in the Propensity to Make Attributions to Prejudice Factors Influencing Attributions to Prejudice: Harm, Intent, and Individual Differences in the Propensity to Make Attributions to Prejudice Stuart S. Miller and Donald A. Saucier Kansas State University SPSP 2015 SPSP 2015 Figure 1. Simple Slopes ATTRIBUTIONS TO PREJUDICE The Propensity to Make Attributions to Prejudice Scale (PMAPS) Expectation People discriminate against people who are not like them. Racist behavior is more widespread than people think it is. Other people treat minorities based on stereotypes. You'll see lots of racism if you look for it. Trivialization Racial minorities are too worried about being discriminated against. Racial minorities are too sensitive about stereotypes. Minorities today are overly worried about being victims of racism. People are overly concerned about racial issues. Vigilance I think about why racial minorities are treated stereotypically. I think about whether people act in a prejudiced or discriminatory manner. I consider whether people's actions are prejudiced or discriminatory. I am on the lookout for instances of prejudice or discrimination. Efficacy I am quick to recognize prejudice. My friends think I'm good at spotting racism. I find that prejudice and discrimination are pretty easy to spot. Note. Responses were measured on a 1 to 9 scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree). Trivialization scores were inflected before averaging all 15 items to create the composite PMAPS score (Study 1: a = .80; Study 2: a = .83). The Propensity to Make Attributions to Prejudice Scale (PMAPS) predicts third party observers’ tendencies to see (or fail to see) prejudice in others’ behaviors (Miller & Saucier, under review). In the current studies we examined how this tendency interacts with situational cues that support or contradict attributions to prejudice. Prior research on targets’ attributions to prejudice (e.g., Kaiser & Major, 2006; Pinel, 1999) and theories based on top-down cognitive processing (e.g., Barrett & Swim, 1998; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Nickerson, 1998) suggest that individuals’ prior beliefs and expectations influence their judgments about whether others’ behaviors are prejudiced. Additionally, bottom-up processes may be involved when individuals make use of information about the intent of an action and the harm done to the target (Swim et al., 2003). However, when information about harm and intent is absent, observers’ prior beliefs and expectations that characterize a tendency to make attributions to prejudice may more strongly influence individuals’ attributions. We hypothesized that individuals’ beliefs about the prevalence of racial prejudice, trivialization of targets’ concerns, vigilance in spotting prejudice, and efficacy in recognizing prejudice will combine to predict attributions to prejudice in a hypothetical situation. Furthermore, we hypothesized that these beliefs will be especially predictive when explicit information about harm and intent is not available (i.e., when situational ambiguity is highest). Study 1: Harm Study 2: Intent Study 2: Intent Study 2: Intent METHOD Participants Study 1: Caucasian male (n = 78) and female (n = 129) college students (N = 207) aged 18 to 51 (M = 19.29, SD = 3.36) Study 1: Caucasian male (n = 81) and female (n = 178) college students (N = 259) aged 18 to 47 (M = 19.36, SD = 2.60) Procedure Base Vignette: Jason was looking for an apartment prior to the start of the fall semester at college. He submitted a rental application to Mike, the landlord. Mike showed Jason the apartment and said that he would get back to him regarding whether he could rent it out to Jason. A few days later, Mike phoned Jason to say that he was renting the apartment out to another individual. Study 1 Harm Manipulation No Harm: Jason was not disappointed because he had already found an apartment he liked better. Ambiguous Harm: (No additional information) Clear Harm: Jason was very disappointed because he had to eventually settle for an apartment that he didn’t like nearly as much. Study 2 Intent Manipulation No Intent: A few days later, Mike phoned Jason to say that he was renting the apartment out to another individual who was higher on the waiting list. Ambiguous Intent: (No additional information) Clear Intent: A few days later, Mike phoned Jason to say that he was renting the apartment out to another individual. Mike suspected that Jason, being a young Black male, may keep company with people he didn’t want hanging around the building. RESULTS Table 1. Simple Slopes Study 1. The PMAPS did not predict spontaneous attributions to prejudice, or attributions to a prejudiced actor in any of the three experimental conditions. However, the PMAPS predicted attributions to prejudiced behavior and this effect was stronger in the ambiguous harm condition than in the no harm condition (no other differences were significant). These findings provide only partial support for our hypotheses. Study 2. Consistent with our hypothesis that higher levels of the PMAPS would be associated with higher levels of attributions to prejudice and a greater likelihood of making spontaneous attributions to prejudice, the PMAPS predicted spontaneous attributions to prejudice and levels of attributions to a prejudiced actor and to prejudiced behavior. Only partial support was found for our hypothesis that the PMAPS would be a stronger predictor when information about an actor’s intent is absent. The PMAPS did not predict attributions to prejudice in the clear intent condition and did predict attributions to prejudice in the no intent and ambiguous intent conditions. However, the interactions testing the different effects of the PMAPS between conditions did not reach conventional levels of significance. Participants completed all materials online. Participants first completed the PMAPS in an ostensibly unrelated study several weeks prior to participating in the main study. After providing demographic information, participants viewed the above image and read a base vignette (see right) that was completed with one of three randomly assigned story endings. In Study 1, we manipulated information about the level of harm done to the target and in Study 2, we manipulated information about the intent of the actor. Participants were next prompted to write down the reason why they thought that the landlord did not rent the apartment out to the student. These responses were coded by two judges for the presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of attributions to prejudice (Study 1 kappa = .93; Study 2 kappa = .88) Participants also responded to several items measuring their attributions to a prejudiced actor (4 items; Study 1: a = .91; Study 2: a = .91; e.g., Mike is prejudiced toward Blacks) and to prejudiced behavior (4 items; Study 1: a = .92; Study 2: a = .91; e.g., Mike's behavior was racist). Responses were measured on a 1 to 9 scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree) and averaged together to create composite scores for attributions to a prejudiced actor and to prejudiced behavior. CONCLUSIONS The current studies provide evidence to support our hypothesis that individuals’ beliefs and expectations about the prevalence of racial prejudice, trivialization of targets’ concerns, vigilance in spotting prejudice, and efficacy in recognizing prejudice combine to predict attributions to prejudice. Only partial support was found for our hypothesis that top-down processes related to these beliefs are stronger when bottom-up processes may be limited by a lack of information about harm and intent. The no intent condition in Study 2 is interesting because it shows that information supporting alternative attributions to non-prejudiced causes may not be given equal consideration by individuals who differ in their levels of PMAPS, suggesting that individuals may differ in their criteria for making attributions to prejudice. Understanding how individuals differ in terms of their criteria for making attributions to prejudice will contribute to developing theories and models about the psychological processes involved. Given that prejudice emerges often under the cover of ambiguity, understanding the processes that underlie perceptions of prejudice is essential in understanding contemporary intergroup relations. Note. Coefficients are unstandardized regression weights; coefficients that do not share a common superscript are significantly different at p < .05; Lower CI and Upper CI are the lower and upper limits respectively of a 95% confidence interval for the effect. These data are under review. Please address correspondence to: Stuart S. Miller, Kansas State University, Department of Psychological Sciences, 468 Bluemont Hall, Manhattan, KS, 66506-5302; Email: ssmiller@ksu.edu.