U.S. Geopolitics in Asia Raimo Väyrynen Helsinki, March 6, 2017

U.S. Geopolitics Geopolitics in the Trump era – offshore balancing can be either multilateral or unilateral. Offshore balancing means the retention of great-power capability without being engaged with full force in matters of other regions. The long perspective in the U.S. geopolitics; from being a full- fledged hegemon in the Reagan and Clinton years to being a reluctant hegemon under Obama – limited engagement in the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere.

U.S. Geopolitics Trump’s geopolitics is the struggle between multilateral and unilateral geopolitics. Pence and Mattis favor restraint, but multilateral engagement from a position of power. Trump’s early statements reflects a unilateral position which approximates isolation in which the US is not hindered by alliances, ”make America great again” Classical offshore balancing (Christopher Layne): the US must reduce and restrain its power

Chinese geopolitics China is potential challenger, but prefers ”peaceful” and ”harmonius” developments. It wants to avoid head-on collision with the US and defend primarily its own perimeters or sphere of interest, incl. ”nine dash line”. Since the late 15th century, Chinese geopolitics has had continental orientation. Mongol dynasty built the Imperial Channel to avoid pirates and was connected with the Silk Road. During Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) Zheng He made in 1405-33 seven trips to Asia and Africa with formidable fleets but then China was closed.

Great Wall and Lattimore The Great Wall was constructed during the Ming Dynasty against the nomad invasion and was not ancient origin. It is a symbol which created in the 1950’s to foster the image of China as a great nation. Arthur Waldron, The Great Wall of China. From History to Myth (1990). Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (1940) explored the history of the Mongol society. Great Wall was a defensive installation against the invasion from the Interior of Asia. Chinese history starts from the North, the loess region, and extends to the river regions in the South.

Wittfogel Early influence of Elsworth Huntington and later on Karl Wittfogel (hydraulic civilization, Oriental Despotism, 1957, controversy), rejected the views by Arnold Toynbee. China was unable to expand to arid regions because of Mongol resistance and environmental constraints. The border zone of Chinese civilization vs. the steppe. The Silk Road from the 13th century, Chinese luxuries to Europe. ”One Belt, One Road”(OBOR), the Road refers to maritime routes, while the Belt describes the overland trails. They involve 900 projects with a total value of $ 4 trillions.

New Silk Road OBORs economic corridors; China-Russia-Mongolia EC, Eurasia Land Bridge EC, China-Central Asia EC, China-Pakistan EC, China-India EC and China-Indochina EC (three last EC are maritime corridors, following the Eurasiain coaslands). Motivations for OBOR; Chinese overcapacity in steel and cement, energy needs, Xi Jinping’s ambitions, break out of the continental isolation. Declaration with the Eurasian Economic Union in 2016, transportation investment would increase trade with EU, FTA less so, Asia would benefit. AIIA central role in financing, 56 members (not USA), Chinese capital initially $ 50 billion. Chonqing-Duisburg link since 2013, Latvia.

True Maritime Power Xi Jinping has set the aim of acquiring true maritime power with strategic interconnection with land power. Domestic support, matching naval capabilities with US and Japan, maritime law enforcement, and extensive participation of cooperation. China as a responsible stakeholder in East Asian seas, but not in forceful persuasion. Summit between Obama and Xi; new kind of cooperative great- power relation. USA has not challenged China in the ESCS. Trump’s early policy was to challenge China on the sea limits, but it is now more uncertain. China aims to develop a balanced geopolitical position with great-power ambitions.

Power transitions and geopolitics Power transition from one great power to another: Gilpin, Modelski, Wallerstein. War is more likely when the challenger approaches the power of the hegemon. Hegemonic war between the US and China? Deconcentration and delegitimation. The US do not like the continental expansion of China (Brzezinski), but do like to combat the Chinese influence in regional seas. From the early 2000s it has aimed to rebalance, not roll back Chinese maritime role (deep engagement). George W. Bush started offshore balancing, Obama develop it further, and Trump will likely deepen it, accept Chinese claims in the ESCS.