Chapter Fourteen Strategy

Table 14.1 Simultaneous Entry Game © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Page 475 Solved Problem 14.1 © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.1 Whether an Incumbent Pays to Prevent Entry © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.2 Noncredible Threat © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.3 Game Trees for the Deterred Entry and Stackelberg Equilibria (cont’d) © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Table 14.2 Entrant’s Best Response and Profit © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.4 Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.5 Incumbent Commits to a Large Quantity to Deter Entry © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.6 Incumbent Loss If It Deters Entry © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Page 488 Solved Problem 14.3 © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.7 Investment Game Tree © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.8 Raising-Costs Game Tree © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.9 Advertising © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Figure 14.10 Shifts in the Marginal Benefit of Advertising © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Table 14.3 Advertising Game © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

Cross Chapter Analysis Page 508 © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.