Ryle’s philosophical behaviourism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk © Michael Lacewing

Philosophical behaviourism A family of theories that claim that we can analyse mental concepts in terms of concepts that relate to the body, and in particular, the concept of ‘behaviour’ Focus not on metaphysics – what exists – but on language – mental concepts Before we do metaphysics of mind, we need conceptual analysis © Michael Lacewing

Methodological behaviourism A theory about how a scientific psychology works (Watson, Skinner) To be properly scientific, psychology must deal with what can be observed, not what cannot Therefore, psychology should aim only at the explanation and prediction of behaviour without appealing to ‘inner’ mental states A claim about science and about how we know about mental states © Michael Lacewing

Philosophical behaviourism What we are talking about when we are talking about the mind and mental states is behaviour Our psychological terms are about what people do, and how they react ‘The mind’ is not a thing Different kinds of philosophical behaviourism Hempel: ‘logical’, ‘analytical’, ‘hard’ behaviourism But sometimes ‘logical’ = ‘philosophical’! Ryle: ‘soft’ behaviourism © Michael Lacewing

Dualism’s ‘category mistake’ Ryle understands substance dualism (‘the official doctrine’) as claiming: the mind can exist without the body – they are two different substances; there are mental and physical properties, but while the body is in space and is subject to mechanical (physical) laws, the mind isn’t ‘The dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’ © Michael Lacewing

Dualism’s ‘category mistake’ Category mistake: To treat a concept as belonging to a different logical category from the one it actually belongs to E.g. Oxford University; team spirit The mind is not another ‘thing’ It is not a distinct, complex, organised unit, subject to distinct relations of cause and effect (to lose your mind and lose your keys is not to lose two things!) Mental concepts (of ‘states’ and ‘processes’) do not operate like physical concepts The ‘para-mechanical hypothesis’: since physical processes can be explained in mechanical terms, mental concepts must refer to non-spatial, non-mechanical processes This is a category mistake © Michael Lacewing

Dispositions Simplest form: to be in mental state x is to behave in way y E.g. To be in pain is to exhibit pain-behaviour Objection: suppressed pain (pain without pain behaviour) Many mental states, e.g. knowing French, are dispositions, not occurrences So (many) mental states are dispositions of a person to behave in certain ways (in certain circumstances) To be in pain is to be disposed to cry out, nurse the injured part of the body … © Michael Lacewing

Dispositions We often speak of mental states expressed in action Knowing how to play chess; reading thoughtfully Cp. skills: not a single action, but not something invisible or non-spatial – a disposition Disposition: How something will or is likely to behave under certain circumstances E.g. solubility, being hard ‘If…then…’ Mental concepts, e.g. being proud, pick out a set of dispositions that are ‘indefinitely heterogenous’ © Michael Lacewing

Not categorical, not reducible Whether someone has a particular disposition is a matter of whether certain statements about what they could or would do are true or not Many of these circumstances may never arise Psychological statements don’t describe categorical – actual, concrete, particular – states of some mental substance Statements involving mental concepts can’t be translated or reduced to a set of hypothetical statements about behaviour Mental concepts can analysed in these terms, but never completely replaced – the account in terms of what a person would in circumstances x, y, z can’t be completed © Michael Lacewing

Thinking How can an ‘internal process’ like thinking be a disposition to behaviour? Note that there isn’t one kind of thinking We do many things thoughtfully – this isn’t a matter of a second independent mental processes accompanying the behaviour, but a matter of how the behaviour is done Reply: thinking to oneself is internalised speaking Speaking is behaviour, and thinking is acquired later The silence is inessential to the nature of thinking – you can think out loud or with pen and paper © Michael Lacewing

Thinking Thinking isn’t just a disposition, but also an occurrence Cp. ‘it is dissolving’ It is still the basis for attributing dispositions Paying attention – you are ready to report on what you are doing if asked © Michael Lacewing

Physicalism and the category mistake We can extend Ryle’s criticism of substance dualism to later physicalist theories Identity theory and eliminative materialism understand mental properties and physical properties in the same way Identity: they are physical properties Eliminativism: they are part of a (faulty) empirical, causal account of human behaviour This metaphysical approach to philosophy of mind commits the same category mistake as dualism © Michael Lacewing

Physicalism and the category mistake Nevertheless, philosophical behaviourism is a materialist theory We can’t talk about mental substances and properties as things that ‘exist’ Questions about what exists are questions about physical substance and properties Mental states are analyzed in terms of behaviour, which depends upon physical properties (just as dispositions in general depend upon categorical facts) © Michael Lacewing