Conflict Dynamics of Dual Land Administration in Karen State/Kawthoolei of Myanmar SiuSue Mark, Researcher International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague Erasmus University 23 March 2017

Since Myanmar’s 2010 Transition… Multiple political and economic reforms national ceasefire signed between the Government of Myanmar (GoM) and eight of 21 major armed groups on October 2015 package of land-governance reforms, including land-use certificates under the 2012 Farmland Law

Territorial Sovereignty is Challenged “fragmented sovereignty” over property institutions, where the state and non-state actors compete not only to exercise their military control over territory, but also to define institutions that govern property (Lund 2011) Around the country, different armed groups provide different services (e.g. education, health, land administration) (Joliffe, 2014, 2015) Karen National Union (KNU) has been administering its own land policy since 1974

Implementing KNU Land Policy End of 2015: 34,544 household land titles and 105 community forest titles Demarcated: 18 customary land areas 14 wildlife areas 35/63 reserve forests 8 herbal medicine forests

Differences KNU Policy recognizes that people own the land, not only the land use rights customary land ownership is more strongly protected in the KNU Land Policy Tries to keep land held within a community by forbidding its sale to outsiders Greater limits to amounts of land that companies can own. Companies can receive a maximum of 50 acres for up to 20 years.

2012 Bi-lateral Ceasefire; 2015 National Ceasefire Land under each authority will title that land In mixed areas, titling will depend on which authority can gain access Post- ceasefire, land documented by the KNU will be recognized by the government

In reality… Sometimes, no authority recognizes land ownership In KNU controlled areas, communities only have KNU certificates. In GoM controlled areas, communities seek GoM certificates In mixed-control areas, communities seek formal recognition from both authorities.

Hlaingbwe Township (Government-controlled) “Under the peace process, KNU reached there and is also giving titles because the people don’t feel fully secure under the GoM laws… They feel the KNU policy provides more guarantees for them, even if they are under GoM administration.” (KNU Justice Minister, 2015)

Insecurity in the gray zone Property relations must be sanctioned by “the state or some other form of politico-legal authority” (Sikor and Lund 2009) uncertainty of authority increases the vulnerability for the lives and livelihoods of local communities. Kaw Sa Lo village: When IDPs started to return a few years ago, the KNU gave the villagers land titles. Local government refused to recognize these certificates and charged them with trespassing

Insecurity plays out in several ways: Weak tenure security Pay taxes to both authorities in some areas e.g. for the transportation of cash crops through checkpoints Which authority to turn to when seeking justice

Future arrangements? Peace-building aid tends to be state-centric problematic not only in terms of political legitimacy in some areas ignores the fact that in many areas, larger EAOs have long- established service arrangements State, international actors may not be immediately comfortable with this, but… Many EAOs are now “legal” & future plans may involve joining the formal governance arrangements GoM to work more collaboratively with structures?