Lessons Learned Implementing an IEC 61850-based Microgrid Power-Management System October 12, 2015 Presented by: Jared Mraz, P.E.

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Lessons Learned Implementing an IEC 61850-based Microgrid Power-Management System October 12, 2015 Presented by: Jared Mraz, P.E.

Introduction Fuel refinery in Salt Lake City, Utah Reliability improvement projects started in 2012 New main substation New medium-voltage distribution infrastructure New microprocessor-based relays installed Dedicated Protection and SCADA network installed Existing loads cut-over from aging substations to new feeds

System Overview

Need for Power Management System Plant load 18 MW prior to upgrades Several expansion projects executed during course of reliability improvements By cutover in March 2015, load grew to 25 MW Generators capable of 18.4 – 24 MW Utility source provides balance Load shedding scheme required to keep Co-Gens running during islanding Loss of Co-Gens results in costly outage due to loss of steam

Power Management System Overview Contingency-based scheme Central controller monitors system conditions Controller calculates amount to shed in real-time for pre-defined “contingencies” Requires protection-speed communications Met performance requirements identified during preliminary studies Protection network already in place for GOOSE schemes at plant GOOSE selected as protocol for load shedding

Contingency Scheme Overview Three Breaker Types Contingency Change of state can initiate load shed Monitor status and power import Topology Status used to determine system configuration Load Monitor power consumption Tripped during load shedding event

Contingency-based Scheme Example Shed load when both main breakers open Shed pre-event import plus margin Decisions based on real-time metering and breaker status from field devices

Contingency-based Scheme Example Scheme must shed 4 MW, plus small margin Lowest-priority 5 MW feeder selected to trip Controller will trip feeder if contingency trigger occurs

Contingency-based Scheme Example Main breakers trip for utility undervoltage

Contingency-based Scheme Example Pre-selected feeder tripped by controller

Testing Approach Bench Test RTDS testing selected due to complexity and criticality of system Allowed for thorough closed-loop testing Allowed scheme controllers and IEDs to be interfaced with test system Site Acceptance Test Communications checks Limited set of functional tests Islanding events during plant outage with simulated load

Lesson 1 – Accurately Characterize the System Generator dynamic model validation System modeled in phasor domain software Determined performance requirements for power management system Limit assumptions about system parameters Increased confidence in model

Lesson 2 – Thoroughly Test System Operating Modes Accurately model plant and nearby utility system Examine normal and contingency cases Existing and future loading Variety of initiating conditions for islanding events Determine controlling cases Scheme performance for all cases verified with RTDS Focus on controlling cases

Lesson 3 – Include at Least One of Each Device Type in the Bench Test Actual relays and controllers Contingency and load breaker relays Problem with GOOSE analog values Required re-design of frequency-based triggers Problem may not have been identified using traditional bench test method

Lesson 4 – Test System Failure Modes Verify scheme operation during failure modes Unintended operations not tolerated Failure modes considered Communications failure Settings changes Loss of IED power Failure mode testing Security issue identified in controllers during re-establishment of communications 52A status issue uncovered during DC power failures

Lesson 5 – Identify FAT and Commissioning Test Boundaries Factory Acceptance Test Realistic testing in consequence-free environment Not impacted by operational restrictions or outage duration Response of entire system viewed by design team Test power management system for all foreseeable contingencies Verify logic of controller and each unique IED type in system Minimize exposure to field changes

Lesson 5 – Identify FAT and Commissioning Test Boundaries (Continued) Site Acceptance Test Keep testing succinct to limit outage duration Live islanding tests not practical Focus on items not verified in lab Communications checks I/O, controls, and alarm verifications

Lesson 6 – Carefully Preserve System Test Details Bench Test Setup RSCAD Model, Photos of Setup, Wiring Diagrams Allows test environment to be recreated Bench Test Results COMTRADE captures from RTDS Device SERs captured for all tests Automated tests for controller logic Site Acceptance Results Device SERs and relay event reports captured Test results provide a known reference point for comparison with actual field events.

Conclusions IEC61850 GOOSE messaging provides flexibility for protection and control systems Protection-class network required RTDS testing provides thorough performance validation Thorough lab testing for complex systems minimizes field changes and improves final product

Questions?