Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Gaverick Matheny, “Utilitarianism and Animals” Matheny's main 2-part argument (part 1): 1. Being sentient is sufficient (enough) for having interests, including being free from pain and suffering. 2. Many nonhuman animals are sentient. Thus (from 1 & 2), 3. Many nonhuman animals have interests, including being free from pain and suffering. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Gaverick Matheny, “Utilitarianism and Animals” Matheny's main 2-part argument (part 2): 3. Many nonhuman animals have interests, including being from pain and suffering. 4. An action is morally right (permissible) only if the like interests of all who will be affected by one’s action are given equal weight by one’s action. Thus (from 3 & 4 ), 5. An action is morally right only if the like interests of all who will be affected by one’s action, including nonhuman animals, are given equal weight by one’s action. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Gaverick Matheny, “Utilitarianism and Animals” Matheny's tests for particular animal experiments Balance of pain test: “In every case, we should ask if the pain prevented by an experiment is greater than the pain caused by that experiment.” If not, experimentation is wrong. Infant substitution test: “Would researchers contemplating an animal experiment be willing...to place an orphaned infant in the animal's place?” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Tom Regan, “Are Zoos Morally Defensible?” A utilitarian approach to the question Interests of animals (e.g., their “needs, desires, and preferences”) will figure in the moral assessment of zoos. A problem with applying this approach: We need to know about the interests of all affected, not just the interests of animals. A serious implication of this problem: “the theory requires knowledge that far exceeds what we humans are capable of acquiring” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Tom Regan, “Are Zoos Morally Defensible?” The rights view If wild animals confined in zoos are treated with appropriate respect, then (contrary to the utilitarian approach), we don't have to ask about: The interests of those employed by zoos Economic benefits of zoos How much people learn from zoos Animals have rights for the same reasons that humans do. Zoos are not defensible because they violate animals' right to freedom. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Carl Cohen, “Do Animals Have Rights?” What is a right? “A right (unlike an interest) is a valid claim, or potential claim, under principles that govern both the claimant and the target of the claim.” Why animals do not have rights: Cohen's lioness & baby zebra thought experiment Animals are “totally amoral...they do no wrong, ever. [...] In their world there are no rights” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Carl Cohen, “Do Animals Have Rights?” (cont'd) “Animals cannot be the bearers of rights because the concept of rights is essentially human; it is rooted in, and has force within, a human moral world.” Note: Cohen still thinks we have obligations towards animals, because he thinks factors other than rights can produce obligations. Why Regan's argument for animals rights fails Regan's argument equivocates on “inherent value” Sense 1: moral dignity Sense 2: being more than “just a thing” © Oxford University Press

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Mary Anne Warren, “Human and Animal Rights Compared” The content of a right = the sphere of activity the right protects (e.g., the content of the right to free speech is free speech). The strength of a right = the strength of reasons required for it to be legitimately overridden (e.g., the right to live might be stronger than the right to vote—it may be all right to prevent someone if doing so will save a live). Warren argues that both animals and humans have rights, but these rights differ in terms of content and strength. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Mary Anne Warren, “Human and Animal Rights Compared” The rights of animals are weaker than the corresponding rights (i.e., rights with the same content) as humans because: 1. Humans desire liberty and life more strongly, and 2. Humans possess moral autonomy Note: Moral autonomy is not necessary for having rights, according to Warren, but it can strengthen the rights one already has. The nonparadigm human objection and Warren's response © Oxford University Press

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Jordan Curnutt, “A New Argument for Vegetarianism” Part 1 of his 3-part argument: 1. Causing harm is prima facie morally wrong. 2. Killing animals causes them harm. 3. Therefore, killing animals is prima facie morally wrong. Part 2 of his 3-part argument: 3. Killing animals is prima facie morally wrong. 4. Animal-eating requires the killing of animals. 5. Therefore, animal-eating is prima facie morally wrong. © Oxford University Press

Chapter 9: The Ethical Treatment of Animals Jordan Curnutt, “A New Argument for Vegetarianism” Part 3 of his 3-part argument: 5. Animal-eating is prima facie morally wrong. 6. The wrongness of animal-eating is not overridden. 7. Therefore, animal-eating is ultima facie morally wrong. Objection to Part 3: the wrongness of animal-eating is overridden Appeals to tradition, aesthetics, convenience, human welfare Curnutt's reply © Oxford University Press