Analysis of Suspect Chemicals REGIONAL TRAINING COURSE FOR CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES OF STATES PARTIES IN ASIA ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE TRANSFERS REGIME OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION NEW DELHI, INDIA 10 – 13 DECEMBER 2012 Analysis of Suspect Chemicals Declarations Branch/Verification Division ORGANISATION FOR THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Objectives By the end of this session participants should: Be aware of what steps to take if a potentially toxic chemical is discovered Be aware of potential sources of advice and assistance that may be available in your country which should be explored on your return. Understand the role of detection, on-site and off-site analysis Be aware of the limitations of military detection equipment

WHAT TO EXPECT

What to Expect – Chemical Munitions? Extremely unlikely that you will discover containers loaded with actual chemical munitions Cannot rule it out – terrorists may try to smuggle small numbers of chemical munitions but difficulty in obtaining these makes this very unlikely. Relatively easy to detect with X-ray scanners

What to expect – Toxic Chemicals Unlikely that a country trying to obtain chemical weapons will try to transfer large quantities of toxic chemicals. However, they may try to obtain small amounts for CW research. In addition terrorists may try to obtain small amounts of toxic chemicals for an attack – you don’t need much for terrorist purposes.

What to expect – Toxic Chemicals (2) Difficult to transport toxic materials without drawing unwanted attention from authorities due to safety precautions. If no safety precautions taken, run the risk of a release during transport causing death or injury to innocent bystanders or proliferator not desired target

What to expect – CW Precursors Much more likely that a proliferator will try to obtain precursor chemicals which they can then convert to CW. Most precursors standard industry chemicals Easier to get hold of these chemicals In general not highly toxic hence easier to transport without drawing attention Easier to justify why you are transferring these chemicals – less need to conceal chemicals

WHAT TO DO IF SUSPECT CW OR TOXIC CHEMICAL DISCOVERED Secure the scene Try to tentatively identify the substance only with the information available Report the incident to the appropriate authority Do you know who? Is there a procedure in place to deal with such cases? Who will take any samples or carry out analysis?

THINGS YOU SHOULD NOT DO DO NOT take any action unless you have been trained in handling toxic chemicals DO NOT enter confined spaces DO NOT open trailers or trucks DO NOT open drums or other containers DO NOT presume what is marked on label is what is inside DO NOT destroy evidence

Advice on Chemical Issues Including Sampling and Analysis Customs laboratory Chemical unit within customs Can provide advice and liaise with outside agencies on chemical issues, including sampling and analysis Other government departments/laboratories University laboratories If suspected chemical weapon the OPCW can provide advice and assistance The Secretariat Other member states

DETECTION AND ANALYSIS

Detection and Analysis Detection of CW agents and toxic industrial chemicals On site analysis of suspect chemicals Off site analysis of suspect chemicals

Detection of CW agents and toxic industrial chemicals Mainly based on military equipment, e.g. Detector papers and tubes Handheld detectors based on Ion Mobility Spectrometry Flame Photometry

Limitations of Military Detectors for Customs Really aimed at detecting the presence of chemical weapons agents (CWAs) and some toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) not at identifying what the suspect substance is. Precursor chemicals on CWC Schedules generally not covered Subject to interference from many standard chemicals regularly passing through customs. Can warn of possible dangers and inform sampling and analysis but not replace it

On-Site Analysis

On-Site Analysis Identification of much wider range of chemicals than military type detectors aim is to identify what the chemical is not just to indicate the presence of small number of dangerous chemicals. Less susceptible to false positives than military type detectors such as IMS Can quickly resolve many issues without the need to transport samples to a fixed lab.

On- Site Analysis - Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) Portable Easy to use Quick Identification based on comparison with library of compounds Additional libraries can easily be added

On- Site Analysis - FTIR (2) Can be used to identify wide variety of chemicals CWAs, TICs, CW precursors. Explosives Narcotics Common chemicals Most common CWC chemicals included

Off Site Analysis

Off site analysis – the customs laboratory Many customs authorities have their own laboratory (or laboratories) Others rely on other government or university labs Range of chemicals that can be analysed much greater than portable equipment Confirm identification by detectors or on site analysis (where available) Possible need for independent verification

Gas Chromatograph –Mass Spectrometry (GC-MS) Primary technique used by OPCW for analysis of scheduled chemicals But expensive and needs careful maintenance – not commonly available in customs labs. Agilent 6850 GC/ 5973 MSD

Other Techniques for Analysing Scheduled Chemicals FTIR GC NMR

OPCW Central Analytical Database Source of identification information for Customs Laboratories Contains MS, NMR, IR, GC retention indices information on over 4000 CWC related chemicals Can be obtained through National Authority or directly from OPCW

Thank you Any Questions? 25 25