Regina Birner and Philip Osano Community conservancies and payments for wildlife conservation (PWC) as a coping strategy under different conservancy institutional arrangements Regina Birner and Philip Osano Enabling Livestock Based Economies in Kenya to Adapt to Climate Change: A Review of PES from Wildlife Tourism as a Climate Change Adaptation Option, ILRI, Nairobi, 15 February 2012

Presentation Outline Climate Change and Conservancies Criteria for case studies Institutional Arrangements Climate Change Adaptation: Pastoral Coping and Management Strategies Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs Concluding Reflections

Temperature Change (1970-2025) Climate Change and Conservancies

Precipitation change (1970-2025) Climate Change and Conservancies

Criteria for case studies Kitengela (WLP) Mara (OOC and Naboisho) Ol Kiramatian Group Ranch Land Tenure Private Communal Payment arrangements Public funding Market funding (private investors) Market funding Environmental conditions Governance Intermediary: NGO (The Wildlife Foundation) Intermediaries (OOC): Private company (Ol Purkel Ltd) and Land Committee Group Ranch Committee Landuse regulations Restrictions on sale, subdivision, fencing Restriction on settlements, grazing Land zonation (irrigated crops, wildlife and grazing) Criteria for case studies

2. Criteria for case studies Olare Orok & Naboisho Ol Kiramatian Kitengela

Introduction Payment for Environmental Services (PES) Paying farmers or livestock for services such as conserving biological diversity or reducing soil erosion Increasingly important strategy to reach environmental and development goals Market-based instrument that offers “win-win” solutions Challenges of PES schemes Transaction costs involved in reaching large number of smallholder farmers or livestock keepers Need for smallholders to organize Collective action problems and “elite capture” Bargaining power of smallholders Organization (collective bargaining) What is a “fair price” for environmental services? 3. Institutional arrangements

Research Tool: “Net-Map” (Influence-Network-Mapping) Participatory mapping method Invented by E. Schiffer, further developed by IFPRI Governance Team Goal is to visualize Actors Relations / networks between actors Influence of different actors on specified outcomes – power relations between actors Governance challenges Qualitative and quantitative analyses possible Social network analysis Tool can also be used to facilitate participatory processes

Using Net-Map in different contexts http://netmap.ifpriblog.org/

Step 1: Identifying actors and their linkages Actors, as identified by respondents, are marked with “sticky” notes on a large sheet of paper Linkages are drawn on the paper Types of linkages Membership Contracts Licenses Flow of funds

Step 2: Identifying the influence level of different actors Checkers‘ game pieces are used to visualize influence level of actors (three-dimensional map) Influence perceived by respondent Influence on specified outcome: Well-managed conservances that meet both environmental andcommunity goals

Step 3: Using the map to discuss governance issues What is the source of influence of different actors? How can disadvantaged actors be empowered? What governance challenges, such as elite capture and leakages may occur? How can they be addressed?

Funds Contracts Licenses Insurance companies Tourists Funds Contracts Licenses Membership Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Tour operators (5) NEMA Naibosho Tourism Partners Company Other offices issuing licenses (~10) Base Camp Foundation Local administration incl. police Narok County Council Manco Naboisho Conservation Ltd. Seyia Ltd. Maasai Mara Reservie Donors Auditor Naboisho Landholding Company Private banks Kenya Wildlife Service Enkutotos (customary) Executive Board (5) Community projects Board of members (23) Project benefits Fines Lands Office Land owners (518) Outside Landowners

Insurance companies Tourists Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife “Balance of power” Tour operators (5) NEMA 4 Naibosho Tourism Partners Company 4 Other offices issuing licenses (~10) Base Camp Foundation Local administration incl. police 6 Narok County Council Manco Naibosho Conservation Ltd. Seyia Ltd. Maasai Mara Reservie 2 1 Donors Auditor Naibosho Landholding Company Private banks Kenya Wildlife Service Enkutotos (customary) Executive Board (5) Community projects 5 Board of members (23) x Perceived influence on outcome (Scale 0-6) Lands Office Land owners (518) Outside Landowners

Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Northern Rangelands Trust Insurance companies Tourists Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Northern Rangelands Trust Tour operators (5) NEMA Tusk Trust Other offices issuing licenses (~10) Narok County Council Orpunkel Ltd. (5 directors) O.C.C. Trust Donors Board of Trustees Maasai Mara Reservie Kenya Wildlife Service Private banks Guiding School Motorogi Conservancy Ltd. O.C.C. Ltd. Research Community projects Motorogi land owners (119) O.C.C. Land owners (157) Lands Office Outside Landowners

6 4 6 2 1 Perceived influence on outcome (Scale 0-6) x Insurance companies Tourists Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Northern Rangelands Trust Tour operators (5) 2 NEMA Other offices issuing licenses (~10) Tusk Trust 6 1 4 Narok County Council Orpunkel Ltd. (5 directors) O.C.C. Trust Donors Board of Trustees Maasai Mara Reservie Kenya Wildlife Service Private banks 6 Guiding School Motorogi Conservancy Ltd. O.C.C. Ltd. Research Community projects x Perceived influence on outcome (Scale 0-6) Motorogi land owners (119) O.C.C. Land owners (157) Lands Office Outside Landowners

Why is a “balance of power” possible? ... in spite of unequal basic conditions of tourism operators and pastoralists In terms of capital, formal education, etc. Secure land rights of the pastoralists They are the formal owners of the land. Tourism operations not possible without their consent Collective bargaining Organization of the land owners in a landholding company Makes it possible for them to speak with one voice (in spite of considerable heterogeneity) In case of Naibosho: Joint company by land owners and tourism operators Outsourcing of management tasks to private operator (who is in charge of “unpopular measures”, e.g., demanding fines)

Questions for discussion How important is the role of private foundations / indvidiuals to make these arrangements work? How sustainable are the arrangements in the absence of committed indvidiuals? How dependent is the system on funds from donations vis-a-vis the income generated from tourism? What is the relation between profits and donations? What share do the land owners get? What share do the community members without land in the community conservancy get? How is the risk distributed – ultimately? Is there a need to improve transparency?

Questions for discussion Is the institutional design too complex? What are the transaction costs involved? Is there a trade-off between complexity and balance of power? Are there gains from moving to larger units? For examples, having one Trust Fund for an entire region? Does the state play an adequate facilitating role? Analysis suggests that role of the state is mainly regulatory – issuing licenses. Could the licenses system be streamlined (one-stop-shop)? Will the government start to tax the new income streams generated? (e.g., payments to farmers)? What is the danger of “state capture”?

Questions for discussion Are there missing links? Is there a need to have strongter links with the management of the Maasai Mara Reserve? Should community conservancies play a role in addressing the management challenges of the Reserve? How strong are the links to the institutions providing support services to livestock keepers (e.g., veterinary services, livestock extension services?) What is the role of customary authorities? What role can they play in addressing current and future challenges, e.g., of organizing inclusive collective action?

Questions for discussion How inclusive are the institutional arrangements? Strong voice for land owners, but low share of female land owners (approx. 5 %). Idea to make both spouses members of the respective institutions? Question of how funds are distributed within the households, if women lose income, say from milk. How about non-land owners? They benefit from community projects. But how strong is their voice in the selection and management of the projects Idea to have them represented in the Trust Funds? To what extent are the community projects in any case tasks that the government needs to support? (e.g., schools, drinking water).

Key features of the institutional design How do the institutional arrangements influence opportunities to use PES for climate adaptation? Key features of the institutional design Livestock owners have individual property rights to plots of land. Community conservancies are the outcome of voluntary collective bargaining. Key question: How does climate change affect ...the economic opportunities of pastoralists and tourism operators (in absolute terms, and relative to each other)? ... the bargaining power of the parties concerned? What role do other factors play (such as globally increasing land values)? Does climate change affect the parties differently? Might create incentives to withdraw if alternative uses of land become more profitable under climate change

Strategies to make PES in conservancies “climate-smart” Including adaptation to climate change in community projects (Task of the Trust Funds) Would require stronger link to agricultural/livestock research and extension (current focus is on social projects). Some examples, however, already exist: Fodder bank Explore the possibilities to raise additional funds from climate mitigation financing opportunities. Adjusting income streams to buffer variation in other income sources Should this be left to the land owners - using the existing banking and insurance system? Should it be part of the contracts – considering that the tourism operators already have access to the banking and insurance system?

Climate Change Adaptation 1) Mobility (negotiations) 2) Species composition 3) Stocking levels 4) Livestock market participation 5) Breeding/feeding Herd related 6) Investments in water infrastructure 7) Social networks 8) Insurance 9) Buying/selling/leasing land 10) Diversification Salaries Remittances PES Crops 11) Savings and other assets Human capital Collateral for loans Political capital 13) Exiting pastoralism 4. Coping and risk management strategy

5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs Social Cultural heritage social cohesion and conflicts Empowerment Community projects Gender Inter-generational Income Amount Stability Security Predictability Distribution Access to financial institutions Market creation/access Land management Land sales Restrictions Grazing Settlements Firewood collection Water Fencing Crops Mining Access Burning 5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs Ecosystem Services Wildlife Tourism Biomass supply Carbon storage

Synergy: Fencing and mobility 5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs

Synergy: storage and market creation 5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs

Trade-off: cropping and diversification 5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs http://www.pbase.com/image/41391886

6. Concluding reflections Public (State) Private (Market) Civic (civil society) Types of institutions Government agencies (local, national and global levels) Service organisations Private business Membership organisations Co-operatives NGO’s PES “Users” /Buyers The Global Environmental Facility/World Bank Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) The Nature Conservancy (TNC) Public PES Intermediary The Wildlife Foundation (TWF) Civil society 6. Concluding reflections Households (participants, non-participants and ex-participants) Individual land owners