4TH MANFRED LACHS INTERNATIONAL Montreal, Quebec, Canada Space and security relationships issues from a political and technological point of view Florence Gaillard-Sborowsky Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique 4TH MANFRED LACHS INTERNATIONAL 27-28 May 2016 Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Interplay between space and security is not new But despite this long history space powers have often had troubles to find a common ground implicit comprehension of the space security, lack of definitions of the main notions in the field (threat, risk, vulnerability, space security etc.) some preconceived notions on security in space also often because of its disconnection from the ASAT’s programs reality Impact the core fondations on which the rules of law at international level could be built

Space security from political science: lessons learned for international rules framework Space security notion emerges on the international scene since the 80s Emergence of new problems transforming the relationships between space and security leading to anew term ‘space security’. Actors intend to bring together : militarization , weaponization, debris, satellite meteorology etc. But Space security is widely discussed, more rarely defined. What means space security ? Space security is a "sub-concept" of the security concept Methodological point of view from security studies : potential guidelines to delimit space security Space security for whom? For what values? How far? At what price? Over what period? What threats or/and risks? qualification is essential

Current situation of the security in space from technological standpoint What are the technologies’ realities ? 3 broad categories of effort : development of ground-based weapons designed to damage or destroy ground installations development of ground-based weapons targeting objects in orbit space weapons (possibly co-orbital) can destroy a spatial target Historical and chronological review of ASAT’s technologies proposed, studied, tested, developped and in service : programs specifically anti-satellite not specifically anti-satellite programs but tested as anti-satellite not specifically anti-satellite programs but considered / proposed as anti-satellite

programs specifically anti-satellite fgdefg

not specifically anti-satellite programs but tested as anti-satellite

not specifically anti-satellite programs but considered/ proposed as anti-satellite

Major trends in the development of American and Soviet-Russian systems:   Weapons system United States URSS/Russia specifically Not specifically Total Project/ Studies Tested In service Kinetic Energy Ground Airborne Space 3 2 1 10 5 7 12 2+2 ? Total KE 9 8 4 25 Directed Energy 1 ? Total ED 14 32 6 13

Current potentially operational systems: US  : MIRACL+AEGIS (ground)  Russia : IS-Mu (space) + relaunch of KONTAKT program and Sokol Eshelon (airborne) Threat credibility : United States : only country to have a complete doctrinal vision of the use of their ASAT capabilities + associated means + corresponding budget. US have the majority of military satellites in orbit and therefore could be threatened, but no other space nations has sufficient ASAT destroying capabilities. Russia : most of the programs officially stopped China : 2007 essay, continued technologies demonstrations (without ASAT destruction and ABM) in 2010, 2013, and 2015 India : hostility in principle to the militarization but desire the skills recognition

Motivations for ASATs: Specific position of the United States : securing space while preparing for war? Third-party countries’ position is paradoxical as the US cannot be convinced to abandon the principle of installing weapons in orbit. They have no alternative but to consider engaging in the way they denounce. It disadvantages them and formalizes the US approach’s legitimacy, they initially wanted to prevent.

Lessons learned for international framework and the rules of law A problematic relationship between the national and international level Reflected in three main tensions : “Province of all mankind" versus "Sovereignty" "Global Commons" versus "Ownership" "Peace use" versus « Secure use" At collective level, preferred effective approaches tend to increase transparency and confidence building measures among space powers International convergence on risk rather than threats Prerequisites