Is Audit Quality Influenced by Prospective Non-Audit Service Fees Monika Causholli University of Kentucky   Dennis Chambers Kennesaw State University Jeff L. Payne

Coffee (2006) “The auditor’s independence was compromised not by the threat that existing consulting revenues from the audit client would be withdrawn, but by the anticipation that additional consulting revenues were obtainable – if the auditor cultivated management and acquiesced to it.” Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance

Research Question Does the expectation of future non audit service fees influence audit quality? We find evidence that suggest this is the case.

Introduction Regulators have consistently expressed concerns that non audit service fees (NAS) impair audit quality (Levitt 2000, SOX 2002). Enron type financial failures led to an increased scrutiny of NAS with the eventually passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) SOX prohibits the payment of most NAS.

Prior Research A consistent link between NAS and audit quality has not been shown across a myriad of studies (Habib 2009) Proxies for audit quality include Earnings management including the use of discretionary accruals Earnings conservatism Earnings restatements Earnings response Going-concern opinions NAS measured using various metrics Log (NAS) Ratio of NAS to audit fees Ratio of total fees (NAS + audit) to audit fees.

Motivation Kinney and Libby (2002) note, “...more insidious effects on the economic bond may result from unexpected [or increased] audit and non-audit service fees that more accurately be likened to attempted bribes.” Coffee (2006) states that “…the real conflict lies not in the actual receipt of high fees, but in their expected receipt. Even the client currently paying low consulting [fees] to its auditor might reverse this pattern if the auditor proved more cooperative.”

Theory Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (e.g.,Deci et al. 2001) suggest that economic incentives arising from pressure to obtain NAS can reduce audit quality Intrinsic motivation – Individuals will act in accordance with the norms and standards of their reference group. Extrinsic motivation – Individuals will act in accordance with their own desires, what best rewards them personally. To the extent extrinsic motivation dominates intrinsic motivation, then individuals will not act in accordance with the norms and standards of their reference group. Tangible extrinsic rewards are affective at modifying behavior if these rewards are expected and based on the individuals actions.

Implications Auditor’s are affected by professional codes of conduct, industry expectations, and the requirement to exercise independent judgment Auditor’s are affected by external pressures to increase audit and NAS revenues and to attract and retain clients. Brown and Dugan (2002) AA partners pressured to double fees on existing clients Audits a “loss leader” (Levitt 2000) Audit partner promotion and compensation policies based on revenues generated (Coffee 2006) Cross-selling a critical component of success (Wyatt 2003)

Prediction We predict that the pressures to expand and increase future NAS is associated with reduced audit quality in the current period.

Method Fee data from Audit Analytics for 2000-2007 Required data from COMPUSTAT and CRSP for model estimation Big N firms

Method ADCA=Absolute value of discretionary accruals; observations with ADCA > 1.0 have been deleted. Residual from cross-sectional estimation model similar to Lim and Tan (2008) CAR =Cumulative abnormal return equal to the three-day cumulated raw return over days -1, 0, and 1 around the first earnings announcement date after fee information has been disclosed, less the three-day cumulated CRSP value-weighted market return over the same period.

Method Variable of Interest: PFEE*NY_PCT NY_PCT=Percentage change in non-audit-services fees from year t to t+1; winsorized at the 99th percentile. PFEE PrAUSIC=Dummy variable equal to one if the company’s non-audit-services fees are below the 25th percentile of those paid by clients of the company-year’s auditor in the same 2-digit SIC industry; zero otherwise. PrAUCITY=Dummy variable equal to one if the company’s non-audit-services fees are below the 25th percentile of those paid by clients of the company-year’s auditor in the same city; zero otherwise.

Contribution We argue that the threat to independence is from the expectation of gaining future NAS fees, not NAS fees from existing clients as examined in prior literature. We argue that any client, not only the clients that already pay high NAS fees, can lure the auditor into being more lenient by simply promising a reward in the form of more NAS fees.

Contribution We find that future realized NAS fees are negatively related to both measures of audit quality in the current period and these results hold only for the pre-SOX period. Overall, our results add to the discussion of whether NAS fees compromise auditor independence. Our unique approach extends the literature and provides evidence that supports the regulators perspective currently embedded in the SOX law, that NAS have the potential to impair auditor independence.