Searle on the Mind-Body Problem Minds, Brains and Science Chapter 1 Philosophy 224 Searle on the Mind-Body Problem Minds, Brains and Science Chapter 1

The Difficulty As we saw with Descartes, accepting mind-body dualism is both common and fraught with significant challenges. It continues to be problematic today, but Searle thinks he has a way out. What we need is an explanation of why it remains so problematic. Searle identifies two explanations. Old fashioned vocabulary—we are still dealing with the issue using the philosophical terminology of the enlightenment. It is difficult to avoid the temptation to attempt to resolve the apparent dichotomy between physical things and mental things by eliminating one or the other (think about Marx).

A First Response Given these explanations, Searle thinks any adequate response to the challenge has to acknowledge these constraints. With regard to the first, we need to develop a new vocabulary because breaking with the old vocabulary also breaks with the old ways of thinking. As for the second, Searle thinks the temptation to do away with one or the other is both encouraged and thwarted by 4 difficult features of mental phenomena: Consciousness—awareness of the mental is a fact of our experience, but explaining it is difficult because it is the source of all that is uniquely human about our experience (including the very fact that we have experience); Intentionality—the fact that consciousness is directional, that consciousness is always consciousness of something; Subjectivity of Mental States—consciousness is always ‘from a point of view;’ Mental Causation—common sense tells us that our mental states affect our physical states.

Searle’s Solution Embracing these constraints, Searle’s response to the mind-body problem is a form of materialism that we’ll call biological naturalism. It’s essentially a combination of ‘naive’ physicalism and ‘naive’ mentalism. Searle’s physicalism is the claim that mental states are caused by processes in the brain, ex. the description of pain sensations on p. 18. Searle’s mentalism is the claim that mental states are nothing but brain states. Thus, brains cause minds, but minds are just features of brains. There is an apparent paradox here (the brain causes itself?), the solution of which, according to Searle, goes a long way towards a solution to the mind-body problem.

Understanding Causation The crucial step in resolving the paradox is to take on the notion of ‘causation.’ One seemingly obvious problem with the two theses is that they seem to suggest that mental states are in some form or other self- caused (typically an assertion of dualism). Searle suggests that this only seems obvious with a very simplistic understanding of causality (like evidenced on a pool table—mechanistic interaction). We get a better account of causation from physics. We know that solid objects are actually collections of small particles. The solidity of the desk is caused by the arrangement of the particles, but is not something other than the arrangement. Rather, it is realized in the arrangement. There is a causal relationship here, but the effect is not independent of the cause.

A Non-Reductive Materialism Up to this point, this sounds a lot like Reductive Materialism (all processes and realities observed in the world are explainable by reducing them to their most basic scientific components), but Searle makes an important distinction. Although mental states are caused by brain states, and are not realizable independently of brain states, they are not reducible to them. It is correct to say of a particular collection of particles that it is hard, but it is not correct to say of any one of the particles that it is hard. Likewise, it is correct to say of a particular mind/brain that it is thirsty, but not correct to say of any neuron or region that it is thirsty.

Consciousness? Searle tries to demonstrate the adequacy of his point of view by demonstrating how well it handles those four features of the mental specified above. First, we must deal with the character of consciousness itself. Searle insists that the question of consciousness is is best handled by considering how it actually exists. Neuroscientific analysis presents us with a very persuasive account, but one which many people resist. Searle thinks lack of familiarity and understanding is the problem and that this problem will eventually go away (ex. struggle between vitalism and biology, resolved not by biology winning, but because everyone came to understand the insights and starting point better).

Intentionality, Subjectivity and Mental Causation What about intentionality? As with consciousness, neuroscience and biology in general are our best resource. (ex. thirst, arises in hypothalamus due to chemical transmission from the kidneys). What about subjectivity? This is a false problem. Subjectivity is not opposed to objectivity, but is just another fact of our objective experience. What about mental causation? This is the easiest. Given naive mentalism, there is no real problem understanding how mental activity could have an effect, because it is just brain activity.