ASN.1: Cryptographic files

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Presentation transcript:

ASN.1: Cryptographic files Zdeněk Říha

ASN.1 Grammar To understand the structure (what is the meaning of particular fields) we need ASN.1 grammar

ASN.1 – RSA keys Source: PKCS#1  RSA.key

ASN.1 – RSA padding PKCS#1 v1.5 In practice: m = 0x00 || 0x01 || 0xFF … 0xFF || 0x00 || T Where T is defined as DER encoding of In practice: Source: PKCS#1

ASN.1 – RSA signature RSA signature is the number s = md mod n  TSA.crt

ASN.1 – signature OIDs Source: BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1

ASN.1 – RSA PSS params  CSCA_CZE.crt Source: PKCS#1 RSASSA-PSS SHA256 MGF1 SHA256  CSCA_CZE.crt

ASN.1 – DSA keys Source: RFC 5480 DSAPrivateKey is an INTEGER, usually denoted as X Source: OpenSSL  DSA.key

ASN.1 – DSA signature Source: RFC 5480  DSA.crt

ASN.1 – DSA - OIDs Source: RFC 5480

ASN.1 – ECDSA keys INTEGER ECPoint Source: RFC 5915

ASN.1 - ECDSA public key  CSCA_Switzerland.crt

ASN.1 – ECDSA signatures  CSCA_Switzerland.crt Source: RFC 5480 1.2.840.10045.4.1 - ecdsa-with-SHA1  CSCA_Switzerland.crt

ASN.1 – ECDSA signature OID Source: BSI TR-03105 Part 5.1

ASN.1 - certificates Source: RFC 5280

ASN.1 – certificates - pubkey Source: RFC 5280  CSCA_CZE.crt

ASN.1 – certificates - times Source: RFC 5280 Until 2049: UTCTime YYMMDDHHMMSSZ From 2050: GeneralizedTime YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ  CSCA_CZE.crt

ASN.1 – certificates - names Source: RFC 5280

ASN.1 – certificate - names  CSCA_CZE.crt

ASN.1 – certificate - names Source: ITU-T X.520

ASN.1 – certificate - names Source: ITU-T X.520

Certificate profiles For particular areas/purposes there exist certificate profiles which prescribe what kind of attributes will be used in Names E.g. for electronic passports ICAO Doc. 9303 states: Source: ICAO Doc. 9303

ASN.1 – certificates – v3 Critical x non-critical extensions Source: RFC 5280 Critical x non-critical extensions

ASN.1 – certs – extensions  CSCA_CZE.crt

X509v3 cert extensions Authority Key Identifier Identification of the issuing CA Non critical Similarly “Subject Key Identifier” Source: RFC 5280

X509v3 cert extensions Key Usage Restrictions of the use of the key Source: RFC 5280

X509v3 cert extensions Extended Key Usage Purposes of the certified key Source: RFC 5280

X509v3 cert extensions Certificate Policies Policy relevant for the issue and use of the certificate Preferably only an OID Source: RFC 5280

X509v3 cert extensions Subject Alternative Name Issuer Alternative Name “Internet style identities” Email DNS name IP address URL Must be verified by CA

X509v3 cert extensions Basic Constraints Is Subject a CA? Max. length/depth of the certificate chain/path A pathLenConstraint of zero indicates that no non-self-issued intermediate CA certificates may follow in a valid certification path. Source: RFC 5280

X509v3 cert extensions Name Constraints Only for CA certificates “indicates a name space within which all subject names in subsequent certificates in a certification path MUST be located” Source: RFC 5280

X509v3 cert extensions Policy Constraints Must be critical For CA certificates Constraints path validation Prohibit policy mapping (or) Require acceptable policy OID in each certificate Source: RFC 5280

X509v3 cert extensions CRL Distribution Points How to obtain CRL Source: RFC 5280

ASN.1 – certificate request Source: RFC 5280

ASN.1 - CRL Source: RFC 5280

ASN.1 – PKCS#7 / CMS Source: RFC 5652

ASN.1 - PKCS#7 / CMS Source: RFC 5652

PKCS#7 Sample  France.p7s

ASN.1 – PKCS#8 Source: PKCS#8