Prof. Andreas Steffen Institute for Networked Solutions

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Presentation transcript:

TPM-Based Attestation of IoT Devices Cyber-Security Event Singapore, March 10 Prof. Andreas Steffen Institute for Networked Solutions HSR University of Applied Sciences Rapperswil andreas.steffen@hsr.ch

Where the heck is Rapperswil? HSR

HSR - Hochschule für Technik Rapperswil University of Applied Sciences with about 1500 students Faculty of Information Technology (300-400 students) Bachelor Course (3 years), Master Course (+1.5 years) Our Lab Research Building

strongSwan – the OpenSource VPN Solution Windows Active Directory Server Linux FreeRadius Server Corporate Network High-Availability strongSwan VPN Gateway Windows 7/8/10 Agile VPN Client strongSwan Linux Client N Rekeying Notification (optional) SAi Suite of cryptographic proposals for the Child SA (ESP and/or AH) Ni Initiator Nonce KEi Initiatior public factor for the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (optional PFS) TSi Initiator Traffic Selectors (subnets behind the Initiator) TSr Responder Traffic Selectors (subnets behind the Responder SA1r Selection of a cryptographic proposal for the IKE SA Nr Responder Nonce KEr Responder public factor for the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (optional PFS) Internet

Free Download from Google Play Store October 16, 2016: 21’816 installations

Attestation of IoT Devices based on Trusted Network Connect (TNC) TPM-Based Attestation of IoT Devices Cyber-Security Event Singapore, March 10 Attestation of IoT Devices based on Trusted Network Connect (TNC)

The Energy Grid Network devices and SCADA components controlling the energy grid are extremely vulnerable to cyber attacks! It is important to be able to detect malware embedding itself into IoT firmware. PA-TNC IF-TNCCS 2.0 Batch Types • CDATA ClientData • SDATA ServerData • CRETRY ClientRetry • SRETRY ServerRetry • RESULT Result • CLOSE Close

RSA 2015 Security Conference San Francisco PA-TNC IF-TNCCS 2.0 Batch Types • CDATA ClientData • SDATA ServerData • CRETRY ClientRetry • SRETRY ServerRetry • RESULT Result • CLOSE Close Cisco 1120 Connected Grid Router with strongSwan running on Linux Guest OS

Trusted Network Connect (TNC) Architecture RFC 5792 RFC 5793 RFC 6876 RFC 7171 Lying Endpoint Network Access Control Abbreviations • AR Access Requestor • IF Interface • IMC Integrity Measurement Collector • IMV Integrity Measurement Verifier • M Measurement • PDP Policy Decision Point • PEP Policy Enforcement Point • T Transport • TNC Trusted Network Connect PEP Policy Enforcement Point PDP Policy Decision Point VPN Client VPN Gateway

Layered TNC Protocol Stack TNC Measurement Data [IMV] operating system name is 'Android' from vendor Google [IMV] operating system version is '4.2.1‘ [IMV] device ID is cf5e4cbcc6e6a2db IF-M Measurement Protocol PA-TNC (RFC 5792) [TNC] handling PB-PA message type 'IETF/Operating System' 0x000000/0x00000001 [IMV] IMV 1 "OS" received message for Connection ID 1 from IMC 1 [TNC] processing PA-TNC message with ID 0xec41ce1d [TNC] processing PA-TNC attribute type 'IETF/Product Information' 0x000000/0x00000002 [TNC] processing PA-TNC attribute type 'IETF/String Version' 0x000000/0x00000004 [TNC} processing PA-TNC attribute type 'ITA-HSR/Device ID' 0x00902a/0x00000008 IF-TNCCS TNC Client-Server Protocol PB-TNC (RFC 5793) [TNC] received TNCCS batch (160 bytes) for Connection ID 1 [TNC] PB-TNC state transition from 'Init' to 'Server Working' [TNC] processing PB-TNC CDATA batch [TNC] processing PB-Language-Preference message (31 bytes) [TNC] processing PB-PA message (121 bytes) [TNC] setting language preference to 'en‘ IF-T Transport Protocol PT-EAP (RFC 7171) [NET] received packet: from 152.96.15.29[50871] to 77.56.144.51[4500] (320 bytes) [ENC] parsed IKE_AUTH request 8 [ EAP/RES/TTLS ] [IKE] received tunneled EAP-TTLS AVP [EAP/RES/PT]

Demo: Mutually Trusted Video Phones CeBIT 2016 Hannover: Raspberry Pi 2 IoT Platform Raspian OS (Debian 8) Intel TSS 2.0 Stack Infineon HW TPM 2.0 PA-TNC IF-TNCCS 2.0 Batch Types • CDATA ClientData • SDATA ServerData • CRETRY ClientRetry • SRETRY ServerRetry • RESULT Result • CLOSE Close Raspi 3 Raspi 4

Mutual Attestation of IoT Devices DB Trusted Reference DB TLS DB DB Attestation IMV Attestation IMV TNC Server TNC Server PT-EAP PT-EAP TNC Client TNC Client IKEv2 OS IMC Attestation IMC Attestation IMC OS IMC Linux OS PA-TNC IF-TNCCS 2.0 Batch Types • CDATA ClientData • SDATA ServerData • CRETRY ClientRetry • SRETRY ServerRetry • RESULT Result • CLOSE Close TPM TPM Linux OS Linux IMA* IPsec Linux IMA Video Link Video Link IoT Device 1 IoT Device 2 * IMA: Integrity Measurement Architecture

File Version Management using SWID Tags ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 Software Asset Management Part 2: Software Identification Tag NISTIR 8060 Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable SWID Tags <SoftwareIdentity xmlns="http://standards.iso.org/iso/19770/-2/2015/schema.xsd" name="libssl1.0.0" tagId="Ubuntu_16.04-x86_64-libssl1.0.0-1.0.2g-1ubuntu4.6“ version="1.0.2g-1ubuntu4.6" versionScheme="alphanumeric"> <Entity name="strongSwan Project" regid="strongswan.org“ role="tagCreator"/> <Payload> <Directory name="/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu" > <File name="libcrypto.so.1.0.0" size=“2361856" SHA256:hash="879a98c17952cd00d20cf42e83b1c54b4187f48dccb06cc8cc80ac2505a4db56"/> <File name="libssl.so.1.0.0" size="42834“ SHA256:hash="b46a5c50ee77d7fe59fdb0eb1bae18a724c0e7962b5f228e2d901d6bff93be26"/> </Directory> <Directory name ="/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/openssl-1.0.0/engines"> <File name="libatalla.so" size= "15488" SHA256:hash=" 3e3a07ac750d335555230c1b438c844f7983044a4efcf2c2564670d98549ca9c"/> ... </Directory> <Directory name ="/usr/share/doc/libssl1.0.0"> <File name="copyright" size= "6547" SHA256:hash="df574956b215bcdb0fb9e1b7b1562c9f172f1b5243d03b2f5bab5ecc68300ac5"/> ... </Directory> </Payload> </SoftwareIdentity>

Conclusion A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) allows the reliable detection of any unauthorized change in the BIOS and operating system of an IoT device, solving the lying endpoint problem. Attestation measurements are digitally signed by the TPM thus asserting the trustworthiness. Additionally a TPM offers a secure and trustworthy hardware identity derived from a unique Endorsement Seed permanently programmed into the TPM during the manufacturing or provisioning process. Modern Intel and ARM processors offer a built-in firmware TPM based on Intel Platform Trust Technology (PTT) and ARM TrustZone, respectively. The strongSwan open source project offers a full implementation of the Trusted Network Connect (TNC) Internet standards, allowing the remote or mutual attestation of IoT devices.

Thank you for your attention! Questions? www.strongswan.org/tnc/