Contemporary Moral Problems M-F12:00-1:00SAV 264 Instructor: Benjamin Hole Email: bvhole@uw.edu Office Hours: everyday after class

Agenda Any administrative questions? Clicker Quiz Last thoughts on the Infanticide Objection to Warren? Marquis, “Why Abortion is Immoral”

What does Marquis claim is the main reason why it is presumptively wrong to kill a fetus? The fetus can feel pain The fetus is an innocent person from conception with an inviolable right to life Abortion will harm the woman Killing the fetus would deprive it of a valuable future The fetus actually meets Warren’s five criteria for personhood All of the above

Which of the following claims is/are not defended by Marquis: a future like ours is a sufficient condition for presumptive moral standing a future like ours is a necessary condition for presumptive moral standing the ability to make one’s own maxims is a necessary and sufficient condition for personhood and dignity A & C B & C

Marquis claims that: abortion is presumptively morally wrong contraception is presumptively morally wrong contraception is not presumptively morally wrong A & B A & C

The Infanticide Objection Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion”

The Infanticide Objection The Objection If Warren’s “5 criteria” theory of personhood is correct, then infanticide is morally permissible. But it is not! Therefore, Warren’s “5 criteria” theory of personhood is incorrect. Warren’s response Infanticide is not always morally impermissible “neonates are so very close to being persons that to kill them requires a very strong moral justification” Neonates have indirect moral standing, but are not themselves persons

“Why Abortion Is Immoral” Marquis

Exegesis Marquis, Core Argument Contraception Objection Marquis, Response P1. If abortion is (presumptively) morally permissible, then the fetus is not a person with full moral standing.   P2. Abortion is morally permissible. Therefore, a fetus is not a person with full moral standing. P1. If X has a future like ours of great value and killing X deprives X of that future, then killing X is (presumptively) morally wrong. P2. A fetus has a future like ours and killing that fetus would deprive it of a valuable future. Therefore, abortion is (presumptively) morally impermissible. P1. If the “future like ours” premise is true, then contraception would be morally impermissible. P2. But contraception is not morally impermissible! Therefore, the “future like ours” premise is false. P1. If there is “no non-arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception,” then contraception is morally permissible (according to the “future like ours” premise). P2. There is “no non-arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception” Therefore, contraception is morally permissible (according to the “future like ours” premise).

What is moral standing? To determine whether abortion is wrong, Marquis claims we must first determine what makes killing generally wrong. His answer: When someone is wrongly killed, he or she is deprived of a valuable future: “experiences, projects, activities” “When I am killed, I am deprived... of what I now value [and] also what I would come to value... Therefore, when I die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future.”

What is moral standing? To determine whether abortion is wrong, Marquis claims we must first determine what makes killing generally wrong. “The category that is morally central to this analysis is the category of having a valuable future like ours; it is not the category of personhood.”

A future like ours If X has a future like ours of great value and killing X deprives X of that future, then killing X is morally wrong. Implications: A future like ours is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for presumptive moral standing. It is seriously presumptively wrong to kill children and infants. It is not the case that only biologically human life can have great moral worth, e.g., intelligent animals/aliens. It might be seriously wrong to kill some currently existing non-human mammals. Does not entail that euthanasia, physician assisted suicide, and infanticide are morally wrong (in all cases).

Strongly Agree Agree Somewhat Agree Neutral Somewhat Disagree Disagree Do you agree with Marquis? “If X has a future like ours of great value and killing X deprives X of that future, then killing X is morally wrong.” Strongly Agree Agree Somewhat Agree Neutral Somewhat Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree

A future like ours Conclusion: “Since the loss of the future to standard fetus...at least as great a loss as the loss of the future to a standard human being who is killed, abortion, like ordinary killing, could be justified only by the most compelling reasons.” In other words, he concludes that abortion is “seriously presumptively wrong.” Marquis intentionally avoids the question of whether the fetus is a person.

The Contraception Objection Marquis: “the immorality of contraception is not entailed by the loss of a future like ours simply because there is no non-arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception …” Objection If Marquis' view were true, then contraception would be wrong. But that's absurd. 

Do you agree with the Contraception Objection? Strongly Agree Agree Somewhat Agree Neutral Somewhat Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree

Exegesis Marquis, Core Argument Contraception Objection Marquis, Response P1. If abortion is (presumptively) morally permissible, then the fetus is not a person with full moral standing.   P2. Abortion is morally permissible. Therefore, a fetus is not a person with full moral standing. P1. If X has a future like ours of great value and killing X deprives X of that future, then killing X is (presumptively) morally wrong. P2. A fetus has a future like ours and killing that fetus would deprive it of a valuable future. Therefore, abortion is (presumptively) morally impermissible. P1. If the “future like ours” premise is true, then contraception would be morally impermissible. P2. But contraception is not morally impermissible! Therefore, the “future like ours” premise is false. P1. If there is “no non-arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception,” then contraception is morally permissible (according to the “future like ours” premise). P2. There is “no non-arbitrarily identifiable subject of the loss in the case of contraception” Therefore, contraception is morally permissible (according to the “future like ours” premise).