages are envolving over time. Positive when land is sold, less so after some years when land become more scarce and prices increase Strong increase in conflicts over ownership to land between domestic investors and multiple local people claiming ownership after initial sale Significant increase cases at ward and district land courts Shifting village government have conflicting interests in land transactions DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 10

Decentralized through mobile sawmills Timber value chain Value of trees in the field 2000$ per acre; Value as processed sawn planks 10-15.000 $ Decentralized through mobile sawmills Timber traders operate unregulated cartels. Taxation of timer trade is minimal No policy policy facilitation of value chain DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 11

Timber value chain F DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 12

Timber Rush and Food security Trees replace food crops Less land for hire for the poor Sale of trees for buying food Casual labour market ensure food security for the ‘able poor’ DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 13

Political economy of forest fire Forest fire is the major risk for village plantations Villagers only help fight fires for domestic investors that they have good relations to No institutional enforcement of firebreaks, no modern firefighting equipment, no consequence for starting fires DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 14

Towards a new rural social fabric ? Domestic investors are members of the village and asked to make voluntary contributions to village projects Domestic investors create jobs Social relations between investors and village government are of mutual importance DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 15

Unpacking large-scale natural ressource investments DIIS ∙ DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES