Natural Resources Defense Council Session 3 Feb 23 15.00 - 17.00 International/Regional outlook: Status of reprocessing policy in South Korea and how they view Japan's reprocessing policy Jungmin Kang Natural Resources Defense Council International Conference on the US Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and Japan's Plutonium Policy Tokyo, Japan February 23-24, 2017

NPP Sites (Ref: Google Earth Pro, Nov 29, 2016)

Power Reactors in Operation (Ref: Nuclear Power in South Korea (Updated October 2016)(http://www.world-nuclear.org/information- library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/south-korea.aspx))

Power Reactors under Construction or Planned (Ref: Nuclear Power in South Korea (Updated October 2016)(http://www.world-nuclear.org/information- library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/south-korea.aspx))

Installed Nuclear Capacity (1980-2035) (Ref: Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), The 2nd National Energy Basic Plan, January 2014 (Korean); MOTIE, The 7th Basic Plan for Long-Term Electricity Supply and Demand (2015 ~ 2029), July 2015 (Korean))

Amounts of Spent Fuels Generation PWR (1GWe) CANDU (0.7 GWe) Annual SF Generation (tHM) Approx. 20 Approx. 100 SF Generation (tHM) For 40 years For 50 years 20x40=800 20x50=1,000 100x40=4,000 100x50=5,000 SF Generation for 50 years (tHM) 20 PWRs + 4 CANDUs 40 PWRs + 4 CANDUs 1,000x20=20,000 1,000x40=40,000 5,000x4=20,000 As of the end of 2015, approx. 6,800 tHM of PWR spent fuel and approx. 7,800 tHM of CANDU spent fuel were stored in the spent fuel storage facilities at South Korea’s four NPP sites.

National Policy on Spent Fuel Management On May 25, 2016 South Korean government firstly announced a national plan to build a geologic disposal site to be operational in 2053. To do this, it is scheduled for government to select site for an Underground Research Laboratory (URL) at the disposal site by 2028, to construct the URL and to do empirical study till 2042. An interim storage facility is to be built at the disposal site by 2035, to store spent fuel until operation of disposal site. If unavoidable, spent fuel would be stored at onsite temporary storage facilities till operation of the interim storage site begins. In addition, government would try to utilize an international spent fuel management facility for storage and disposition of spent fuel if available. R&D of reduction of volume and radiotoxicity of spent fuel would be continued (Ref: Korean Atomic Energy Commission, Draft Plan for the High Level Radioactive Waste Management, July 25, 2016 (Korean))

KAERI’s Plan on Pyroprocessing/Fast Reactor (Ref: In-Tae Kim, "Status of R&D Activities on Pyroprocessing Technology at KAERI," SACSESS Int'l Workshop, Apr. 22, 2015)

KAERI’s Plan on Pyroprocessing/Fast Reactor (cont’) (Ref: In-Tae Kim, "Status of R&D Activities on Pyroprocessing Technology at KAERI," SACSESS Int'l Workshop, Apr. 22, 2015)

KAERI's Argument on Reduction of Spent Fuel Disposal Area & Radiotoxicity (Ref: Yeong-il Kim, "Prospects for Future Nuclear Enegy System in Korea," IAEA INPRO Dialogue Forum, Seoul, South Korea, August 29, 2012)

Cs-137 & Sr-90 With both about 30-year half-life, Cs-137 and Sr-90 are contained in the spent fuel that generate significant radioactive decay heat within short-term period. Pyroprocessing separate the Cs and Sr into a waste stream. The Cs/Sr stream would then be contained in a form and stored in a surface or near-surface facility for approximately 300 years. The separated Cs and Sr should be disposed in a geologic repository after 300 years. There are concerns on radioactive release of Cs-137 or other radioactive materials, e.g. C-14, during the pyroprocessing processes. If separated Cs and Sr are stored in a surface or near-surface facility for approximately 300 years, why not spent fuel itself?

CANDU Spent Fuel CANDU spent fuel would not be pyroprocessed and would be directly disposed in a geologic repository because of its lower decay heats release. Then why not store PWR spent fuel for a long time and dispose it in a geologic repository. Decay heat release from CANDU spent fuel with burnup of 7 MWd/kgHM for 50-year cooling: 113 W/tHM Decay heat release from PWR spent fuel with burnup of 40 MWd/kgHM for 200-year and 300-year cooling: 206 W/tHM and 162 W/tHM, respectively

To Achieve KAERI’s Goal on Reduction of Radiotoxicity To reduce radiotoxicity of PWR spent fuel to 1/1,000, more than two fast reactors (with an equivalent power capacity) per one PWR needs to be deployed and takes hundreds of years to operate the fast reactors. A 2008 DOE study assumed 120 LWRs and 80 FRs for the fast reactor recycle alternative, based on a transuranic conversion ratio of 0.5. (Ref: "Nuclear Waste: Technologies for Separations and Transmutations," National Academy Press, 1996; U.S. DOE, Office of Nuclear Energy, "DDraft Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement," Draft Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, October 2008)

Pyroprocessing Not Proliferation Resistant “This paper presents the results of an evaluation of the relative proliferation risks of particular reprocessing technologies of current interest. The assessment focuses on determining whether three alternative reprocessing technologies - COEX, UREX+, and pyroprocessing provide nonproliferation advantages relative to the PUREX technology because they do not produce separated plutonium. …This evaluation found only a modest improvement in reducing proliferation risk over existing PUREX technologies and these modest improvements apply primarily for non-state actors.”

10-Year U.S.-ROK Joint Fuel Cycle Study (Ref: John W. Herczeg, "Status and Prospect of the 10-Year U.S.-ROK Joint Fuel Cycle Study," May 6, 2016.)

New U.S.-ROK 123 Agreement The new U.S.-ROK Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (“123” Agreement), signed June 15 and entered into force on November 25, 2015. Although South Korea could not get priority consent on reprocessing from the US, South Korea can alter in form or content for post-irradiation examination of irradiated nuclear material subject to the agreement and the separation of radioisotopes from irradiated low enriched uranium subject to the agreement at the designated facilities in South Korea. However, those South Korean activities would be limited to convert oxide spent fuel form into metal form by removing fission gases from the spent fuel without plutonium separation. (Ref: Fred McGoldrick, "The New Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Between South Korea and the United States: From Dependence to Parity," Korea Economic Institute, September 2015)

New U.S.-ROK 123 Agreement (cont) About the US-ROK joint fuel cycle study (2011-2021), the High-Level Bilateral Commission would determine whether or not give consent to pyroprocessing operations in South Korea once it reviewed results of the study, based on technical and economic feasibility and nonproliferation acceptability of pyroprocessing. If the High-Level Bilateral Commission agrees, South Korea would get consent to pyroprocessing in South Korea without an amendment of the agreement, through subsequent arrangement process. The New Agreement allows retransfer of US-origin spent fuel in South Korea for overseas reprocessing. In the new agreement, South Korea has possibility of acquiring enrichment up to less than 20 percent in the uranium isotope 235 for assured fuel supply, through the High-Level Bilateral Commission under its implications for the nonproliferation regime. (Ref: Fred McGoldrick, "The New Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Between South Korea and the United States: From Dependence to Parity," Korea Economic Institute, September 2015)

The US’s Double Standards Current US-Japan 123 Agreement allows Japan’s reprocessing and enrichment. As of the end of 2014, Japan had 47,800 kilograms of separated plutonium: 10,800 kg in Japan, 20,700 kg in UK, and 16,300 kg in France. Just two reactors restarted in August and October 2015 since the 2011 Fukushima accident. Monju reactor is decommissioned. However, Japan continues to advance plans to start up the Rokkasho reprocessing plant in 2018. Rokkasho reprocessing plant would produce an additional eight tonnes of separated plutonium annually. It presents a high risk of nuclear security as well as nuclear proliferation in case. So, how South Koreans view Japan's reprocessing policy?