Cyber Security in the Water Sector

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Presentation transcript:

Cyber Security in the Water Sector Author: Brandon Khoury Faculty Advisor: Dr. Lingfeng Wang Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

Research Objectives Highlight importance of cyber security in water sector Review historical progression Intrusion path analysis Means of risk mitigation and assessment

Background Vital to the daily function of the general population Small amount of water plants provide service to over three quarters of U.S. population [1] Industry mission sight includes reliable and affordable water services

Background cont. Industrial automation technology Components Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Components Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) Human Machine Interface (HMI) Server/Client communication protocol Network connectivity

Sensor/Telemetry Site Growth vs. Time Background cont. Sensor/Telemetry Site Growth vs. Time Source: See references [5]

Methodology Open ended methodology Deductive Inductive General sources/inquires lead to more specifically focused research Inductive Specific technological factor leads to hypothesis on general vulnerability Confirm with research Synthesis of data – intrusion path analysis

Theoretical Intrusion Path

Intrusion Path cont. Denial of Service (DoS) scenario Affects integrity (ability to function correctly and detect error/malicious activity) of system components [4] Capitalizes on water sector and SCADA weaknesses Lack of resources for incident detection Intrinsically archaic network architectures Complex hacking code and lack of anti-virus software Un-encrypted communication protocol, MODBUS for example

Risk Mitigation Technical: Process/Organizational: Multi-Factor Authentication Virus protection software/intrusion detection Transaction logging (MODBUS) [2] Network segmentation Process/Organizational: Maintain IT staff Risk mitigation goals Performance metrics [5] Response/disaster recovery plan [3]

Example of simple network segmentation architecture Risk Mitigation cont. Example of simple network segmentation architecture

Conclusion Why is this important? Water industry designed without security as a primary concern Technological advances put sector even more at risk An attack could endanger public health Inhibit primary industrial functions that required water Upgrading to adequate security is a large task Time, Money, Manpower Constant quality control

Questions Questions? Thank you!

References [1] C. Copeland and B. Cody, “Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector,” Congr. Res. Serv. Rep., pp. 1–6, 2010. [2] E. J. Byres, M. Franz, and D. Miller, “The Use of Attack Trees in Assessing Vulnerabilities in SCADA Systems.” [3] S. Panguluri, W. Phillips, and P. Ellis, “Cyber Security: Protecting Water and Wastewater Infrastructure,” Handb. Water Wastewater Syst. Prot., pp. 285–318, 2011. [4] S. Amin, X. Litrico, S. Sastry, and A. M. Bayen, “Cyber Security of Water SCADA Systems—Part I: Analysis and Experimentation of Stealthy Deception Attacks,” pp. 1–8, 2012. [5] Water Sector Coordinating Council Cyber Security Working Group, “Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Water Sector,” pp.5–37, 2008.