The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political Truth Helps, But Only When You Listen…. The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political Robert David Steele <bear@oss.net> The direct URL is www.oss.net/Papers/White/SAG.ppt. The post brief includes my planned remarks in the Notes format. There are a number of us that have been speaking truth to power for the last quarter century, including Martin Van Crevald, Ralph Peters, former Commandant of the Marine Corps Al Gray, myself. I’m going to provide a very quick overview of the real-world threat as I see it, then segue into a discussion of changed conditions, and conclude with a discussion of some of the aspects of the new craft of intelligence as I see it.
Conflict Specifics for 1995-2000 Internal Political & Ethnic Violence Goes Through the Roof LIC Business is Good Let me make clear to you what our intelligence community and our media and our schools continually ignore. The world around us is at war. These are the trend lines from 1995-2000. Low-intensity conflicts are rising steadily, while political and ethnic violence has gone through the roof. Gang warfare, rather than unit warfare, is the predominant form of conflict today. TRANSITION: George Bush needs to understand all this. HIC Levels Off High-Intensity Conflict Low-Intensity Conflict Internal War Source: PIOOM (NL), data with permission © 2000 A. Jongman Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Conflict Facts for 2000 26 LIC+, 78 LIC-, 178 VPC Each day, today, we have on-going 26 severe low-intensity conflicts that have killed over 300,000 people in 1999 alone, and have killed roughly 8 million over time. There are 78 less severe low-intensity conflicts, and over 178 violent political conflicts internal to specific nation-states, all going on today. India, Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan, Colombia, China, Russia, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan, all populous countries, are engaged, right this minute, in between 6 and 32 conflicts each! TRANSITION: This is the reality today. Source: PIOOM (NL), data with permission © 2000 A. Jongman Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Ethnic Fault Lines 2000 43 Genocide Campaigns On-Going Today This map shows the ethnic fault lines causing genocide today. There are 43 distinct genocide campaigns going on today--18 of them rather severe. If you choose to download this briefing, you will find directly below it, in my White Papers section, two Word documents--one detailing the eight stages of genocide, the other listing the 43 genocide campaigns on-going today. From Mayans to Tutsis to Hutus to Timorese to Khmers to Tibetians to Armenians and Kurds, the death toll runs into the high tens of millions. Neither our intelligence community nor our media are prepared to inform policy makers or our public about these harsh truths. Whether we like it or not, the stability of the rest of the world will influence our own home front security. TRANSITION: Ethnic conflict is certainly about human hatred in the extreme, but it is also about competing demands for scarce resources within failed state environments. Source: Dr. Greg Stanton Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Water & War 4 1 3 5 6 2 Hyper-Arid Arid Semi-Arid Sub-Humid Water Pollution 1 2 3 4 5 6 Hyper-Arid The lines of water scarcity coincide with ethnic conflict in the Slavic-Islamic and Sino-Slavic border areas. From unregulated pollution to excessive irrigation to destructive dams to vanishing aquifers, our world is in grave danger. Water scarcity is a very special non-traditional threat. TRANSITION: We do not have time, now, to discuss other critical strategic resource shortages, but let us take a quick look at some of the non-traditional threat conditions our Nation must address in the near future. Sub-Humid Source: The State of the World Atlas (1997), chart 54, 53 Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Collateral Specifics for 2000 Complex Emergencies 29 Countries Peacekeeping Forces 18 UN, 20 Other Refugees/Displaced 67 Countries Landmines 62 Countries Food Security 27 Countries Torture Common 94 Countries Today’s urgent non-traditional national security challenges include: 29 complex emergencies-- millions of refugees and internally-displaced persons across 67 countries; food scarcity and related disease in 27 countries; modern plagues, from AIDS to Ebola to tuberculosis, creeping across 59 countries and rising; child soldiers murdering one another in 42 countries …the list goes on. TRANSITION: With this as background, let’s examine the real-world conflict spectrum. Modern Plagues* 59 Countries & Rising Corruption Common 78 Countries Child Soldiers 42 Countries Censorship Very High 63 Countries *State of the World Atlas (1997), all others from PIOOM Map Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Surprise! Only 10% of the conflicts today involve state-on-state, force-on-force. Fully half of the conflicts are between states that exist and nations that have not been allowed to exist. You can see all the details on the wall-chart that Mr.. Leavitt has posted, front and back. You can order your own copy for $10 from PIOOM, get the details from the chart. One quarter of the conflicts are comprised inter-ethnic tribal internal conflicts (but do not include genocidal behavior). The final 15%) are gang warfare, genocide, and anti-colonial uprisings. Do not underestimate genocide. I have posted to my Archives the list of 43 genocide campaigns, 18 of which are active today and killing hundreds of thousands a year. This does not make the news nor is it properly covered by intelligence. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
3. Barricade (Good or Bad) With all that as background,, let me just sketch out for you three “big picture” scenarios. I call them the Break-Out, Black Death and Barricade Scenarios. The break-out scenario is clear. At some point these millions of dispossessed get smart and realize we can’t keep them out forever. They take to the boats, surge through the chunnel, and march through Mexico. Europe and Russia from the ground, Australia from the sea. Think about what that means. The black death scenario is occurring today--tens of thousands are dying across 59 countries and at some point those countries may run out of able-bodied men with whom to bury the dead. Then what? Finally, there is the barricade scenario. We can spend money to keep them out by force, or by charity. 1. Break-Out 2. Black Death 3. Barricade (Good or Bad) Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Four Threat Types GUERRILLAWAR CULTURALWAR HIGH TECH BRUTES PHYSICAL STEALTH, PRECISION TARGETING NATURAL RANDOM CYBER - DATABASE IDEO - MASS GUERRILLAWAR CULTURALWAR HIGH TECH BRUTES (MIC / HIC) LOW TECH (LIC) SEERS (C3I WAR) (JIHAD) MONEY--RUTHLESSNESS POWER BASE KNOWLEDGE--IDEOLOGY TERRORISM ECONOMICWAR In the late 1980’s I conceptualized these four warrior classes. In the upper left corner, our traditional high tech brutes--generally between major powers with money to burn on systems. In the upper right corner, low-tech brutes, playing to their own strengths. In the lower right corner, low-tech seers, generally non-state non-violent movements with minds. And in the lower left corner, high-tech seers, consisting of individuals, non-state, and state organizations, waging what some call cyber-war. Each of these warrior classes has very distinct strengths and weaknesses. They also have different “ways of war”……. and different types of war will be fought between different kinds of warrior classes. TRANSITION: This typology is helpful in understanding the major threats we are already addressing today. IC Only: for those responsible for collecting intelligence, this typology is helpful in contemplating the relative utility of different sources & methods. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Means - Ends Disconnect We appear to have a huge disconnect between our existing means and our needed ends. Program 50--our military--gets over $300 billion a year. Program 150--our diplomatic and soft power--the Peace Corps, the Agency for International Development, some other odds and ends, gets less than $30 billion a year. Our critical infrastructure protection, gets less than $3 billion a year while our port security gets next to nothing and our borders are relatively open to any organized enemy group. About $12-16 billion goes to domestic counter-terrorism initiatives that are largely fluff. Now we also finally realize that how we handle visas, border security, airline security, and many other home front issues, matters much much more than we realized. TRANSITION: Transformations of the force are not possible if we continue to spend as we have in the past. The President and his senior managers must make trade-offs. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Presidential Trade-Offs $100 million will buy: 1 Big Platform (Air or Sea) or 1,000 Potential George Kennan’s or 10,000 Peace Corps Volunteers or 1,000,000 cubic meters of desalinated water National security in the 21st century cannot be achieved through conventional military power alone, nor can we, as the one remaining superpower on earth, isolate ourselves from emerging conflicts overseas. As Trotsky was fond of saying: You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you. If you keep in mind the three strategic scenarios I outlined, Break-Out, Black Death, and Barricade, you are now ready to think about trade-offs. TRANSITION: There is plenty of money available--what is lacking is the strategic vision and global understanding needed to make tough decisions. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
New Strategy: 1 + iii 1 i i i CINCWAR CINCSOLIC CINCPEACE CINCHOME Strategic NBC Small Wars State/USIA Home Guard Big War(s) Constabulary Peace Corps Border Patrol Reserve Ground Truth Economic Aid Port Security Reserve Reserve Electronic Summing this all up in a new force structure, it comes down to this: CINCWAR must be ready for big war with no notice. CINCSSOLIC should manage three related capabilities--the Small Wars force, the Constabulary force, and the Ground Truth battalions for each region. CINCPEACE--Colin Powell would be perfect as the first one--should manage a vastly more robust program of non-military engagement around the world, and work with SecDef to integrate Programs 50 and 150. CINCHOME needs to be created, with oversight of the National Guard program, port and border security, critical infrastructure protection, a restoration of the national draft, and the development of a new form of individual reserve, the civilian minuteman. TRANSITION: I call this the “One Plus Triple I” strategy. It has six sub-strategies. Minutemen Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Bloom on Biology of Intelligence When conformity enforcers silence diversity generators the group is committing mass suicide Language and culture kill half our brain cells Internal processing more vital than external collection Diversity generators are the very heart of evolution. Our own language and culture have “closed down” half our brain. Internal processing is more important than external collection. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Saul on Pathology of Reason Secrecy is pathological, undermines public confidence Intelligence is about disseminated knowledge, not about secrets Western thinking has been corrupted by its focus on industrial processes in isolation from culture. Secrecy is pathological and undermines public intelligence. Intelligence is about sharing knowledge. Western thinking has been corrupted. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Wilson on Unity of Knowledge All knowledge is related and interactive--science without the humanities is mis-guided dangerous science Knowledge and education must be universally distributed within the public, not held back by selected policymakers Knowledge in isolation, knowledge that is not shared, can be mis-guided and dangerous to society. Knowledge must be universally distributed to achieve the optimal gains within society. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
McKibben on Missing Information Information is not a substitute for “being there” Television killed history--media only acknowledges reality for which film exists (last 40 years vice 4000) One day of human observation is vastly more valuable than one day of electronic noise. Information is not a substitute for being there--most of our sources, both secret and non-secret, are second or third-hand and therefore of questionable authority. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
McKenna on Real-Time Forget about trying to predict or impose a future Instead, cast a very wide net of intimate probes for early warning of what your clients need Then be able to collect, process, and deliver in real-time, over and over again Real-time intelligence requires a very wide network capable of Global Coverage, a real commitment to paying attention to weak signals, and a complete devotion to giving the client what they want when they want it. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Davenport & Beck on Attention 1) Global Coverage for AWARENESS 2) Surge target-local focus for ATTENTION 3) Domestic political focus for ACTION 10 seconds for scanning, 3 minutes for attention: new standard for products Putting all the resources against hard targets alone is a prescription for disaster. Global coverage, AWARENESS, is the foundation for then paying ATTENTION to the right things at the right time. At the same time, intelligence is needed about domestic political reactions in order to best shape action. We need all three, and the standard for getting a policy makers’ attention is a tough one: 3 seconds to grab them, 3 minutes maximum to explain the problem. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Wheaton on Warning Warning solution includes Casting wide early net Surging on potential hotspots Getting senior’s attention Options decrease as conflict escalates--seniors need to focus on crisis prevention rather than crisis management Early warning maximizes policy options, but four-star customers are hidden behind too many staff barriers to get the message. The four-star mind should be focused on crisis prevention rather than crisis management; that is where the real long-term value lies and where the four-star’s influence can have the greatest effect. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Pelton on Ground Truth Most government and media sources have not actually had eyes on target and boots in the local mud You don’t have to travel to these places to have them affect home front security We simply are not grasping essential ground truths We don’t understand the real world because we are relying on an intelligence community obsessed with a handful of hard targets, and a media that uses information to entertain. It is a very dangerous world, and we don’t have to travel there to be affected. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Shawcross on Endless Conflict Peace operations are as complex and difficult as war operations Humanitarian assistance can create black markets and sustain a conflict Good will without strength makes things worse Neither our military nor our intelligence community are comfortable dealing with perpetual instability and threats other than conventional threats. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Current Doctrine This is our starting point. Joint doctrine assumes that all needed information will come to it through the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance system. This is a very flawed assumption, as we shall see. Let me emphasize this--the Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency had two major findings in its unclassified report of a few months ago: First, that DoD systems do not budget for the costs of tasking, processing, exploiting and disseminating the information they need to be effective; and Second, that neither the IC nor DoD have invested substantially in TPED--we are literally processing less than 10% of what we collect through secret means and we are spending almost nothing on open sources of information. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
1 2 Decision-Maker Integration, Reflection & Decision Information Management Staff Collection Management, Fusion, Analysis & Presentation 1 2 EXISTING INPUT normal staff process, counterparts, family/friends OPEN SOURCE INPUT Internet & private sector fee-for-service RANDOM SECRET We do not know what we need to know at the CINC, Service, and agency levels, to make good collection management decisions, such as: do we already have it, do we ask for it, buy it, or steal it? At the same time, we have made no serious provision for the purchase of tailored OSINT in support of each Service Chief, CINC, or agency head, and therefore one can say that our decision makers are operating on perhaps half--some would say less than 10%--of the available information. TRANSITION: Substantial changes will be required in the intelligence discipline if it is to be effective in supporting 21st Century operations. So far, technology has not been part of the solution. INFORMATION UNIVERSE Relevant and Irrelevant -- Open and Secret
OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE HUMINT SIGINT IMINT MASINT ALL-SOURCE ANALYSIS OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE OSINT combines the proven process of intelligence with global multi-lingual sources, generally from commercial vendors that add value. It is the foundation for both all-source processing and all-source analysis. It is the foundation for establishing an information commons that can be shared with the private sector and better leverage private sector information about transnational threats. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Real-World Information Digital Analog Oral/Unpublished English Language NRO NSA FBIS UN/STATE Foreign Languages* CIA/DO Cascading Deficiencies: 1) Don’t even try to access most information 2) Can’t process hard-copy into digital 3) Can’t translate most of what we collect This is another way of looking at our problem. We are limited, in most cases, to what we can harvest from digital or online English-language information. The bulk of the available information is actually offline and not in English. We are not trained, equipped, or organized to discover, discriminate, distill, and deliver the vast majority of the relevant information available to us, especially in the lower tier countries. I have been trying to focus the U.S. Intelligence Community on this problem since 1992, and received strong support from the Aspin-Brown Commission, but with little practical effect. *27 predominant languages, over 3,000 distinct languages in all. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
SI/TK Competing Security Models Selective Importation System High/Firewall Just Enough, Just in Time Default to Validated OSINT Validated OSINT A major obstacle to bringing the IC into the 21st Century has been the insistence on importing external sources very selectively into a “system-high” environment. This is a huge waste of time and money at the same time that it cuts us off from 90% of the information relevant to policymaking, acquisition management, and operational command and staff decision-making. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Minimal Mandatory Languages Arabic Catelan Chinese Danish Dari Dutch English Farsi Finnish French German Indonesian Irish Italian Japanese Korean Kurdish Kurmanji Norwegian Pashto Polish Portuguese Russian Serbian Spanish Swedish Tamil Turkish Urdu etc Our arrogance with respect to foreign languages knows no bounds. We simply assume it is not worth doing except for a few hard targets. The FBI decision to not translate all of the documents captured in the first World Trade Center bombing will stand in history as one of the dumbest counterintelligence decisions ever made. We have to be deeply skilled in these languages, with an almost unlimited ability to surge as needed. No more excuses--this is fundamental. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
OLD NEW BIG CHANGE NUMBER ONE TIME IMPACT SHORT TIME IMPACT LONG MULTI-CULTURAL & TRANS-NATIONAL EQUITIES SINGLE-CULTURE SINGLE-ORGANIZATION EQUITIES LEADERS DECIDE PEOPLE DECIDE TOP-DOWN COMMAND & CONTROL SECRET SOURCES & METHODS BOTTOM-UP INFORMATION-SHARING OPEN OBVIOUS DETAIL OBSCURE DETAIL OLD NEW The new world demands that we turn our C4I paradigm on its head. We can no longer plan on unilateral warfare using secret sources that nurture top-down decision-making. Every major issue in national security today requires a bottom-up multi-cultural approach that relies almost exclusively on open sources of information-- sources that can be shared and that do not violate the integrity of any of the participants. The Internet is the C4I backbone of the 21st Century, and that is where we should be investing at least half of our C4I dollars. TRANSITION: Our needs for broader and more diverse open sources of information are also affected by our needs for new forms of coalition among non-traditional allies. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Actionable Intelligence Available Information BIG CHANGE NUMBER TWO The New Intelligence Gap: the difference between what you can know and what you can use! INFORMATION TIME Actionable Intelligence Available Information Here is a depiction of the “information explosion” that challenges all knowledge workers, not only in intelligence, but in all occupational specialties. We spend $30 billion a year going after a very small amount of the relevant information--that which we can steal. We spend almost nothing on the predominant bulk of the information that is open--generally information that is not in English and not online. TRANSITION: At the same time, we have to deal with disconnects between our emphasis on secrets and the fact that the majority of the information we need is owned and processed by others. Open source information is more complex than secrets… Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
“A Mind is a Terrible Thing to Waste….” Dan Quayle, Future DCI This sums it up. Half our brain has been killed by the time we are middle-aged analysts, and the other half only receives 2% of the available information. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Pieces Not Coming Together Policy Intelligence Military Intelligence Law Enforcement Intelligence Coalition Intelligence Business Intelligence/OSINT Mass & Niche Media Intelligence Citizen Intelligence--Intelligence “Minuteman” Basic, Advanced, & Corporate Education International Coalition Options We can no longer pretend that only the IC has access to valuable information. All of these niche players have something to contribute, and we have to devise new sources and methods that will allow this larger “virtual intelligence community” to be effective against targets of common concern such as terrorism. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
New Craft of Intelligence China, Islam, Ethnic, Etc. Narrowly focused! I Lessons of History II Global Coverage III National Intelligence IV Spies & Secrecy The new craft of intelligence cannot be limited to secrets. It must embrace historical knowledge, and especially Chinese and Islamic texts, as a foundation for understanding and evaluating all that follows. It must find a way to share the burden of doing Global Coverage with other governments and with other non-state actors. It must find a way to leverage knowledge across all sectors of the nation, from academic and business to media and non-profit enterprises. Finally, but strictly within this larger context, we must do a better job of focusing our spies and secret technical capabilities. Harness distributed intelligence of Nation Cost-Sharing with Others-- Shared Early Warning Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
ROI of 3N for a $1B Bridge to OSINT Global Distributed Knowledge National Distributed Knowledge Government Knowledge Intelligence Community 1B 10B 100B 1 TRILLION Here you see an illustration of how powerful this new concept can be. Investing just $1 billion dollars in a U.S. government open source intelligence network will yield access to $10 billion in “rest of government knowledge (including state and local government), $100 billion in external private sector knowledge, and an estimated $1 TRILLION in global coverage knowledge from other nations and non-state actors. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
1-179 DAY/YR TEMPORARY EXPERTS Striking A New Balance TECHNICAL $$ TS LIFERS HUMINT $$ MID-CAREER HIRES SECRET OSINT $$ We are going to have to find new balance in who we hire, what we produce, and how we label our products. The personnel pool is going to have to change to make better use of really world-class experts on a 1-179 day basis. If I were the boss you would not be allowed to touch secrets until you had proven yourself in the private sector first. We need to continue to spend lots of money on secret technical collection, but we need major increases in clandestine human intelligence and open source intelligence, as well as in more analysts, and also major investments in analytic tools and all-source processing. Most of our products in the future might be sensitive or restricted, but they will have to be unclassified. 1-179 DAY/YR TEMPORARY EXPERTS UNCLASSIFIED IC MANNING IC DOLLARS IC PRODUCTION Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
World Class/One Day Only Feedback Loop Internet Stream Q A Commercial Feeds Maps & Images DIRECT ACCESS TOOLKIT Offline Stream PRODUCTION TOOLKIT MEDIATED ACCESS TOOLKIT Human Experts “Temp Hire” Approach: World Class/One Day Only I’m going to pass very quickly through a series of technical slides, mostly I just wanted you to have them in your book for later consideration. This is the process that we do not follow. There is no feedback loop. We do not fully leverage private sector sources. We do not have the direct access and mediated access toolkits, nor the substantive processing and production toolkits that every analyst needs. PROCESSING TOOLKIT INTEGRATED ONE-STOP SHOPPING PROCESS Call Center -- Multi-Level Security -- Umbrella for Unified Billing Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
A B C Finished Intelligence and Reporting Open Literature Revision Tracking and Realtime Group Review Desktop Publishing and Word Processing Production of Graphics, Videos and Online Briefings A Structured Argument Analysis Notetaking and Organizing Ideas Collaborative Work Interactive Search and Retrieval of Data Graphic and Map-Based Visualization of Data Modeling and Simulations B At the other end of the spectrum, we are still unable to create an affordable desktop analysis workstation that integrates each of the essential eighteen functionalities needed by the intelligence analyst. In comparison to NSA’s abilities, neither CIA nor In-Q-Tel can be considered anything other than a “mom & pop” shop when it comes to information technology. It is time for NSA to become the National Processing Agency. C Clustering and Linking of Related Data Statistical Analysis to Reveal Anomalies Detection of Changing Trends Detection of Alert Situations Conversion of Paper Documents to Digital Form Automated Foreign Language Translation Processing Images, Video, Audio, Signal Data Automated Extraction of Data Elements From Text and Images Standardizing and Converting Data Formats Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001. Open Literature Non-Text Data Restricted Information
ICMAP + NSA(P) = IC2 The Processing Advantage 50% Less Costly OSINT HUMINT More Satisfying STATE SIGINT Both NSA and the IC overall have much to gain from NSA’s assumption of the challenge of all-source processing. The star’s depict the relative value and cost of the various INT’s in the late 1990’s when evaluated by the Collection Requirements and Evaluations Staff at CIA. This was at a time when OSINT was in its infancy as a discipline, and before the Internet changed the dynamics of Global Coverage. If NSA can provide an automated means for executing the ICMAP requirements vision, for integrating OSINT as the foundation for an all-source data warehouse with value-added all-source visualization, modeling, and other exploitation tools, I surmise that the processing advantage would square the value of existing and planned collection and analysis resources. IMINT MASINT 0% 50% Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
OPG VPN Expert Forum Distance Learning Virtual Library Weekly Review Shared Calendar Shared Rolodex OPG VPN Distance Learning Virtual Library Whether or not we make investment in processing and desktop toolkits, we can leverage the Internet today to create Operational Planning Groups that cut across organizational boundaries, even national boundaries. This is what one might look like. It brings together weekly intelligence summaries on that specific issue area, with expert forums, distance learning for the new folks, and a shared virtual library. Shared calendars, directories, a virtual “plot” of time and space factors related to the issue area, and a transparent government-wide virtual budget, would make these subject-matter experts a force in their own right, irrespective of organizational affiliations. Shared 24/7 Plot Virtual Budget Weekly Review Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
New Rules of the Game I Informing Policy, not Collecting Secrets Global Coverage beats Hard Targets Translation in 28+ Languages Gets Serious Two Levels Down (Sub-State Intelligence) Cultural Intelligence is Fundamental Processing beats Collection for Dollars Geospatial and Time Tagging Mandatory Now to conclude, and you have a hand-out with all of these spelled out, I just want to go over some of the new rules of the game--the new rules of engagement for “the new craft of intelligence.” We must focus on informing policy, not on collecting secrets. Global coverage--casting a wide net--is vital to our national security and can no longer take a back seat to Hard Targets. Translation gets serious, and we go two levels down. The new craft of intelligence is going to be 3-5 times more difficult and more sophisticated than the old craft of intelligence. Cultural intelligence is fundamental Processing will take more money than collection--and will demand that we assign geospatial and time tags to every datum. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
New Rules of the Game II Global OSINT Benchmarking Finally Done Counterintelligence Across the Board Cross-Fertilization (Human & Technical) Decentralized Data Base (NGO, Private) Value = Content + Context + Speed Gap-Driven Collection instead of Priorities Needs-Driven Production vice Capabilities NSA is starting to realize they cannot vacuum clean the world under the new information conditions. They need a baseline from which to surge and I believe that a multi-lingual OSINT baseline that can be processed by NSA and have pattern analysis software applied to it, is the wave of the future. Counterintelligence is going to get much more serious. Cross-fertilization of humans and decentralization of data are going to change the way we do business in fundamental ways. Products no one asked for are history. The new value is in getting exactly the right content to the right person at the right time, and to do it in a useful context. Collection must be driven by gaps instead of priorities, and production for the sake of production is history. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
New Rules of the Game III Strategic Intelligence Matters More Budget Intelligence is Mandatory Public Intelligence Impact Public Policy Analysts as Managers New Measures of Merit Multi-Lateral Burden-Sharing Rules Clearances Matter Less than Knowledge Finally, we come back to strategic intelligence. This is what CIA used to be about, it needs to get back into that business big time. Budget intelligence is mandatory, not only of the budgets of other countries, but of our own. As Mr.. Gessaman says, it’s not policy until it is in the budget. We need to do more to understand other people’s budgets, not just what they say publicly, and we need to do a great deal more in terms of sounding the alarm when our national security budget fails to address the urgent threats that we have identified. We will go public with our threat notices to permit the public to instruct the government.. Analysts will be managers of external networks of experts, of open source funds, of customer relations, and of classified tasking. Finally, clearances matter less than knowledge, and multi-lateral burden sharing is going to dominate how we do intelligence in the 21st Century. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
Recommendations SAG Budget Analysis--cross-walk threat/$ SAG Skunkworks--integrated experiments SAG Solutions--cost out now and future SAG Mentors--history, outreach, memory SAG IG--document shortfalls in collection, processing, management, and clients SAG PR--publish unclassified reports As I listened yesterday and reflected last night, I have seen real potential within the SAG--the SAG could become a lifeboat or test-bed for the future of intelligence. Here are a few things that occur to me. Copyright © OSS Inc. 2001.
The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political Truth Helps, But Only When You Listen…. The New Craft of Intelligence: Personal, Public, & Political Robert David Steele <bear@oss.net>