Transaction Flow end-end

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Presentation transcript:

Transaction Flow end-end

Chip End-to-End process AUTHORISATIONS Offline Authentication Cardholder verification method Terminal Risk Management iCVV checking Card Risk Management ATC checking ISSUER HOST Online CAM Online PIN Script processing

Chip End-to-End process AUTHORISATIONS Offline Authentication Offline PIN Validation CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT Transaction Certificate Certificate in BASEII file Terminal Risk Management iCVV checking Card Risk Management ATC checking ISSUER HOST Online CAM Online PIN Script processing

Offline authentication processes IS THIS THE ACTUAL CARD? Static Data Authentication (SDA) Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) Combined Data Authentication (CDA) Offline Authentication Offline PIN Validation Terminal Risk Management Card Risk Management

Offline authentication processes IS THIS THE ACTUAL CARDHOLDER? Offline Plaintext PIN Offline Enciphered PIN Offline Authentication Offline PIN Validation Terminal Risk Management Card Risk Management

Card and terminal risk management SHOULD THIS TRANSACTION PROCEED? Terminal Floor Limits Usage controls Start / Expiry Date checking Terminal hot card file Terminal Action Codes Offline Authentication Offline PIN Validation Terminal Risk Management Card Risk Management

Card and terminal risk management SHOULD THIS TRANSACTION PROCEED? Chip card parameter decisions (Issuer Action Codes) Offline Authentication Offline PIN Validation Terminal Risk Management Card Risk Management

Online authentication processes ISSUER HOST ONLINE – THE TERMINAL SENDS SPECIFIC VALUES TO HOST FOR VALIDATION. iCVV checking Chip card verification value stored in card ATC checking Card generated incremental counter Online CAM One-time only cryptographic value Generated by card secret DES key Online PIN Encrypted PIN reference value

Card usage management - scripts ISSUER HOST ISSUER HOST HAS THE ABILITY TO CHANGE CERTAIN VALUES IN THE CARD OR BLOCK/UNBLOCK USAGE ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT Block card usage Block application usage PIN offline change processing TRANSACTION MANAGEMENT Offline usage values Domestic offline currency values

Guidelines to PKI cryptography EMV Offline Authentication uses Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based on Rivest Shamir and Alderman (RSA) cryptography Made up of Key pairs. Private and Public Private must be kept secret to the owner (Visa, Issuer, Card) Public is available to anybody Sign and verify concept – Secretly sign something with your private key which can be verified with your public key One way conversation only Used for SDA, DDA and CDA Offline Authentication

Guidelines to PKI cryptography Within EMV, certificates are produced by signing data with Private Keys Validation and retrieval of data is performed in public with the corresponding Public Key Complex algorithm based on prime number calculations Current key lengths are 1920 and 2048 bits Offline Authentication

Risk protection method Traditional Fraud Method Traditional prevention Chip prevention (additional to traditional methods) Skimming (copying magnetic stripe) Nothing SDA or DDA or CDA (all offline) Counterfeit CVV + Physical Characteristics Offline Authentication

Static Data Authentication - SDA SET-UP Acquirer Host System Terminal Management System (TMS) Issuer Host System Card Management System Visa Public Key Visa Public Key Visa Private Key 1 Acquirer Terminal (POS) Issuer EMV Data Preparation System Issuer Public Key Issuer Private 2 (IPKC) Account data Signed 3

Static Data Authentication - SDA SDA PROCESSING IPKC (signed by Visa) Visa Public Key Issuer Public Key Signed data (signed by Issuer) Data has not been changed since Issuance Card provides Issuer Public Key Certificate (signed by Visa’s private key) Terminal verifies data and retrieves Issuer Public Key Card provides signed account data (signed by Issuer Private Key) Terminal verifies data has not changed

Dynamic Data Authentication - DDA SET-UP Acquirer Host System Terminal Management System (TMS) Issuer Public Key Issuer Private 1 Visa Public Key Issuer EMV Data Preparation System Visa Public Key Visa Private Key 3 Acquirer Terminal (POS) Account data Signed 2 (IPKC) Card Private Key Card Public 4

Dynamic Data Authentication - DDA DDA PROCESSING Visa Public Key IPKC (signed by Visa) Issuer Public Key Signed data (signed by Issuer) Card Public Key Card signed data Challenge – random value Data has not been changed or copied since Issuance Card provides Issuer Public Key Certificate (signed by Visa’s private key) Terminal verifies data and retrieves Issuer Public Key Card provides signed account data (signed by Issuer Private Key) Terminal verifies data has not changed and retrieves the Card Public Key Terminal asks the card to sign some random data Card signs random data with Card Private Key Terminal verifies card certificate with Card Public Key

Combined DDA / Gen AC (CDA) Card signed data (random number for validation) Plus the cards online random value (request cryptogram) Same set-up as DDA Same process as DDA With the exception of: When the card sends the final card certificate it includes the online cryptographic value used by the host.

Considerations Q - Is there an effective offline authentication process within magnetic stripe processing ? A - No Q -Is SDA more secure than magnetic stripe? A - Yes Q – Is DDA more secure than SDA? Q – Is CDA more secure than DDA? A – Yes HOWEVER, CDA may not be the best solution for your market just because it is the most secure. We have to consider where we are and where we are going!

Summary All processes (SDA, DDA, CDA) are skimming and counterfeit protection measures SDA is the cheapest (no need for a card crypto-processor) DDA and CDA require a card that can perform RSA cryptography Visa mandates SDA on all cards When choosing a method you should consider all functions of the card and likelyhood of a full compromise that can not be detected. Such as (Offline PIN, Online cryptography, Acquirer market floor limits, card terminal risk management)

Areas that Combat Fraud ATC Checking CVM Usage DDA or CDA Scripts