Continuous Protection 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

History of Industry Leadership Founded in 2003 to perform offensive cyber security consulting for the CIA and other high profile government agencies Shifted focus from government consulting to developing security software products Launched first product, Responder Pro, April 2008 Offices in Sacramento, and DC Area Now serve critical infrastructure customers across the government and private sectors including entertainment, financial, healthcare 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Management Team Greg Hoglund, Founder, CEO Penny Leavy, President Sam Maccherola, VP Worldwide Sales Jim Butterworth, VP of Services 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

High Profile Customers CONFIDENTIAL Covered by NDA Government Agencies: Fortune 500 Corporations: Government Contractors: Department of Homeland Security Morgan Stanley L-3 National Security Agency Blue Team Sony General Dynamics 92nd Airborne Citigroup Merlin International Federal Bureau of Investigation IBM Northrop Grumman Congressional Budget Office General Electric SAIC Department of Justice Cox Cable Booz Allen Hamilton Centers for Disease Control eBay United Technologies Transportation Security Administration JP Morgan ManTech Defense Intelligence Agency Best Buy TASC Defense Information Systems Agency Pfizer Blackbird Technologies US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Baker Hughes COB US Air Force Fidelity 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010 4

Install Base/2011 CONFIDENTIAL Covered by NDA DDNA Nodes 400 standalone/800 DDNA for ePO- 71,000/moving to AD for ePO DDNA OEM-12000/300,000 Active Defense-54,000/800,000 Responder Pro 320/530 Responder Field 1200/2400 FastDumpPro-3000 (plus FastDump Pro is included in all of above) 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

High-Value Partnerships Drive Strong Growth in Sales 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010 6

The Evolved Risk Environment All data is digital and can be stolen by motivated and well funded attackers from 3,000 miles away. They are entrenched already. Existing Host-level and perimeter protection is ineffective at detecting emerging threats. The network is becoming perimeterless and the host is the key to protecting the enterprise 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

There is NO RISK REDUCTION Incident Response & Reimage is the traditional model – but…. Reimaging doesn’t fix the vulnerability - over 50% of reimaged machines will end up re-infected with the same malware After the IR team leaves, the bad guys come crawling back out of their holes using multiple layers of entrenched malware and sleeper agents (hey, remember, these guys are hackers) 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

The Breakdowns #1 – Trusting the AV/HIDS AV doesn’t detect most malware, even variants of malware that it’s supposed to detect. HIDS/HIPS are too cumbersome and throw a lot false +’s #2 – Not using threat intelligence The only way to get better at detecting intrusion is to learn how to detect them next time #3 – Not preventing re-infection If you don’t harden your network then you are just throwing money away 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Continuous Protection The bad guys are going to get in. Accept it. Because intruders are always present, you need to have a continuous countering force to detect and remove them. Your continuous protection solution needs to get smarter over time – it must learn how the attackers work and get better at detecting them. Security is an intelligence problem. 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Efficient & Scalable Visibility To detect advanced intruders, the security team needs whole-host remote live-forensics at the click of a button To be efficient, the team needs to search over tens of thousands of machines in minutes The solution needs to support all levels of analysis, from simple search to low-level disassembly The longer malware is not dealt with the more damage is caused 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

The Big Picture of HBGary Detect bad guys using a smallish genome of behaviors – and this means zeroday and APT – no signatures required Followup with strong incident response technology, enterprise scalable Inoculate to protect against known malware Back this with very low level & sophisticated deep-dive capability for attribution and forensics work=Smarter Security 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

HBGary’s take on all this Focus on malicious behavior, not signatures Based upon disassembled and RE’d software Bad guys don’t write 50,000 new malware every morning Their techniques, algorithms, and protocols stay the same, day in day out Once executing in PHYSICAL memory (not virtual), the software is just software Physmem is the best information source available 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Continuous Protection Inoculate Update NIDS Adverse Event Breakdown #3 Check AV Log Breakdown #1 More Compromise Check with AD Scan for BI’s Breakdown #2 Compromise Detected Reimage Machine Get Threat Intel 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Intel Value Window Lifetime  Minutes Hours Days Weeks Months Years Blacklists ATTRIBUTION-Derived Developer Toolmarks Signatures Algorithms NIDS sans address Hooks Protocol Install DNS name IP Address Checksums 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Types of Threat Intelligence Long Lasting – patterns last for years Not packaged as a feed Strong initial value Value drops off quickly over time Cannot be packaged as a feed Behavioral Detection not signatures This is the value line Very Short Lifetime Minimal Value Typically sold as a ‘feed’ External Vendor Supplied Blacklists Signatures for known threats custom to your environment Signatures for threats not based on your environment 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

External Vendor Supplied Blacklists Digital DNA™ Virtual Machine Execution Engines Heuristics Managed Services Internal SOC’s / CERT’s Long Lasting – patterns last for years Not packaged as a feed Traditional AV DAT Files NIDS signatures IP/DNS Blacklists Strong initial value Value drops off quickly over time Cannot be packaged as a feed Behavioral Detection not signatures IOC Query Subscriptions Very Short Lifetime Minimal Value Typically sold as a ‘feed’ External Vendor Supplied Blacklists Signatures for known threats custom to your environment Signatures for threats not based on your environment 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

HBGary’s Focus Behavioral Detection not signatures Long Lasting – patterns last for years Not packaged as a feed Strong initial value Value drops off quickly over time Cannot be packaged as a feed Behavioral Detection not signatures Very Short Lifetime Minimal Value Typically sold as a ‘feed’ External Vendor Supplied Blacklists Signatures for known threats custom to your environment Signatures for threats not based on your environment 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Threat Intelligence Data Flow Inoculate Update NIDS Intelligent Perimeter COMS Adverse Event More Compromise Compromise Detected Scan Hosts Artifacts Malware Analysis Timelines Host Analysis Reimage Machine Get Threat Intel 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Key Competitive Differentiators Behavior based detection Lowest level possible (physical memory) Disassembled and RE programs on fly Attribution-IR, feeds and malware Visibility into all areas of computer Highly scalable, high speed, concurrent Easy to use and full OS support No open source/product quality, (not a bunch of scripts) 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Products 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Technology Block Diagram 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Enterprise Cyber Defense Enterprise Incident Response Active Defense Active Defense McAfee Verdasys EnCase Enterprise Cyber Defense Enterprise Incident Response Digital DNA™ Responder™ TMC’s support in Federal space. REcon Ruleset (‘genome’) Threat Monitoring Mature product in market Automated Reverse Engineering Automated Feed Farm Windows Physical Memory Forensics NTFS Drive Forensics Could be productized… 12/29/2017 Product, extremely flexible, SDK available Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Digital DNA™ 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Digital DNA™ Automated PROACTIVE malware detection Software classification system 5000 software and malware behavioral traits Example Huge number of key logger variants in the wild About 10 logical ways to build a key logger 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Digital DNA™ Benefits = Better cyber defense Enterprise detection of zero-day threats Lowers the skill required for actionable response What files, keys, and methods used for infection What URL’s, addresses, protocols, ports “At a glance” threat assessment What does it steal? Keystrokes? Bank Information? Word documents and powerpoints? = Better cyber defense 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

How an AV vendor can use DDNA Digital DNA uses a smallish genome file (a few hundred K) to detect ALL threats If something is detected as suspicious, that object can be extracted from the surrounding memory (Active Defense™ does this already) The sample can then be analyzed with a larger, more complete virus database for known-threat identification If a known threat is not identified, the sample can be sent to the AV vendor automatically 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Digital DNA™ Performance 4 gigs per minute, thousands of patterns in parallel, NTFS raw disk, end node 2 gig memory, 5 minute scan, end node Hi/Med/Low throttle = 10,000 machine scan completes in < 1 hour 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Under the hood These images show the volume of decompiled information produced by the DDNA engine. Both malware use stealth to hide on the system. To DDNA, they read like an open book. 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Ranking Software Modules by Threat Severity Software Behavioral Traits Digital DNA™ Ranking Software Modules by Threat Severity 0B 8A C2 05 0F 51 03 0F 64 27 27 7B ED 06 19 42 00 C2 02 21 3D 00 63 02 21 8A C2 Malware shows up as a red alert. Suspicious binaries are orange. For each binary we show its underlying behavioral traits. Examples of traits might be “packed with UPX”, “uses IRC to communicate”, or “uses kernel hooking with may indicate a presence of a rootkit”. The blue bar shows the Digital DNA sequence for the binary iimo.sys. 0F 51 0F 64 Software Behavioral Traits 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

B[00 24 73 ??]k ANDS[>004] C”QueueAPC”{arg0:0A,arg} What’s in a Trait? 04 0F 51 B[00 24 73 ??]k ANDS[>004] C”QueueAPC”{arg0:0A,arg} The rule is a specified like a regular expression, it matches against automatically reverse engineered details and contains boolean logic. These rules are considered intellectual property and not shown to the user. Unique hash code Weight / Control flags The trait, description, and underlying rule are held in a database 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Digital DNA™ (in Memory) vs Digital DNA™ (in Memory) vs. Disk Based Hashing, Signatures, and other schematic approaches 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

White listing on disk doesn’t prevent malware from being in memory Internet Document PDF, Active X, Flash Office Document, Video, etc… DISK FILE IN MEMORY IMAGE Public Attack-kits have used memory-only injection for over 5 years OS Loader White listing on disk doesn’t prevent malware from being in memory MD5 Checksum is white listed Whitelisting typically works by have a list of good hashes with the assumption that you’re loading only good binaries for execution into memory. But bad code can get injected into good programs. White listing does not mean secure code. DDNA will find the bad injected code. White listed code does not mean secure code Process is trusted 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Digital DNA defeats packers IN MEMORY IMAGE Packer #1 Packer #2 Decrypted Original OS Loader Digital DNA defeats packers Starting Malware As you know most malware is packed. The bad guy does this to avoid detection. For every packer used, you need another signature. But a program must unpack itself in memory to execute. Its underlying behaviors remain the same, so its DDNA remains the same. Packed Malware Digital DNA remains consistent 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Same malware compiled in three different ways DISK FILE IN MEMORY IMAGE Same malware compiled in three different ways OS Loader If the same malware is compiled e different ways you would need 3 different hashes or signatures to see it. DDNA still detects because the program is logically the same and has the same behaviors. MD5 Checksums all different Digital DNA remains consistent 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Compromised computers… Now what? 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Active Defense™ 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Why Active Defense? ONLY vendor that can concurrently search -Physical Memory -Live OS -Raw Disk -OVERLAID with BEHAVIOR based detection, based upon Physical memory snapshot PLUS BI’s -NO open source, real product -Easy to Use no complex RegX -Support for ALL Windows Platforms/Big name endorsements 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Alert! 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Hmm.. 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Active Defense Queries What happened? What is being stolen? How did it happen? Who is behind it? How do I bolster network defenses? 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Active Defense Queries 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Responder 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

HBGary Responder Professional Standalone system for incident response Memory forensics Malware reverse engineering Static and dynamic analysis NO knowledge of assembly code needed/Fast and complete Digital DNA module REcon module 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Responder Professional 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Recon/Inoculator 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

REcon Records the entire lifecycle of a software program, from first instruction to the last. It records data samples at every step, including arguments to functions and pointers to objects. Offline physical memory analysis: Rebuilding windows without windows All physical to virtual address translations 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Inoculation Example Using Responder + REcon, HBGary was able to trace Aurora malware and obtain actionable intel in about 5 minutes. This intel was then used to create an inoculation shot, downloaded over 10,000 times over a few days time. To automatically attempt a clean operation: ******************************************* InoculateAurora.exe -range 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.254 -clean 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Inoculator™ 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Future Products CONFIDENTIAL Covered by NDA Razor-FireEye Competitor- Q1 2011 Active Defense for the Cloud-Q1 2011 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Reimage or Remove Malware HBGary Products Inoculate Update Perimeter IDS Razor (TBD) Inoculator Active Defense™ More Compromise Inoculator Active Defense™ for the cloud (TBD) Responder™ Active Defense™ Digital DNA™ Active Defense™ Scan Hosts Compromise Detected Digital DNA™ Inoculator Reimage or Remove Malware Get Threat Intel 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010

Advanced Discussion: How HBGary maintains DDNA with Threat Intelligence

Partnership Feed Agreements Intelligence Feed Partnership Feed Agreements Feed Processor Machine Farm Meta Data Sources Digital DNA

From raw data to intelligence Malware Analysis Feed Processor Responder Active Defense Data Integration Meta Data Link Analysis Stalker primary Digital DNA Palantir Stats

Ops path Malware Attack Tracking Digital DNA™ Active Threat Tracking Mr. A Mr. B Mr. C Malware Attack Tracking Digital DNA™ Active Threat Tracking Detect relevant attacks in progress. Determine the scope of the attack. Focus is placed on Botnet / Web / Spam Distribution systems Potentially targeted spear/whalefishing Internal network infections at customer sites Development idioms are fingerprinted. Malware is classified into attribution domains. Special attention is placed on: Specialized attacks Targeted attacks Newly emergent methods Determine the person(s) operating the attack, and their intent: Leasing Botnet / Spam Financial Fraud Identity Theft Pump and Dump Targeted Threat Email & Documents Theft Intellectual Property Theft Deeper penetration

Over 5,000 Traits are categorized into Factor, Group, and Subgroup. This is our “Genome”

Country of Origin Country of origin Is the bot designed for use by certain nationality? Geolocation of IP is NOT a strong indicator However, there are notable examples Is the IP in a network that is very unlikely to have a third-party proxy installed? For example, it lies within a government installation C&C map from Shadowserver, C&C for 24 hour period

C&C server source code. Written in PHP Specific “Hello” response (note, can be queried from remote to fingerprint server) Clearly written in Russian In many cases, the authors make no attempt to hide…. You can purchase many kits and just read the source code…

A GIF file included in a C&C server package.

GhostNet: Screen Capture Algorithm Loops, scanning every 50th line (cY) of the display. Reads screenshot data, creates a special DIFF buffer LOOP: Compare new screenshot to previous, 4 bytes at a time If they differ, enter secondary loop here, writing a ‘data run’ for as long as there is no match. Offset in screenshot Len in bytes Data….

‘SoySauce’ C&C Hello Message this queries the uptime of the machine.. checks whether it's a laptop or desktop machine... enumerates all the drives attached to the system, including USB and network... gets the windows username and computername... gets the CPU info... and finally, the version and build number of windows.

Aurora C&C parser Command is stored as a number, not text. It is checked here. Each individual command handler is clearly visible below the numerical check After the command handler processes the command, the result is sent back to the C&C server

Link Analysis Link Analysis We want to find a connection here C&C Fingerprint Botmaster URL artifact Affiliate ID Developer Protocol Fingerprint Endpoints Developer C&C products Link Analysis

Example: Link Analysis with Palantir™ Implant Forensic Toolmark specific to Implant Searching the ‘Net reveals source code that leads to Actor Actor is supplying a backdoor Group of people asking for technical support on their copies of the backdoor

Managed Service Weekly, enterprise-wide scanning with DDNA & updated BI’s (using HBGary Product) Includes extraction of threat-intelligence from compromised systems and malware Includes creation of new IDS signatures Includes inoculation shot development Includes option for network monitoring specifically for C2 traffic and exfiltration

Questions? 12/29/2017 Copyright HBGary, Inc 2008, 2009, 2010